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UKRAINE'S EUROPEAN CHOICE: GEOPOLITICAL COST OF THE ISSUE

Abstract

The paper studies several aspects of the "price of the issue" concerning the association with the EU for Ukraine and the Ukrainians. It shows the place of Ukraine in the geopolitical concepts of Russia, Poland, EU countries and the USA. The article claims that the issue of Ukraine's European integration is of geopolitical nature and is solved not by the government of Ukraine but by the countries, which are the subjects of European geopolitics. It analyzes the reasons that do not allow Ukraine to act as an active subject of geopolitics.

Keywords: external political scenario, geopolitical concepts, European integration, European geopolitics.

At the end of 2013 political events brought Ukraine to the fore in the news programs of the leading global mass media, agitated the world community. These events made philosophers, political scientists, sociologists and other specialists in social relations revisit their conceptions of the post-Soviet space, especially those territories, which border on the EU in the context of geopolitics. Errors of judgement of the world community in understanding Russia's geopolitical ambitions have come into view, the need to reconsider the basic principles of the European security has become obvious.

Before the Vilnius summit everybody understood that it was not only the issue of Ukraine's association with the EU that was being solved in the form of a bilateral agreement. The signing of the association agreement will dramatically change the geopolitical configuration of Europe with all the consequences including economic, political and humanitarian aspects. President of Ukraine V. Yanukovych's refusal "to pay too high a price for European integration" resulted in large-scale protests.

Analytical structures in Ukraine and abroad were not ready to foresee such a massive surge of the civil activity of the population that had gone through the painful process of experiencing the consequences of the 2004 "Orange revolution" and seemed to have lost faith in any forms of protest against the authorities. However, Ukrainian citizens went to the streets to make their intention to get integrated into the European Union known – without political slogans. They had organized themselves through social networks. During the first two weeks of protest they clearly emphasized their distancing from any political forces. For the first time civil society clearly demonstrated its existence in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian public could not understand why the government of V. Yanukovych that had declared its intention to reach the association agreement with the European Union and that had done a fair amount of work in this direction had quickly and radically changed its external policy priorities without any visible reasons stating that "it is making a pause" due to economic reasons the main of which was aired as a threat of breaking economic ties with Russia. It should be pointed out that the Ukrainian political leadership headed by President V. Yanukovych was hardly known for adherence to political principles. For instance, they changed their decision regarding the status of the Russian language seven times while the decision about the North Atlantic Alliance was changed two times.

This article analyses several aspects of the "price of the question" about the association with the EU for Ukraine and Ukrainians in the context of geopolitics. The complexity of the current analysis is not due to the fact that the confrontation of people and the authorities that started before the Vilnius Summit is not yet over and when this paper is being written Maidan in Kyiv continues a timeless protest action gathering hundreds of thousands of people every weekend. It is not due to the fact that political rhetorics is likely to manipulate phenomena of different size and quality mixing them into mixed conglomerates of momentary declarations; their untangling seems to be a senseless and ungrateful activity. The problem is that the events in Ukraine have uncovered the depths of "the history of the Ukrainian question": since Bohdan Khmelnytsky's times it has always been seen as the conflict of Russia's imperial ambitions and the Ukrainians' aspiration to sovereignty.

Paradoxically, after playing a key role in the disintegration of the USSR and the CIS Ukraine that acquired independence, found itself forced to coexist with a new state, the Russian Federation being built on radically different principles than the Russian Empire but was trying to usurp the traditional expansion mission. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union Z. Brzezinski wrote, "The loss of Ukraine caused Russia's greatest worry. The appearance of an independent Ukrainian state on the map made all the Russians not only revise their political and ethnic identity but also put a major geopolitical barrier on the way of the Russian state[1].

However, before the Vilnius Summit the destiny of Ukraine was again decided not in Kyiv, not in Vilnius, not in Brussels or Washington but as usual in Moscow. And it was decided in favor of the Russian Federation.

That is why V. Putin was calm keeping watch over the Maidan. However, the Ukrainians able to withstand the assaults of armored vehicles, water-jet cannons, stun grenades, and snipers' bullets gained the Maidan a victory.

While the inert institutions of the EU kept calculating how to lose nothing due to (far-away-to-happen) accession of Ukraine to the EU, the Russian president, having understood that Ukraine was about to leave his sphere of influence, did not think twice to lose the image of a civilized politician, to violate international treaties, to undermine the very concept of the global security established after the Cold War to annihilate the Ukrainians' "European ambitions".

The following events were so fast-paced that the world would take a lot of time to understand them. The Ukrainians sealed their European choice with tragic deaths of over 100 persons as a result of armed clashes between the citizens, on the one hand, and the militia and internal-security troops, on the other hand. Those people were named the "Heavenly Sotnia" following the famous Cossack traditions. They were mourned for in all the Ukrainian regions. However, not everybody wished to declare them heroes.

President V. Yanukovych fled from the country upon signing the agreement with the opposition brokered by the foreign ministers of Poland and France in the presence of a Russian observer. The power in Kyiv shifted to the only legitimate body - the Supreme Rada. The presidential Party of the Regions lost the majority, and a new coalition was formed in the Rada. including three opposition parties and non-partisan deputies. The new government was established following the quota principle, however, the majority are represented by Y. Tymoshenko's party Batkivshchyna. Their leader was freed from prison with dozens of victims of political persecution of the toppled authorities. V. Klychko's Udar party rejected ministerial positions. An early presidential election was appointed for 25 May in Ukraine.

A shock wave sweeping away the followers of the ex-president, who, from Rostov-on-Don, called on the Russian President V. Putin to bring troops in Ukraine and recover his power, covered the whole country. V. Yanukovych's palace residence, ex-Prosecutor General V. Pshonka's estate and estates of some other top officials were opened to everybody, and the public were stunned to understand the degree of corruption of the toppled clan.

It seemed that the Ukrainians astonished themselves and the whole world once again. Europe could see that next to it, in a non-democratic Ukraine, one could find people who were ready to die and who died for the European values... It seemed that the "dignity revolution" was over, it was time to let people go from the Maidan, to carry out political purging, to restore the paralysed economy, and create a new democratic society dreaming to become part of Europe...

However, it turned out that V. Putin had an absolutely different geopolitical scenario for Ukraine. It was not a revelation for the experts but neither the Western analysts nor the Ukrainian citizens could (and wished to) believe the possibility of realization of such a scenario. Still, they had to believe it.

What did Ukraine have to pay for its geopolitical choice because of Russia? Having sensed the weakness of the central Ukrainian authorities, V. Putin "realized the dream of

the Russian-speaking people of the Crimea" – using the referendum farce (96.77 % for) facing the barrels of the Russian guns the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea was annexed to Russia. And Europe permitted him to do it.

Once the founder of Ukrainian integral nationalism D. Dontsov wrote "Every weakening of Europe – be it the decline of Poland, the weakening of Turkey or Sweden – fatally affected Ukraine. Ukraine under the tutelage of Russia means Suvorov in Warsaw, Don Cossacks on the Square de Bastille in Paris, it is Brusilov in the Carpathian Mountains, and it is Budyonny at the border of Romania"[2].

The prophesy of the "Banderovites' ideologue" came true with terrible precision. The Cuban Cossacks appeared in the streets of the Crimean cities and towns. The unidentified military with the newest Russian weaponry suddenly showed up at the Supreme Council of the Crimea, blocked the Ukrainian military units, blocked the passage to the Crimean peninsula from the continental Ukraine. The puppet "prime minister" S. Aksyonov, the person nicknamed Goblin in the business circles close to the mafia, became head of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

The people were suggested deciding on their citizenship within a month. The ethnic Russians (who composed 58.3 % of the Crimean population according to the data of the First All-Ukrainian Census of 2001) weeped for joy. The Crimean Tatars (12.0 % of the population) began preparations for a new deportation in fear. 24.3 % of the Ukrainian population of the Crimea, just like the armed forces of the Ukraine blocked at their stations became hostages of the Russian geopolitical game.

After what has happened many people ask the question of the reasons for not being ready for such "pirouettes" of the Russian foreign policy while V. Putin has demonstrated his ability to manipulate the East and the West on numerous occasions. It is enough to recollect the history of the country's attempt to enter the NATO. The political platform to move Ukraine closer to the NATO was created back in 2002. The security agreement was signed in 1995 while "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine" was signed in 1997. The Ukrainian government actively worked in this direction in 2002-2003 when a new strategy of relations with the alliance was adopted. The final goal was for Ukraine to enter the NATO. But this did not happen. First of all, joining the NATO was perceived not as a means of the democratic development of the state but an instrument of receiving economic preferences from Russia that actively hindered closer relations between Ukraine and the alliance using all means available from the soft power arsenal. In spite of the pro-Western orientation of V. Yushchenko's government moving towards the NATO was actually stopped during his administration. Two specific circumstances completely killed this opportunity, namely, the victorious participation of Russia in the war against Georgia in 2008 and the signing by V. Yanukovych of the Kharkiv agreements with Russia that extended the presence of the Russian Black sea fleet in Sebastopol for another 25 years. This made the expansion of the NATO on the post-Soviet territory practically impossible. The external political scenario of "sitting on two chairs", the attempts of trading with Russia using the manipulation of the "European vector" gained solid ground in the

relations of Ukraine with neighboring countries. However, it turned out that it existed so long as the Russian leadership let it be.

One should examine the economic hindrances in Ukraine's way to the European integration. The question was formulated in the following manner: as a result of signing the agreement the EU receives 46 million consumers of its goods while Ukrainians get a customs border for its export to Russia that is equal to economic suicide. The scale of economic ties between Ukraine and Russia determines the country's economy to a significant degree. However, the problem of reaching real economic sovereignty does not seem irresolvable. The modern history of post-Soviet countries knows of a successful example of re-orientation of no less long-term and large-scale ties with "the older brother", which were successfully diversified by Georgia in the past ten years thanks to, first of all, the political will of the country's former leadership. Of course, it would be incorrect to compare the economic and resource potential of Georgia and Ukraine. Moldova has the same positive experience. However, being the Russian puppet, V. Yanukovych always made it clear that without V. Putin's stamp no agreements with the EU could be signed.

The problem is that in reality the Ukrainian ruling elite has never been interested in the reform of economy that is based on the European model and that presupposes the overcoming of total corruption, innovative development and unpopular social measures. Ukraine's economic policy has never supported its sovereignty in the 20 years of independence. The USSR's heritage was not used to develop the nation but became the basis for creating oligarchic groups in the state of permanent redrawing maps of spheres of influence and property redistribution.

In the realities of March 2014 V. Putin did not provide Ukraine with a different choice, except swift and tough conducting of the reforms postponed for decades. This process would be accompanied by a threat of the country's break by the secessionists financed by Russia in the south and east and prospects of the "continental Ukraine" being invaded by the Russian troops. The European Union offers the government of Ukraine financial aid, IMF loans, and opportunities of modernizing economy that (upon the political will of the authorities and the investment of considerable material resources) could allow to fundamentally solve the country's economic problems in a mid- and long-term perspective. Besides, the new government has no other variants to stabilize the ruined economy.

We cannot but agree with the statement of the well-known American social and political journal *Foreign Policy* claiming, "that Ukrainians do their best to get to Europe to avoid the Belarusian scenario that frightens them out of their wits"[3]. Failures of Putin's plans of the Ukrainian-events evolution can be explained by differences in mentalities of the Russians and Ukrainians pointed at by the second President of Ukraine L. Kuchma who wrote a book with a symbolic title "Ukraine is not Russia"[4]… There are even fewer reasons to believe that Ukraine is another Belarus.

Ukrainians keep surprising experts with the unexpectedness of their protest moods. People did not protest against the decline in the standards of living, corruption, selective justice, lack of control over power structures and other phenomena of the Ukrainian real-

ity of the past few years. Instead they went to the streets to protect "their European choice" that in the conditions of modern Ukraine offers rather vague and remote perspectives that will be reached through the "tightening of belts". Mass media more and more often voice the opinion that the geopolitical choice of Ukraine is the choice of the partner "who can see and formulate the perspective" of resolving all the above problems..

At the same time, it was dangerous to expect that Russia's actions were not the result of a fine political calculation supported by dozens of years of hidden intervention in the internal affairs of the sovereign Ukraine.

A majority of patriotic analysts have believed for the recent ten years that in spite of the notorious "geopolitical split" that divides the political and cultural moods of Ukrainians down the Dnieper into "pro-Western" and "pro-Russian", wich meaning is being played up by external political forces, when it deals with the territorial integrity of the country, Ukraine's population is really united by the factor roughly defined as "mentality" that analysts find hard to identify. It is similar to what theoreticians of Ukrainianism like to call "svidomist'".

The persons forming the state's humanitarian policy honestly believed that the number of "svidomy"* Ukrainians grows from year to year, especially among the youth. On the one hand, it was believed that they understand that in geopolitics there is no such notion as "friendship of peoples", they do not experience nostalgia for the Soviet Union as a superpower as they never were its citizens and, unfortunately, have been hardly introduced to great Russian culture. On the other hand, the majority of them have been abroad, they communicate with the whole world without any "barriers" and as the Western lifestyle is not a "forbidden fruit" for them they do not feel any piety towards "the values of the Euroatlantic civilization" seeing not only their positive but also negative sides. It is exactly these people who went to Maidan in Kyiv; today they are the ones who unite into non-governmental organizations that are independent from political parties. This creative youth turned Euromaidan not only into a "territory of freedom" but also into a unique art object.

A powerful civil movement in Ukraine began to form in November 2013. Probably it was the first movement in the Ukrainian history that did not divide into the "East" and the "West" but united people with specific ideas about human rights, personal freedoms, forms and functions of power, types of its interaction with people that, in essence, have a universal character. In order to mobilize they needed their own brains and the Internet. Unfortunately, the state power hit these people on the head with truncheons and tried to control their means of communication, thus only encouraging social mobilization of the ever growing number of Ukrainian citizens. There exists a hope that it is exactly this movement that will decide the destiny of power in Ukraine at the presidential election in 2014.

The same analysts underestimated the Russian presence in Ukraine's ideological field. As soon as the civil society being born in the depths of the sold-out and corrupt country made a claim about itself, Russia's "agents of influence" showed up, it turned out that they occupied the key positions in the Ukrainian establishment. The results of their

* nationally conscious – translator.

pro-Russian actions have just become obvious to the Ukrainians now - destruction of the law-enforcement agencies and the army, complete domination of the Russian propaganda-and-information machine in the south east of the country and in the Crimea. The Ukrainians found out in terror that the key positions in the security service and the Joint Staff had been occupied by the Russian (!) citizens in the recent years. The annexation of the Crimea has confirmed the theses aired by the former President of Georgia M. Saakashvili in his speech in the Maidan in Kyiv on December 7, 2013 and in numerous interviews. He stressed, "What happens in Ukraine today is the raider seizure by the Putin's Russia of a sovereign state in the center of Europe. We do not interfere into the internal affairs of Ukraine but everybody understands that Ukraine has no other way but to go to Europe for it is a choice of principles and values, in his address in Kyiv on December 7, 2013[5].

The former Georgian President believes that in order for Russia's neighbors to normalize relations with Russia it should stop being an empire. In this context the process of Ukraine's European integration will take not months but years and decades until Russia stops being an empire… Today the Ukrainians understand more and more that they will be able to return the Crimean territories only then. Analyzing the external policy of Russia towards the neighboring countries M. Saakashvili had reasons to claim that "Today Russia has no borders, it has only outskirts"[6], and, consequently, the sovereignty of all the former Soviet Union republics is seen by it as a historical casus that requires immediate correction. In relation to the Ukrainian Crimean autonomy the words by M. Saakashvili have come true. The world community has shrugged its shoulders: who would have courage to counteract the owner of the largest nuclear-weapons arsenal on the globe.

If we analyze who and which of politicians and governments really, not declaratively, support Ukraine's European integration we can see that they were the countries of Eastern European Borderland that are directly interested in it. They include countries from Lithuania and Poland to Moldova whose former Prime-Minister Filat together with Saakashvili made a speech on Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kyiv together with a delegation of the European People's Party. Their leaders better than others understand the complexity and ambiguity of the situation of the Ukrainian authorities and the Ukrainian people.

Poland is traditionally considered to be the "lobbyist" of the interests of Ukraine in the European Union. In the context of Poland's geopolitics and its national security Ukraine had always been of primary importance for its ideologists J. Pilsudski, W. Bonczkowski, J. Giedroyc, Y. Mieroszewski, V. Meibaum, and E. Nezbrzycki. Pilsudski formulated the idea of the anti-Russian union of Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Finland and Poland from the Baltic to the Black sea. His doctrine of Intermarium embodied the idea of Polish Prometheusianism, the goal of which was to bring "the torch of freedom" to the peoples of Eastern Europe oppressed by Russia. The geopolitical doctrine of Giedroyc and Mieroszewski reflected the intention to create a buffer zone between Russia and Europe. The doctrine implied the creation of Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine that would be independent from Moscow and ideologically anti-Russian.

The pro-Russian geopolitician V. Gulevich writes that "the shifting of the civilizational "front line" from the Polish territory to the territory of Ukraine saves Poland the necessity to be a permanent arena of collision between the two worlds because the main collisions will take place directly on Ukrainian lands. Poland will stay in the rear of this struggle"[7].

Z. Brzezinski repeatedly wrote of the fact that the sovereignty of Ukraine significantly weakens the security system of the Eurasian continent the way Russia wants to see it. Evaluating the very fact of the acquisition of independence by Ukraine as the third most important historical event in the 20th century after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire and the division of the world after the Second World War into opposing systems he also assigns Ukraine the role of "the buffer zone" that could help to "transform" Russia. Z. Brzezinski believes that the role and place of Ukraine in the process of European integration can be considered from the position of inheriting (imitation) and re-orientation[8]. In his speech during hearings about the political situation in Ukraine and its consequences in the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 1, 2014 Z. Brzezinski emphasized, "The support of Ukraine is not a war against Russia but help that will make it a normal post-imperial country. The Eurasian project will not solve the problems of Russia… If Ukraine is defeated, Russia will become an empire after all"[9].

The hopes of Euro-Atlantic geopoliticians (Brzezinski, Kissinger) of the possibility to transform the geopolitical priorities of Russia with the use of Ukraine as a vivid example of the implementation of the democratic Euro-Atlantic model of society seem utopian upon the actions of the Russian Federation concerning Ukraine. The verdict of the Russian geopolitics is clear "the independent existence of Ukraine (especially within current borders) can have sense only as a "cordon sanitaire" as the geopolitically opposing elements will not allow the country to join either the Eastern or the Western block, either Russia-Eurasia or Central Europe completely. All of this dooms Ukraine to the existence of a puppet and the geopolitical service of a thalassocratic strategy in Europe"[10].

Lithuania and other Baltic states support Poland's intention to move the EU borders away from its territory. After joining the EU the Baltic states and Poland can remember their experience of being "under the imperial heel" as the unpleasant past which, as it has turned out, is likely to repeat itself, but for the countries of the post-Soviet space that go along the fairway of Russia's "integration projects" to express their support of the European choice of Ukraine automatically means to arouse Moscow's dissatisfaction that will lead to feasible and tangible economic consequences. That is why only Georgia and Moldova striving for European integration actively express their solidarity with the Ukrainians. Armenia preferred to use external political loyalty to Russia's geopolitical interests to obtain a suitable price for Russian energy sources. Upon the Crimea's annexation by Russian, Kazakhstan acknowledged the aggressor's actions to be correct.

For Russia the European integration of its closest neighbors is a direct threat. I shall quote the book "Osnovy geopolitiki" ("Basics of geopolitics") (2000) of the philosopher, geopolitician, publicist and leader of the "Eurasia" movement A. Dugin that is presented as "an indispensable reference guide for those who make decisions in the most impor-

tant spheres of Russian political life"[11], "The sovereignty of Ukraine represents such a negative phenomenon for Russian geopolitics that in general can easily provoke an armed conflict. … Ukraine as an independent state with certain territorial ambitions presents a great threat. … This does not mean that the cultural, linguistic or economic autonomy of Ukraine should be limited and that it should become a pure administrative sector of the Russian centralized state (as, to a certain extent, was the state of affairs in the tsarist empire or in the USSR). But strategically Ukraine must be strictly the projection of Moscow in the south and in the west"[12].

In the course of geopolitics students of military academies of Russia are informed that "the fact of the existence of "sovereign Ukraine" is the declaration of a geopolitical war with Russia on the geopolitical level (this is not so much the concern of Ukraine but of Atlanticism and the Sea Power). The case in question is not that Ukraine herself chooses the role of an Atlantic "cordon sanitaire" (though in certain cases this cannot but be a conscious step) but rather that in reality the country begins to fulfill this role as Ukraine does not actively join the integration processes with Moscow or (at least) does not fall apart into separate geopolitical components"[13].

If Western geopoliticians saw Ukraine as the buffer between Russia and the EU, Russian geopoliticians considered two possible variants for the development of the events, 1) integration of Ukraine into CIS-2 (but of a smaller scale) or into the Customs Union, EP-1 or similar Russia-centered unions; 2) the division of the country into "several belts which correspond to the range of geopolitical, ethnic and cultural realities"[14]. The events of the recent months have demonstrated that the last geopolitical scenario keeps unfolding.

Even when the signing of the Vilnius documents seemed inevitable D. Efremenko, doctor of political sciences, head of the department of sociology and social psychology at the Institute of scientific information on social sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences thinking about noted with regard to the potential consequences of this step for Russia and Ukraine, "Beautiful words about "the irrevocability of the European choice" should be better left for the Ukrainian internal political use. In the long run we are talking about the scale of material, political, diplomatic, informational and other resources which Russia will be ready to use in order to influence the Ukrainian elites and public opinion"[15]. As we see, Russia was not going to let "Europe abduct Ukraine". It turned out to be ready to pay any price for breakup of Ukraine because it knew way too well that the price would be determined not by the American but by the European politicians mostly who had used the secret and open services of the Russian capital on numerous occasions in the recent decade... It is this what explains Europe's sluggishness and inefficiency of economic sanctions against the aggressor. The UN Security Council is unable to overcome Russia's veto. The NATO Secretary General, just like the UN Secretary General, speaks not as the head of the most powerful military alliance in the world but as a "bird of peace" having virtuous appeals in the arsenal only. Today only the lazy one does not make comparisons to Hitler's occupation of Sudetenland...

Z. Brzezinski clearly indicated the impossibility for Russia to lose Ukraine, "Ukraine, as a new and important space on the Eurasian chess field is a geopolitical axis and fulcrum because its very existence on the map as an independent state affects the status of Russia and its gradual change. Without Ukraine Russia is not longer a Eurasian power. And even though Russia can further strive to the status of an empire, without Ukraine Russia will be primarily an Asian empire (...) But if Russia manages to gain control of Ukraine with its 52-million population, considerable natural resources and access to the Black sea, Russia will automatically have means to become a powerful empire that covers both Europe and Asia"[16].

How does Ukraine see her place on the geopolitical map of Europe in this respect? It is difficult to answer this question. There are several reasons for this.

The first one is theoretical. It means that by and large there is no geopolitical doctrine of Ukraine as such. Since the moment of acquiring independence geopolitical steps of all governments were of exclusively tactical and not strategic character. Ukraine does not have her own geopolitical school. Russian geopoliticians repeatedly criticized the geopolitical theoretical schemes of Ukrainian nationalistically oriented public leaders (Y. Lipa, D. Dontsov, M. Kolodzinski, S. Rudnitski, et al.) calling them "intellectual plagiarism"[17]. The lack of a clearly articulated national idea shared by the majority of the population does not contribute to carrying out a successful geopolitics.

The second reason has to do with the realization of the geopolitical course of the country. The state's national strategy is not a declaration but a consistent instruction for carrying out the external policy. The success of external policy in a long-term perspective depends on the ability of politicians, who realize the national geopolitical strategy, opportunely and sequentially use the best methods of solving specific problems. Unfortunately, Ukrainian politicians do not demonstrate such abilities. As long as the ruling elite considers Ukraine to be, first of all, a business project patriotic rhetoric and geopolitical theories about the lack of alternatives to the sovereignty of the country will not become the area of practical realization. "Crisis management" and "manual control" are not allowed either in external politics or in economics. While balancing between the East and the West seems to the country's leadership almost the only possible strategic reference point "the unexpressed neutrality of Ukraine" does not seem to be the best external political decision.

The third reason is that Ukraine has never been the subject of geopolitics in the geopolitical strategies of the 20th century as the country did not really have the fundamental factors of state sovereignty. On numerous occasions the first President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk had been trying to bring to the current authorities the idea that the state should independently solve its problems and that the subjects of modern geopolitics do not care for the Ukrainian problems. In order to become a subject of regional geopolitics the Ukrainian government needs to obtain the recognition of Ukraine as a key factor of the Russian-European interaction and to show Moscow and Brussels the need to develop an inclusive approach to Kyiv. Considerable political efforts and material resources are needed in order to solve these problems. It is senseless to hope

that there are political forces in the world that will work for the strengthening of the geopolitical positions of Ukraine out of sheer kindness. The strategy of the "balance of interests" makes the geopolitical course of Ukraine dependent on the current state of affairs, and this proves the fact that Ukraine is only striving for the status of the subject of geopolitics but largely remains an object of games of external forces. So much so that, according to analysts' prognosis, in near future the leaders of the country will face a powerful internal and external pressure of powers that are interested in the rejection by Ukraine of a non-aligned status.

In the current situation of open confrontation with Russia there is no alternative to the geopolitical self-identification of Ukraine because only when Ukraine becomes a full-fledged member of international relations that is able to carry out her own geopolitical strategy will she will have a perspective as a sovereign state and not as a fragmented "grey zone" in the center of Europe.

Geopolitical perspectives of Ukraine's real joining the EU do not leave much room for optimism if Ukraine keeps giving its territories away to Russia. The road to Russia has happened for the Crimea and part of the population of the country's south east to be much easier both economically and psychologically as these countries are states with genetically similar political regimes. As far as the European Union is concerned, political institutions, norms and practices of Ukraine have developed in the directions contrary to the European values in the period of V. Yanukovych's staying in power. Even if Ukraine once again comes close to the moment when for the love of "a wonderful European future" specific actions are needed that will change the character and mechanisms of the functioning of the state power and social institutions towards openness, transparency and accountability to society there is no confidence that the current Ukrainian ruling elite (not deposed actually) will want and will be able to do it. To make accession to the EU a reality is an overarching goal for the new Ukrainian authorities. It is not clear now how it would look like and whether it would be able to "sew Ukraine back together" with a well-designed internal policy and to consolidate the society on the basis of the European values in the face of a direct threat on behalf of the "Big Brother".

In spite of the fact that the political part of the treaty of Ukraine's association with the EU has been signed, it is actually just a "declaration of intent".

The majority of serious Ukrainian political analysts seem to be quite pessimistic in relation to the issue of European integration. "Even if we had a perfect democratic profile and even if we had a Swiss formula per capita it would still not give Ukraine a chance to become a member of the EU." "This is a question of modern geopolitics and balance of relations between the EU and Russia, and the Customs Union. A similar situation is found in the sphere of security between the NATO and CSTO,"[18] says the former deputy head of the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine, former first deputy minister of foreign affairs A. Chaly.

Logically a question arises whether all the sacrifices and hopes of Ukrainians who literally for the third month have been living on the main square of their capital will turn out

to be in vain and will not bring Ukraine any closer to the community of free democratic peoples of Europe?

No expert or analyst can answer this question today. Only the Ukrainian people themselves, the only unpredictable element in all political calculations of external observes, can answer it. Maidan Nezalezhnosti showed that neither the authorities nor the opposition in Ukraine are worthy of their people who demonstrated to the whole world its vision of the place of the country on the geopolitical map of the world and readiness to sacrifices for it. However, the Ukrainian people has demonstrated that there is a new generation that does not have any problems with self-identification or the inferiority complex. Their leaders will assert new values in their country irrespective of where the politicians, who no longer represent the people after November 2013, try to bring the country. And even if the ideals of the Euromaidan will be discredited by the politicians once again, it will be only a temporary loss of a free European people who identifies itself with the community of free peoples. It will not tolerate the imperial dictate and will never accept the attempts of any external force to choose its destiny for it.

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Pavel Tereshkovich

SUBMISSION AND SELF-RELIANCE: SOCIAL ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY BELARUSIAN POLITICAL REGIME

Abstract

The article examines interplay of several features of social history which caused the rise of the contemporary Belarusian dictatorship. The severe form of serfdom which was quite close to slavery encompassed the majority of the Belarusian population in the 19th century and produced the behaviour patterns based on submission and self-reliance. Comparative economic backwardness in the first half of the 20th century and the Soviet collective-farm ("kolkhoz") system preserved those models until the 1960s. The rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of the 1960–1980s allowed them to move to urban areas populated almost totally by the former villagers. That environment provided perfect ground for the establishment of the authoritarian regime in the 1990s.

Keywords: Belarusian, comparative economic background, industrialization, authoritarian.

It is hard to overlook restoration of authoritarianism and totalitarianism on the territories of the former Soviet Union in the 2000s even by the unaided eye. However, Belarus occupies a special place against this background. The regime established in this country since 1994 is comparable in its controversy with the political systems of some Central Asian countries only. At the same time, the collective consciousness of the neighbouring countries' residents sympathises with it (including those countries which became the EU members in 2004), and the political elites of the post-Soviet area willingly use the know-how of the Belarusian authorities to suppress organised opposition, dissent, and ensure control over society. The "success" of the Belarusian authoritarianism is preconditioned not only by its ingenuity, significant social support (stable 30-40 %) but also by the

majority of the population yielding to it, to my mind. In other words, the regime is "successful" because it is not challenged by mass resistance. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that low resistibility of the Belarusian society to authoritarianism has historical preconditions and deep roots in the traditional patterns of social behaviour. These patterns are significantly different in the neighbouring countries.

In the region of Central Eastern Europe to which Belarus belongs, national movements were the first form of mass political mobilisation historically. The Belarusian national movement appeared later and had fewer achievements than those of other peoples. In its turn, the disadvantage was related to the features of ethno-social stratification and economic development of Belarus in the 19th – early 20th centuries, the period named "the peoples' century" in the European history.

I would like to begin with stratification. In the mid-19th century conventionally believed to be the starting point of modernisation, Belarus (what is meant here is the territory approximately corresponding to the current territory of the Republic of Belarus) could serve as a classical example of agro-literate society: up to 90 % of the population resided in the rural areas. The Belarusians making up to 75 % of all the population – 2.5 million persons – were villagers almost exclusively: maximum 120 thousands of those resided in towns and 60 thousand in boroughs. Up to 84 % of the Belarusians belonged to the Orthodox Christian denomination. The majority of town and borough dwellers (up to 60 % of the population) were Jews[1].

The economy was almost completely agrarian and was controlled by a limited group of landowners (0.3 % of the population). The majority of those were Roman Catholics (93 %), Polish-culture bearers and native Polish speakers who owned 77 % of the serfs and 94.7 % of the demesne[2]. Among the numerous gentry (szlachta) (up to 4.4 % of the population), there was a significant share of Orthodox Christians (e.g., in Pinsk county up to 87.5 %)[3]. However, the peasantry and the nobility were anyway divided by an almost insurmountable socio-psychological gap aggravated by denomination differences, language and cultural practices, centuries of mutual hatred, and this gap had its effects on almost anything, including anthroponomy.

The similar nature of social stratification was a typical phenomenon in numerous regions of Central Eastern Europe. The peculiarity of Belarus was the multitude of serfs. According to the statistics of the late 1850s, the peasantry numbered up to 75 % of the population. Over 82 % of them were serfs – landlords' property (61.8 % of the total population), the rest were state peasants – they were owned by the state directly. To compare, the serfs amounted to around 44.2 % of the population in Ukraine, 36.9 % of the population in Lithuania, and in total 37.5 % in the European part of the Russian Empire. Moreover, during the first half of the 19th century the share of the serfs decreased in Lithuania and Ukraine: in 1817 it was 53.4 % and 55.6 % respectively, and in Belarus increased conversely (from 57 %)[4].

Besides, it should be added that numerous groups of the population free from serfdom but not different from the serfs by their ethnic, language, and denomination characteristics

existed in Lithuania and Ukraine at the same time. Free peasants who composed 14 % and more of the population in the early 19th century and up to 5.6 % in the mid-19th century in Lithuania are referred to here. In Ukraine a numerous group of Little Russian Cossacks existed (up to 12 % of the population taxed in 1834)[5]. Nothing similar existed in the ethno-social stratification of Belarus. Thus, by the mid-19th century the Belarusians were almost completely serfs socially; they had no opportunity to use the experience of a different life, other social practices, and behaviour patterns due to ethnic and denomination barriers. Certainly, this is not the reason for stigmatization. Other peoples of Central Eastern Europe had to overcome a similar situation; the issue, to a greater extent, is in the nature of serfdom in the territory of Belarus.

The prevailing form of the feudal rent in the mid-19th century (for 94.1 % of serfs in Belarus) was corvée. To compare, up to 54 % of the peasants in the central region of Russia paid a rent at that time[6]. This seemingly statistical aspect had highly important social consequences. I would like to note that social psychology of serfs is more often a matter of social and political essays than of research. There exist several texts examining the issue of breaking the peasants' social psychology during the collectivisation period but they are of only indirect interest in our case[7]. That is why, I believe, consideration of the analysis of economic behaviour of serfs carried out in the works of the undeservedly forgotten Russian economist Alexander Chayanov would be much more fruitful. I am referring to his article *On the theory of non-capitalist economic systems* («К вопросу о теории некапиталистических систем хозяйства») (I would like to note that its publication in the USA in 1966 exerted exceptional influence on the formation of the American school of economic anthropology). Alexander Chayanov's major idea is that the categories and principles of capitalist economy are not applicable to the phenomenon of the "family-operated farm" forming the basis of existence of the pre-capitalist economies. It is a subsistence farm which objective is not to derive profit but to meet the family's needs the most important notion of which in economic strategy is self-exploitation determined by the ratio of dependents and workers and by the traditional consumption level. Alexander Chayanov compared several economic systems, including ancient slavery, slavery in Latin America in the first decades of the Spanish rule, and the Russian serfdom in the form of render.

> *"In spite of similarity between the legal position of the slave and the serf, the economic structures of the slave's and serf's households are of absolutely different nature. The serf's household is not different … from the already known form of the family-operated household. The classical slavery was efficient only when the workforce was replenished at the expense of capture and not of its reproduction inside the household. In this case production expenses increased to bring up the offspring and to reduce exploitation of the workforce, women in particular"*[8].

Although Alexander Chayanov did not assign himself an objective to specifically study the serfdom based on corvée, his remark concerning this topic is extremely valuable:

> *"transfer to the corvée – a form of the economy organisation similar to the slave-owning one"*[9].

And thereafter –

> *"the corvée of the serfdom period in Russia is not slavery in the meaning of Afro-American slavery in America or slavery of the ancient world systems, although it is similar to those, … the economic principles governing the corvée do not correspond to those which we have determined in the rent serfdom economy"*[10].

The latter difference is determined by the fact that serfdom economy based on the rent stimulates the peasant to step out of the subsistence farm and to get included into market relations. Summing up Alexander Chayanov's views, it is possible to state that the corvée is a (legal) form of slavery based on reproduction of workforce within the peasant subsistence farm. I would like to add that it is the ideal form of slavery not requiring from the peasants and land owner significant expenses to purchase workforce comparable to those which existed, e.g., in the ancient world. As I think, the consequence of the corvée serfdom system prevalence is the formation of two stable behaviour patterns. Firstly, it is self-production based on the subsistence farm. Secondly, it is the unconditional submission pattern being the necessary condition of the peasant slave's survival.

Another important detail differing Belarus from Russia should be added. I am referring to the remote milestone event – the 1557 land reform accompanying the destruction of the communal land ownership in the significant parts of the territory of Belarus (i.e. which became possible in Russia in 1907 only), and even the change of such conservative culture forms as planning of villages and peasant farms. Introduction of household land ownership in the 16th century did not mean transformation of the Belarusian peasant into a classical individualist. Communal structures (e.g., rural community courts) and behaviour norms preserved their importance until the late 18th century mostly. However, they provided a great deal fewer opportunities for self-organisation and joint action. It is a particular characteristic of the regions in which the corvée was the prevailing form of feudal relations[11]. Probably, it is the reason why numerous peasant uprisings in the history of Belarus did not turn into peasants' wars comparable to the events in Russia and Ukraine.

Thus, in my opinion, by the mid-19th century the Belarusian society represented a conservative system in which the majority of the population was in a specific form of economic dependence similar to slavery, and as a result it had no opportunity to borrow behaviour patterns different from the traditional ones, which was amplified by significant ethnic and denomination barriers marking social differences.

Another factor which determined the peculiarities of the contemporary Belarusian society was delayed modernisation. The 1861 abolition of serfdom resulted in immense changes; however, their scale was much smaller than in the neighbouring regions. Redistribution of land ownership and increase of peasants' holdings during the second half of the 19th – early 20th centuries did not turn them into finished-products producers. The majority of peasants' farms relied on semi-subsistence or subsistence farming. As for the amount of trade turnover per capita (a kind of the GDP per capita and market test ratio), Belarus occupied the last place in the European part of the Russian Empire, being inferior even to Arkhangelsk Province. In the territory of Latvia this index was 204 rubles, in Estonia 85, in Ukraine 70, in Lithuania 39, in Moldova 35, in Belarus 25 (!) in the early 20th century. The total trade turnover of Riga with the population of only 377 thousand persons (253 million rubles) exceeded the similar index of Belarus (173 million rubles) in total which had 6.6 million residents in the late 19th century[12]. In a number of regions of Belarus market activity was well below the average indices. I am referring, for example, to the Belaya Vezha region, where the trade turnover was just 4 rubles per person per year (the absolute minimum within Central Eastern Europe), which meant almost complete domination of the subsistence farming[13].

The Belarusians remained an almost exclusively peasant people still; only just above 2 % of them resided in towns. Among the urban population, the Belarusians amounted to 16 % only (to compare, the similar indices for Estonians were 67 %, Latvians 38 %, Ukrainians 32 %). The literacy rate of the Belarusians was 13.5 % (in absolute estimate). To compare, 80 % of the Estonians, 71 % of the Latvians, 37 % of the Lithuanians were literate[14].

The 1920-1950s period did not become a period of full-fledged modernisation, just like the previous one. The 1930s are traditionally connected with accelerated industrialisation in the USSR. However, its pace was much slower in the BSSR in the interbellum period. Until 1939 it was believed that Belarus was a frontier area in which there was no sense to develop major industries. Although the urban population of the BSSR grew significantly (up to 25 % in the early 1939), according to this index the republic lagged behind the USSR in general (34 %). In Western Belarus, the most depressive region of Poland, the proportion of the urban population did not exceed 12 %. By the late 1950s the rural population still significantly prevailed in Belarus (69 %) while its proportion in the USSR was only 52 % on average[15].

Simultaneously, extremely significant changes of the social and ethnic structure of the population took place in the 1920 – early 1950s; the changes were caused by the communist revolution and consequences of World War II. Thus, the revolution resulted in the liquidation of the Polish-speaking social and intellectual elite which happened in Eastern Belarus in 1917-1920 and in Western Belarus in 1939-1945. The growth of the urban population in the BSSR was accompanied by an increase in the number of industrial workers whose proportion reached 10 % of the population in 1939. However, the most significant event for the social structure was collectivisation which had an impact on the majority of the population in the 1930-1950s. This phenomenon is worth special attention. In our

view, collectivisation could be relevantly referred to as the "third edition of serfdom to the east of the Bug river". In essence, the collective-farm system in the form in which it existed in the 1930-1950s was hardly different from the serfdom with the only exception that the state official occupied the position of the landlord or manager. Collective farms were quite often established in the place of the former estates. Work in the collective farm was an almost complete equivalent of the corvée. And the peasants satisfied their own needs by working in the family-operated subsistence (or semi-subsistence) farm just like at the time of serfdom.

Extremely rigid limitation of mobility in the social as well as in the literally spatial meaning makes the collective-farm system similar to serfdom. It is in the 1930s that "registration stamp" in the passport became one of the most important instruments of the population migration regulation. At the same time, the collective-farm workers faced not only cities "closed for registration" but also basic absence of the very right to have a passport. The only possible channels of social mobility to them were advanced training in town, career in the army, and work at construction of industrial enterprises. However, few could use that opportunity in the situation of Belarus. The collective-farm system of the 1930-1950s combined with widespread repressions added to the conservation of the deeply rooted existence patterns – submission and self-production in the subsistence economy.

Concerning the influence of the consequences of World War II on modernisation, I would like to emphasise socio-ethnic aspects of casualties. Liquidation of the population was the most characteristic feature of towns and largely related to the genocide of the Jewish population. Thus, up to 80 % of the population were liquidated in Minsk, for example. Some towns (e.g., Motol, Ozyory, Kurenets, Lyady) due to underpopulation after the war were placed into the category of rural settlements[16]. At the same time, in the majority of small towns (boroughs) the Jewish population did not restore in the post-war period. In general, the Jewish population reduced from approximately 900 thousand persons in 1941 (estimated) to 150 thousand persons in 1959.[17] I would like to stress that in spite of the prevalence of Jews among the urban population for several centuries Jewish culture had never played a strategic role in Belarusian towns. The image of the Belarusian town was determined by the domination of Polish culture in the 17th – first half of the 19th century, Russian in the second half of the 19th – early 20th centuries or Belarusian in the 1920s – early 1930s. However, Jews represented the most stable group of the urban population during the 17th – first half of the 20th centuries. That is why their mass death meant the loss of the bearers of traditions and real patterns of urban life and urban culture, not of urban life and culture in general but of those in certain towns of Belarus. Exceptional political activity of the Jewish population which could not become a pattern useful for borrowing should be added to that.

One should also mention that as a result of mass destruction during World War II and post-war reconstruction the Belarusian towns lost their historical image in many respects. They were not historically formed centres with architectural monuments but architectural

complexes in the Stalinist architectural style not related to the local traditions which became dominant in the cityscape.

Another important fact should be taken into consideration: by the beginning of mass urbanisation the majority of potential migrants had quite a high educational level. In 1959 98.2 % of the rural population were literate[18]. At the same time, although the majority of rural schools were formally Belarusian, some subjects were taught in Russian, and the very study of Russian was a mandatory condition of education.

On the eve of the full-scale modernisation the majority of the Belarusians were villagers (75 %), descendants of serfs who had gone through the collective-farm serfdom for the second time. They were to face migration to towns in which Russian dominated, traditions and bearers of the urban lifestyle as well as the material historical urban environment were lost.

The 1960s – first half of the 1980s were the peak period of industrial modernisation in Belarus. During this period the republic received the investments immense on the Soviet scale. The features of the Soviet statistics do not permit to provide the exact data. However, it is known, e.g., that almost 23 billion rubles were invested in the industry, 18 billion rubles in the agriculture in 1971–1985. At the same time, investment in the industry increased three times as compared with the previous 15 years. Taking into consideration the actual purchasing power and the official exchange rate of the ruble at that period, I would like to take the liberty and state that such investment is comparable to 41 billion US dollars. In 25 years over 350 major industrial enterprises many of which were among the largest ones in the USSR and Europe (e.g., Minsk Tractor Factory, Novopolotsk Oil Refinery etc.) were constructed in Belarus[19]. The industrial output grew by almost 8.9 times in 1960-1985[20].

The relatively late industrialisation of Belarus as compared to the USSR in general became an advantage because the industrial enterprises were equipped with technologically more modern (in the Soviet terms) equipment, and, as a result, the production quality was much higher.

Another peculiarity of industrialisation was that it was carried out almost exceptionally at the expense of centralised investments. Major industrial enterprises were immediately subordinate to the so-called Union ministries, and the local political elite connected their wellbeing with good relations with the Union centre due to this.

The result of the accelerated development of industry and liquidation of the peasants' free-movement limitations was the high tempo of urbanisation. In 1979 the urban population was already 55 % of the total population, in 1988 65 %. The capital of the BSSR Minsk occupied the first place in the USSR as to the rate of population growth in the 1960-1970s. Annually up to 60-70 thousand persons arrived in the capital, and up to 60 % of them were villagers. Already in 1970 the Belarusians comprised the majority of the urban population (69.3 %), at the same time more than 50 % of the total Belarusian population lived in urban areas. In the mid-1970s the migrants comprised up to 76 % of the urban population, including the migrants from the rural areas of the BSSR of 47 %[21].

One of the most important consequences of urbanisation was mass loss of ethnic identity by the migrants. It was manifested, in the first place, in the sharp decrease of schools with the Belarusian language of instruction; by the mid-1980s there remained not a single Belarusian school in towns. All the educational system was oriented to create not the national but the generic Soviet identity. The set of subjects immediately forming national identity played a secondary part while the history and geography of Belarus were not taught as independent subjects at all.

The negative and even aggressive attitude of the yesterday's villagers to the Belarusian language and culture became a typical phenomenon. This attitude is quite explicable and typical of any categories of migrants. For the migrants from the village, it was a form of adaptation to the Russian-speaking environment dominating in the urban areas. It should be stressed that mass de-ethnicisation was to a significant degree determined by the influence of the dominant ideology. The main objective of the Soviet people -- construction of a communist society – was declared to have been completed in 1980. It was also known that the future communist society would be nationless. In that situation preservation of languages losing their social positions seemed absurd. It is known that Belarus was given a special role in the process. It was during his speech at the Belarusian State University in 1959 that Nikita Khrushchyov stated:

"The sooner we begin speaking Russian, the sooner we will construct communism"[22].

Implementation of such policy did not meet any mass opposition. It is understandable. For the majority of the former peasants, what was happening was a natural manifestation of social progress. Indeed, migration to town was to them literally migration from the 19th to the 20th century, from hard labour in the collective farm and life in a wooden hut with no basic utilities to the 8-hour working day, flats with hot water, refrigerators and TV sets. Naturally, the Belarusian language and culture steadily associated with the exceptionally rural lifestyle could not have a high social prestige.

The position of the Belarusian political elite which had no need to use nationalist sentiments to strengthen its position added to mass loss of ethnic identity. It is known that for a long period of the 1920s to 1950s the Belarusians were not permitted to occupy key political positions in the party organisations. Almost all the first secretaries of the Communist Party of Belarus were not Belarusians until 1956. In 1951 the Belarusians amounted to less than 30 % in the government of the BSSR. All of that could naturally create reasons for discontent and contribute to the growth of nationalist sentiments. However, the Belarusian politicians, the so-called "generation of partisans", came to power as a result of personnel reshuffles carried out by Nikita Khrushchyov in the second half of the 1950s. This circumstance contributed to the increase of the political elite's dependence on the Union centre as well.

Finally, mass loss of national identity saw no socially significant opposition of the Belarusian national intellectuals (at least, the scale was not that great as in the neighbouring Baltic republics or Ukraine).

Contraction of the actual circle of their products consumers inevitably turned it into an isolated, closed system similar to the subsistence economy. Its representatives kept losing real understanding of what was actually happening in the Belarusian society.

The modernisation of Belarus has another important aspect. Mass and voluntary Russification became almost the only form of the rural migrants' adaptation to the new lifestyle. While the bearers of urban traditions were mostly exterminated, a kind of establishment of the peasant lifestyle in town took place; it was manifested in the steady preservation of the stereotypes of peasant behaviour and Weltanschauung. Their existence was determined by the typically Belarusian mode of life support. The majority of the yesterday's migrants maintained not only pure kindred but also intense economic relations with the country. At the same time, such a strategy, absolutely irrational from the point of view of the results, time and labour expenses, seemed absolutely natural to the migrants. Mass preservation of the peasant Weltanschauung in town manifested in propensity to egalitarian distribution, perception of commerce not as work but as a form of deception, absolutely peasant-like conservatism, suspiciousness of everything new, unclear, which was combined with and completed the dominant communist ideology perfectly.

In the second half of the 1980s the economy of Belarus was still on the rise, and the republic was often considered to be a well-being oasis in the USSR which had been tired out by queues for foodstuffs chronically in short supply. In those conditions no leader able to be guided by the expectation of reforms or by a surge of nationalist sentiments (like Boris Yeltsin or Leonid Kravchuk) emerged and could emerge in the Belarusian political elite. The national-movement ideology developed by a small group of intellectuals was incomprehensible to the majority whose mother tongue was not Russian (its literary variant) yet and not Belarusian already. Acquiring national independence was rather the result of a trick of fortune (not only for Belarus though) than the result of determined mass struggle and could not be considered a value. Timid economic and political reforms, attempts to revive the Belarusian language and culture in the early 1990s coincided with a break-neck fall in the living standards. It is precisely this fact that explains stable associations of impoverishment with democracy and nationalism, which preconditioned a comparatively easy triumph of Alexander Lukashenka at the 1994 election. His political rhetoric and authoritarian-rule methods simultaneously correspond to and exploit well-established patterns of the Belarusians' social behaviour. In this regard, the economic strategy, the so-called "imports substitution", a certain projection of self-production onto the country as a whole completely corresponding to the logic of the peasant subsistence farm is demonstrable. Alexander Chayanov wrote that from the point of view of capitalist political economy the peasant farm economy often seemed absurd. For example, a peasant can hold land on lease at an overstated price; in this case no production will yield a profit. The point is that a peasant farm does not intend to. The peasant has a different economic logic. The main point is not the products value but the fact that all the mouths to feed in the family be fed. Alexander Chayanov pointed that a peasant semi-subsistence farm can exist on

the periphery and in the context of the industrial economy indefinitely. However, a farm or even a region is one story but a country is another story. Besides, the most important challenge of the contemporaneity is not industrialisation but inclusion into a global post-industrial information society. It is obvious that the economic strategy of a subsistence farm has been exhausted, and this drama delimits the mid-term prospects of Belarus's development. Development of this tendency leaves less and less social space to conserve the traditional behaviour patterns.

Notes

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Dr. Preeti D. Das

RESTORATION OF CULTURAL REMINISCENCE IN THE PROCESS OF NATION BUILDING

Abstract

The collapse of the USSR not only created a vacuum but also generated a move to identify cultural roots of the regions. Who are we? Where have we come from? Who were our ancestors? What were their cultural practices? These are some of the major issues related not only to cultural identity but also to their life style. The societies were thrown open to Western ideologies which made the task to re-establish a strong and powerful nation along with their cultural practices the "search for one's own identity" more challenging in the CIS regions. This made the task of nation building difficult. The nation-building process of societies has to be understood in the light of cultural systems. Under given circumstances the restoration of cultural reminiscence posed a challenge before the multicultural society's nation building process. The paper tries to explore the major problem in identifying the cultural trends in case of the Crimean Autonomous Republic. It also tries to understand how these ethnic cultures can influence the policies in the process of Nation building. The main argument in the paper is focused around the problems related to interconnectedness of cultural process based on the theories propounded by Levi – Strauss and Roland Barthes in the process of nation-building.

Keywords: ethnic groups, cultural systems, cultural identity, globalization, Nation Building.

Rethinking ethnic identity

Emergence of new cultural trends has at its base a deep rooted influence of cultural, geographical and historical background. All modern societies are characterized by the ingrained diversity. This di-

versity of multicultural states is in a sense both foundational and ongoing. The globalization process has increased the pace of interaction between the diverse cultures further leading to the emergence of new cultural trends based on trans-cultural influences. The cultural traditions and beliefs of any ethnic or indigenous groups consist of many internal linkages some of which are very sensitive in nature. As Mathew Arnold defined, "*culture being pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world…*" (Johnson 1979:28) Each community, ethnic group or nation has its own beliefs, traditions, norms and customs which it wants to preserve and to which it is very sensitive. The collapse of the USSR not only created a vacuum but also generated a move to identify cultural roots of the regions.

Who are we? Where have we come from? Who were our ancestors? What were their cultural practices? These are some of the major issues related not only to cultural identity but also to their life style. The exposure of communities and ethnic groups to western ideologies and their cultural heritage forced ethnic groups of erstwhile Soviet state to look beyond "common Soviet identity". However, not a single group wants to disown the super power status acquired due to the then Soviet system. Thus the task to re-establish a strong and powerful nation along with their pre-Soviet cultural practices within the geographical boundaries of today is a challenging task in CIS regions.

The task of Nation building

Combining a range of indigenous and ethnic groups and keeping intact their diverse cultural roots complicates the task of multicultural states to keep everyone united under one umbrella. The nation-building process also had to consider the manner through which this diversity in the newly developed states would be accommodated. As Benedict Anderson has pointed out, "*…nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which – it came into being*." (Benedict 1989:19) This further reiterates that the nation-building process of societies has to be understood in the light of cultural systems.

While talking of restoration of cultural reminiscence in today's multicultural society the presence of civic and social organizations that form the basis of the functioning of society distinct from state structure becomes crucial as these organizations play a significant role in developing an understanding of interconnectedness. Among many scholars Robert Putnam also supports that civil society are vital for democracy because they build social capital, trust and shared values, which are transferred into political sphere and help to hold society together, facilitating an understanding of the interconnectedness of society and interests within it. (Putnam 1994)

According to Taras Kuzio, civil society is weakest in the region (Ukraine), where identity is multiple and mixed. (Taras 1998: 163) As per his assumption the construction of Nation building, i.e. a common Ukrainian identity which is largely absent in eastern and southern Ukraine, might lead to firstly – the removal of multiple and mixed identities

through nation building process in order to give a primary Ukrainian identity. And, secondly, the majority of citizens would be united through civil society within one political culture, 'holding one system of general values, moral basis, ideas, myths, values, social norms etc. (Taras 1998: 163)

Hence, civil society does play a crucial role in modern multicultural society, though the role of religious and cultural trends is no less important. Each of these institutions consists of a well-defined social structure which dictates their behavior. The Nation building process cannot be complete without understanding the nature of internal cultural processes of that particular society.

Theoretical basis of cultural process

The rationale for structural approach to understand society arises from the possibility that social phenomena on their own are very complicated and all significant component units of socio-cultural aspects may not get sufficient importance as far as their impact is concerned. As the topic suggests, there are two things which have been taken up in this article: culture, restoration of culture on the one hand and nation building on the other. Once we understand the terms "culture" and "nation state" we can relate how they react when they are merged together. This does not mean that they cannot exist independently. Though the nation state is part of culture it has always been looked upon separately from culture. However, the formation of a strong nation state cannot be complete until and unless it is coordinated with a well-developed culture of its citizens.

Along with national identities even cultural identities are subject to constant change; they are not static. This change occurs based on the timeframe, their geographic location and their frequent interaction with other cultural identities. Though a period of twenty to thirty years is too short for the adaptation of culture and construction of new culture, however, it is sufficient enough to leave its impact on another culture. The interaction among cultures for a sufficiently long period may even lead to the formation of an altogether new culture; however, part of participating cultures may, partially or fully, restore the inherent practices. This process may lead to subsequent internal division between one and the same ethnic group.

According to Levi Strauss (1966), "Anthropology … is an outcome of a historical process which has made a large part of mankind subservient to the other and during which millions of human beings have had their resources plundered and their institutions and belief destroyed, whilst they themselves were ruthlessly killed, thrown into bondage, and contaminated by diseases they were unable to resist. Colonized people were treated as mere objects of study". (Singh 1992:190) This reinforces the idea that the solutions to reduce the gap between different communities may lie in culture which could help provide better living to the dispossessed through massive programs of planned change. The sociological analysis, Levi-Strauss held, is that the surface structure of social life must relate to its underlying deep structure. This has been shown on the structural analysis of Myths.


The principles of Levi Strauss mentioned in "Structural study of Myths" and in "Raw and the Cooked" do help in identifying component units of society and understanding deeper the behavioral pattern. His arguments are based on two hypotheses: First – that a myth consists of constituent elements; and the second – that these constituent elements lead to another layer of constituent elements, which is more complex than the previous. Each level of constituent elements leads to more complex constituent level based on the level of analysis. Levi Strauss named it "Gross Constituent elements". Thus the internal relations as per him are: "*The true constituent units of a myth are not isolated relations but bundles of such relations, and it is only bundles that these relations can be put to use and combined so as to produce meaning*." (Das 2000:68) In the "Raw and the Cooked" Levi Strauss explains how the structures of myths provide basic structures of understanding cultural relations. These relations appear as binary pairs or opposites. The "raw" is associated with nature while the "cooked" is associated with culture. These oppositions form the basic structure for all ideas and concepts in a culture. In other words (1) - identification of constituent element depends on the level of structural analysis, and (2) The higher the level of structural analysis is, the more complex the constituent elements are.

Roland Barthes' contribution to structural study (propounded for structural analysis of a narrative) will also be of great help to understand the complexities of socio-cultural relations. The most important aspect of his "system of meaning" is the "*organization of participating elements*". According to him, "*…each unit which belongs to a certain level assumes meaning only if it can be integrated into higher level: a phoneme though perfectly describable, in itself, means nothing; it participates in meaning only when integrated into word.*" Roland Barthes gives preference to "*integrated*" relations over "*distributive*" relations as a "*narrative is a hierarchy of instances*". Keeping in mind the nature and requirement of our socio-cultural analysis Barthes' "*meaning of constituent unit*" is vital: "*… meaning must form the first criterion of the unit; it is the functional character of certain segments of the story which makes them a unit*." While describing the next level of structural analysis Barthes' mentioned: "*We call meaning any type of intra textual or extra textual correlation, i.e. any feature of narrative which refers to another moment of the narrative or to another site of the culture necessary in order to read the narrative. Meaning … a citation, the departure of a code.*" In short, the individual constitutive elements acquire substantive meaning only when they are connected with other constitutive elements. At this point it is vital to remember Saussure's "Creation of an image in the mind of receiver" as at the level of "meaning" what image a particular constituent unit is creating becomes significant.

Thus, depending upon the level of analysis the identification of component units is a must for any structural analysis. For the purpose of analysis of a society the component units will be various cultural groups residing in that particular society as they are "the participating elements" of society. They acquire "meaning" when they are integrated with other "constituent elements" of ethno-cultural groups in society. They "assume meaning only when they are integrated in to higher level" which could mean that the meaning may

vary depending upon the integration process. As is known the basic concepts in culture are not static, they keep changing with the change of time and place.

In order to understand the cultural processes the researchers have tried understanding the concepts like "cultural assimilation vs cultural diffusion" (Ashraf, Quamrul). The arguments have been made that "the degree of cultural assimilation and cultural diffusion varies depending upon the level of development." I would like to add that it depends not only on the "level of development" but also on the "nature and component" unit of a particular cultural element. Culture at its formative level has component units out of which or in combination with which it is made of. The nature of these component units is similar to gaseous, liquid or solid elements. Some of them get easily merged with other cultures and form a modified version of itself, for example, some of the traditional food items acquire international acceptance whereas some remain region specific. This process may lead to the formation of a separate group having identity of their own. The emergence of an altogether new cultural group may be considered an outcome of this process. Graphically they can be represented as follows.



Thus, based on these theories one has to be clear as to what is understood under the cultural restoration process. Is it restoration of the traditional practices which existed during pre-Soviet period, or redefine some of the practices in the light of the present requirement? If it is to restore the traditional beliefs then the question arises after approximately 70 years of Soviet rule how to identify specific customs and how many would like to follow these norms in the given circumstances. Many of them are forgotten and remembered partially. On the contrary, if it is to do only with the identity of a particular group then this draws the attention of scholars.

Cultural Process in CIS

Cultural systems on their own are a very complicated process. As per Huntington, "In the new world … cultural identity is the central factor shaping a country's associations and antagonisms." (Huntington 1997:125) The cultural communities, once part of Soviet Union, did share common Soviet identity under the previous Soviet authorities' pressure where culture was used as an ideological tool. However, it was replaced by the new ideology based on the ideology of "returning to one's own authentic root". The disintegration of the USSR led to a considerable shift in the cultural processes in all these countries. Each country reacted differently when it came in contact with other cultural processes. Thus, the titular ethnic groups of the CIS region are struggling with other minorities to inculcate the feeling of "nationhood" rather than imposing the ethic "Ukrainian" identity on minority. Another significant attribute of cultural process is that it acquires certain features based on the need of time and place. What amongst identified features needs to be restored or in other words which of the earlier cultural practices would be acceptable to the post-Soviet societies? State policies do play a crucial role in resolving some of the issues related to these processes. It also depends on how successful is the nation-building process of these countries. Today despite the Soviet experience to control and direct the cultural processes in society and the desire to control these processes the Central Asian authorities do not have sufficient material resources of accurate understanding and controlling the cultural processes. Ukraine is struggling to keep its diverse ethnic groups under one unified umbrella. Russia is also facing internal problems related to ethnic identity. Georgia is facing similar problems. The postmodernist approach to the nation building process in a multicultural society is vital as it is associated with the recognition of plurality of existence through understanding and displayed behavior of the understanding. In the field of international relations the greatest impact of postmodernism has been noticed in the very change in the definition of national security, the core concept of international relations. National security is no longer conceived in terms of defence of borders from external threats but is viewed from the perspective of the entire gamut of challenges to the security and well-being of its nationals from such forces as vague and distant as environmental degradation, food shortages, desertification, deforestation etc. Security itself has become a complex construct as the majority of ethnic groups of CIS region do feel secure together to a great extent based on the common shared history. The post-modernists refuse to see the source of threats in narrow, military terms. They find their epicentres in environmental, demographic, ecological, economic and socio-cultural domains. For example, Samuel Huntington does not see the future threat to the US emanating from any particular country of region, but from a religious belief system, which is globally present without having a centralized leadership or a definite pattern of assault."

Case Study of the Crimean Peninsula

As has already been mentioned the cultural roots are not only very deep but they are intermingled and intertwined with many other cultures. It requires a study of historical detail to understand it properly to be able to restore certain cultural traits. It will also help to identify certain aspects of potential conflict of any culture. An attempt is being made to study it on the example of the Crimea, an autonomous republic of Ukraine.

According to Taras Kuzio, the Ukrainian identity "*has more of an east Slavic than a purely Ukrainian identity, a product of the intense contact with Russians and Russia since the mid-1860s. Supporters of this Russian–Ukrainian fusion trace it back through Tsarist/post-Leninist historiography to Kyiv Rus' as representing one long unity occasionally broken by invading Poles or Tatars*." (Kuzio 1998:13) However, Russians constitute majority only in the Crimea as per 1989 census report. Taras Kuzio considers this as the main reason for granting political autonomy: "*This exception has been recognized by the granting of political autonomy to the Crimean peninsula. Because no non-Ukrainian ethnic group holds a majority in any other region political autonomy has not been advanced in any other Ukrainian region*." (Kuzio 1998:14,)

The Crimean peninsula has been ruled by an array of rulers belonging to various empires – the Cimmerians, Greeks, Scythians, Goths, Huns, Bulgars, Kievan Rus', Ottoman, Golden Horde, Mongols, etc. at various times. It is difficult to deny that they must have had an impact on the formation of the ethnic group "Crimean Tatars". Crimean Tatars, ethnic minority who make up about 13% of the population, existed in the Crimea during the Crimean Khanate. The 1989 census reports that of 86,875 Tatars, 86.9 percent were living in towns, and of the 46,807 Crimean Tatars, 66.6 percent were living in villages.

The declaration of the Supreme Soviet of November 1989 which recognized the forced deportation and repressive measures taken against displaced people as illegal and provided provision to restore their rights led to the increased population of Crimean Tatars. The increase of Crimean Tatars population over a short period of time and at the time of political uncertainty and economic instability caused an increased potential conflict in the region. Attempts have been made to understand and provide theoretical basis for resolving the issues and smooth nation building process. However, there has been little success so far. According to Gabrileyan O. A., the situation of availability of eatable items and conditions of agriculture, social indicators of poverty, health, natural resources, migration, situation of the government, potential internal and external conflicts along with historical, geographical and cultural together formulate two blocks: one the statistical block and the other analytical block and may provide theoretical basis for understanding the potential conflict zones. (Gabrileyan 2003:8)


According to Gertsen A. G., the name Crimean Tatar does require a historical explanation of "Tatars" beginning from the period of the Golden Horde (1224-1266) in order to understand a clear-cut difference between the two. There is no basis for simplified analysis of the ethnonym and on that correlate the ethno genesis of Tatars of Eastern Europe with

the ancient Mongol population. (Gertsen 2010: 228) This argument is being supported by many contemporary scholars. The Crimean peninsula was part of Genghis Kan's empire which was divided into three major sub-groups: Mongolian (Mongol and Kidan), Turkic (Turkic and Uigurs), and Tunguso-manjurs (Tanguri and Cjhurjhani) with the majority of speakers in the Turkic language. (Gertsen 2010:229) Crimean Tatars also considered that they are originally Turkic people.

In order to strengthen the empire towards the end of 1222 the troops of Alan and Kipchak were united whereas the Mongols could split the union on the grounds of commonness of Mongols and Turkish people. The Alans were a group of Sarmatian tribes the first reference to whom was made in the First millennium A.D. appeared in northern Caucasus and from there moved to the to Crimea. They spoke an Eastern Iranian language, a derivative of Scytho – Sarmatian. They got to settled in the south-west Crimea, also partly in the south-eastern part of the peninsula. According to Prof. Khrapunov, ethno genesis of Crimean Tatars goes back to the sixteenth century. (Khrapunov 2010:95)

Thus, as per the sources available the history of ethnic groups in the Crimean peninsula consisted of widely different ethno–cultural groups. These groups have gone through a peaceful cultural assimilation process. There have been marriages between people belonging to different communities. It is also important to note that at all levels these tribes did have a well-developed system of community norms and local self-government. Thus, the history of the first habitants (Neandertalstsi) in the Crimea begins approximately 100–150 thousand years back. They came from the heart of the present Ukraine. All these tribes and communities have been the outcome of "fusion of cultures" by means of peaceful and coercive efforts of varied empires. The Greek historian Herodotus mentioned about Cimmerians on the northern coast of the Black Sea. According to V. Vlasov, the geographical names of "oblast Kimmeria, Bospor Kimmeriiskiy" (Kerch Strait), the city "Kimmerik" and mountain "Kimmeriy" do reflect upon their connection. (Khrapunov 2010: 8) The Tauri, offshoot of Cimmerians were settled in Taurica (ancient name for the Crimea) approximately around 6-7th century BC.

The graph reflects layers of the cultural assimilation process which took place in the historical past on the present Crimean land. As per Gertsen A. G., "the significant moment in the process of formation of the ethnos "Crimean Tatar" was the adaptation of the local Christian population the structure of which itself represented a mixture of various confessional groups". (Gertsen 2010:237). This is crucial as the root of the main argument of the Crimean Tatars lies in that they are not the offshoot of Tatars who came to the Crimea during the Mongol-Tatar invasion but are the indigenous people of the Crimea. However, numerous ancient ethnic tribes might have contributed in the formation of the Crimean Tatars ethnos. The majority of ancient ethnic tribes at different historical junctures contributed to a varied extent in the formation of "Crimean Tatars".



Current Crisis of the Crimean peninsula

Among deportees the number of Crimean Tatars constituted a much higher percentage than other ethnic groups. Out of 228,392 deportees 183,155 were Crimean Tatars, 12,422 Bulgarians, 15,040 Greeks, 9,621 Armenians, 1,119 Germans and 3,652 other foreigners. The Soviet Union's People's Commissariat for international Affairs (NKVD) exiled 151,604 of the Tatars to Uzbekistan and 31,551 to areas within Russia. (Milana: 373) The return of Crimean Tatars to their homeland since 1989 caused great financial pressure on the Ukrainian government. Attempts to negotiate with the Uzbek Government to have a monitored smooth migration process were in vain. Similarly Ukraine did not get much support from other CIS regions. Nonetheless, the influx of Crimean Tatars was much higher immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union when Ukraine began the nation building process. It increased the burden on the Ukrainian Government. One of the major problems was providing accommodation and employment to Crimean Tatars.

At present in the Crimea there are more than 125 nationalities as per the 2001 census report. Despite the fact that the number of Russians has decreased by 11.6% they form the majority 1180.4 thousand people or 58.5% of overall population. Crimean Tatars constitute 243.4 thousand people making 12.1% of the population. Unemployment among Crimean Tatars alone in the year 2001 made 49.6%. This could be one of the major reasons for various violent incidents which took place in the subsequent years between various ethnic groups in some of the regions.

According to some studies, the increased tension also prevails due to the presence of international forces. In the process of self-identification and restoration of cultural reminiscence the identity of Crimean Tatars is undergoing a change under the influence of international Islamic organizations. The need to rely on international support arose due to the lack of material and emotional support for the restoration of "Islam in the Crimea"

from internal resources. Nonetheless, even this was not as easy as each of the Muslim countries has their own vested interest in providing financial assistance to Crimean Tatars. (Muratova 2003:22) This may be true for any funding agency. It requires special attention of policy makers in order to avoid widening the gap between the communities.

The international funding agencies like UNDP, EU countries, etc. provide funds for programs like "Crimea Integration and Development Program" which focuses on areas like democratic governance and economic development in rural areas. Some programs aim at local development through community mobilization, civil society support in the Crimea, etc. As per Natalija Shapovalova, "Crimea is not targeted in the political dialogue between Ukraine and the EU. The European neighbourhood policy Action Plan between Ukraine and the EU only touches upon regional development and the continuation of administrative and local government reforms".

It is worth referring to Goodenough's (1976) and Feldman's (1976) stand in policy analysis: "*…a problem of intercultural communication exists between policy makers and the clients of government programs (who often belong to a different ethnic group or social class). Planners tend to design programs in which they themselves feel comfortable or that conform to political priorities but that may not meet the needs of the client of the programs. If the program is unsuccessful, planners tend to blame the clients rather than acknowledge the cultural or class bias of the program design*." (Singh 1992:193)

The major issues from the point of view of Crimean Tatars can be summarized as follows:

- It is not only to reclaim the territories belonging to ancestors but also to gain political and economic rights.
- Despite the 1944s deportation and humiliation they are struggling to prove that they are indigenous people of the Crimea and not offshoots of Tatars who came during the Mongol-Tatars attack. Many historians and researchers do consider Crimean Tatars as an indigenous ethnic group of Crimea.
- The educational institutions of Crimean Tatars were destroyed and books and literature were burnt. They were forced to live in a concentration camp. Crimean Tatars got only primary education in the Russian, Uzbek and Tajik language and not in the Crimean Tatar language during 1944-1956. The period 1960–1980 was a little liberal when Crimean Tatars could get middle and higher education, though not in the native language with a limited choice of subjects. (http://www.qirimtatar.narod.ru/maarif_obzor.htm)
- In an attempt to cope with the progress of other ethnic groups and provide better living, especially in education and culture sector, the response of the Ukrainian Government to restoration of cultural institutions and religious institutions of Crimean Tatars appears to be too slow.
- The number of Crimean Tatars migrating to the Crimea is much higher than the number of people deported and the location of land provided for their placement by the government is of dispute.

Impact of Globalization on minority groups

Throughout history, borders have played the most crucial role in building the security centric mentality of nations. They are the makers of the state system – the authority and control of states over a spatial domain. Ironically, violations of this sanctity of the border through illegal migrations across it reinforce the concept. As per the arguments of Ranabir Samaddar, the borders created by partition of a territory create more partitions of different kinds. The by-products of these partitions are the problems of minorities, new minorities, sweat and destitute labour, gun running and drug caravans, immigration and aliens, all of which make a mockery of the inviolability of the border. Actually the border, according to Ranabir Samaddar, "exteriorises the interior and interiorises the exterior".

The postmodern focus on otherness, difference and heterogeneity is also in part a function of decolonization and of the immigration of people of colour all over the earth. Vast migrations and diasporas of people of colour, mostly to the metropolitan cores of the more developed countries, have created new fusions of cultures and hybrid identities. Globalization thus involves the circulation of difference and otherness as well as homogenization". At another level it has created some inherent contradictions between the forces of universalism and the forces of localism.

Globalization led to transition of societies, to adoption of newer ideologies within societies. However, have these changes been different from earlier transition in societies, say in the twentieth century? Reflection would suggest that technological advancements, particularly in the field of communication, have played the role of a catalyst to bring about these changes. Besides, the velocity of change or the process of amalgamation of cultures has been far higher and quicker than ever before. So has this been for the better for society? One would find it hard to deny that these changes have brought about betterment of society but along with the same they have also brought in their share of problems or issues. One of the issues that have surfaced on account of these changes has been the fear of insecurity, especially amongst the smaller communities, that their own identities may get lost in the din of the larger, more powerful communities.

Conclusion

To conclude, a society is a space where several layers of overlapping of interconnected actions and proceedings take place. Each layer moves with time following its own developmental dynamics. Similarly changes in any culture get influenced by the surrounding cultures it comes in contact with and depending on the time it stays connected with that culture. The process of Nation-building requires to keep the entire substructures within a compact whole as by nature these substructures constantly change although their impact is very powerful.

Describing the fear of ethnicity John Rex mentioned that historically the unitary Western European nations have been ethnically diverse and divided in terms of class and sta-

tus. These nations perceive the "culture of new immigrant groups, coming often from long distances and having distinct languages, religions and customs, is seen as 'alien'." (John Rex 1997:270) Thus, though the history of Islam in the Crimean peninsula is very old; it had its peak during Crimean Khans where Islam enjoyed the status of State religion; they are not completely perceived as aborigines of the Crimea. The restoration process of Islamic culture of Crimean Tatars is tough. Despite the socio-economic crisis the Ukrainian government has taken into account the needs of Crimean Tatars. However, how soon and successful will it be in inculcating the feeling of "we" and rebuilding the image of "Ukrainian Nation" beyond "Ukrainian ethnic" identity is not clear.

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Tatsiana Chulitskaya

STATISTICS, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RANKINGS OF BELARUS CONTRASTED WITH THOSE OF LITHUANIA: NEXT TO EACH OTHER BUT APART[1]

Abstract

(National) statistics and (international) rankings are known to serve various aims and having different uses in the contemporary world and in the countries under consideration (Pal et al., 2011). Controversies regarding politicisation of the socio-economic development and governance indicators have been known since the very beginning of the UNDP HDI (the early 1990s). In the article we overview the Belarusian experience and reactions to the international and national evaluations within the Lithuanian context. Insights from the period of 1995 (when the first UNDP HDI reports appeared in the two countries) until 2011 show how much the initiatives and interpretations of the statistics and evaluations are influenced by the socio-political development of the country and by its political regime. We assume that the situation with the evaluation and the socio-economic development indices is different in Belarus and Lithuania. Being part of the EU, Lithuania is included in the main European databases (Eurostat) with standardised indices while Belarus uses national statistics based on the barely transformed Soviet-time methodology predominantly.

Keywords: national statistics, international rankings, socio-economic development indices, political indices, Human Development Report (HDR), evaluation, international organisations, Belarus, non-democratic regime, Belarusian National Statistics Committee (Belstat).

While conducting comparative research, it is essential to determine the referent criteria. Evaluations of political, socio-economic, and other indices of countries' development can be carried out on the basis of both international rankings and national statistics. Cur-

rently there exist numerous (mostly non-governmental) institutions which specialise in gathering and evaluating information for applied projects which could also be used in comparative studies later. However, as Schedler notes, these institutions have not been able to overcome the "measurer's dilemma" associated with systematic lack of raw data and inefficiency of the very process of information collection resulting in its "privatisation", non-transparency, and incompleteness (Schedler 2012: 237-238). As a result, the quality of the research based on the above information is contested.

A number of researchers consider the issues of applying international rankings and national statistics in the comparative analysis (Pal et al., 2010; Schedler, 2012; Knutsen, 2010). Conceptualising the notions of a "democratic" and a "non-democratic regime" and indicators of their measurement is a separate issue of particular relevance to the post-Soviet countries (Moller & Scanning 2010; Bogaards 2010; Zaytsev et al. 2012). Using the data of international evaluations as a legitimation or propaganda tool to demonstrate accomplishments of this or that government/country or as a counterpropaganda tool in the case of negative evaluations is another important issue.[2]

The issue of using rankings for political/propaganda reasons arose in the preparation of the first Human Development Indices (HDIs) (in the early 1990s) along with using other rankings and indices calculated by international institutions such as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (analytical centre *Bertelsmann Stiftung* (Germany)), the Global Prosperity Index (non-partisan analytical institute *Legatum* (UK)), the Index of Economic Freedom (*Heritage Foundation* and *The Wall Street Journal* (USA)); the Doing Business Index (*World Bank*), the Freedom of the Press Index (*Freedom House*) etc. Various researchers have undertaken attempts to create universal multi-dimensional indicators using the existing databases to overcome the measurement and comparison issues (Kaufmann et al. 2010; Human Development Report 2010).

The article focuses on the situation with international rankings and national statistics in Belarus in a contextual comparison against those of Lithuania. The analysis of the period of 1995 (the preparation year of the first National Human Development Report) until 2011 demonstrates interdependence of the interpretations of the rankings and statistical indices and of the socio- economic development in these countries as well as of the impact of their political leaders and the political regimes on them in general. We assume that the situation with the international evaluations of political, socio-economic indices and national statistics differs in Lithuania and Belarus at two levels: political and technical. At the political level the national statistics and international rankings are used as a propaganda tool in Belarus, as justification of a special model of the country's socio-economic development by the Belarusian authorities both inside and outside the country, which is not observed in Lithuania. At the technical level the statistics in Belarus is still largely based on the barely transformed Soviet-time methodology and tools (e.g., unemployment measurement on the basis of the criterion of official registration at the employment service (Article 1 of the Employment of the Population of the Republic of Belarus Law No. 125-Z dd. 15 June 2006)). At the same time Lithuania as a EU member is included into major Euro-

pean databases (in particular, Eurostat) and, accordingly, provides its statistical data based on the standardised European indicators. In addition, in spite of the presence of Belarus in numerous international rankings and the availability of some open national statistical sources of information (in particular, web-site of the National Statistics Committee (Belstat)[3]), information concerning numerous areas of the country's socio-economic development is virtually unavailable (e.g., information on labour migration considering the open border with the Russian Federation).

The article begins with a description of the situation with Belarus's international rankings against the background of Lithuania and both countries' indices in the social, economic and political areas. Thereupon the peculiarities of the national statistics in Belarus are considered. In the end the current standing with rankings and statistics indicators in the two countries is compared, and conclusions regarding the peculiarities of the situation in Belarus in the context of the differences existing between Belarus and Lithuania are provided. Methodologically, the article applies comparative analysis of secondary data while examining Lithuania's and Belarus's standings in international rankings as well as a descriptive analysis of the situation with Belarusian national statistics.

International rankings of Lithuania and Belarus: next to each other but apart

Belarus and Lithuania are included in the majority of international rankings and analytical reports of international organisations. The evaluations of socio-economic development of these countries have demonstrated similar results (e.g., HDI, Legatum Prosperity Index), but since the 2000s Lithuania has been steadily occupying higher positions. The situation with the rankings changes with focusing on the evaluations of politics where Lithuania belongs to the group of democratic countries (e.g., the indices of Freedom House) while Belarus belongs to the countries with authoritarian and non-democratic regimes violating the freedom of speech (the same index).

The following peculiarities of Belarus's international ranking could be noted:

- Regionally high (compared to the neighbouring post-Soviet countries, with the exception of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) indicators of socio-economic development (before the economic crisis of 2011 in Belarus);
- Low political indicators of Belarus with the deterioration trend in all the rankings under consideration;
- Use of the rankings by the Belarusian authorities for propaganda purposes; use in the cases when the rankings contain the indices favourable to the regime (HDI, Legatum Prosperety Prosperity Index) alongside the aggressive official rhetoric if the evaluations are negative (the indices of Freedom House).

Besides, some issues with the methods of calculating the national statistical indices in Belarus used to evaluate socio-economic phenomena are to be noted (e.g., in the mea-

surement of unemployment and poverty levels in the studies by the experts of the IPM Research Centre (Chubrik 2008; Chubrik, Shimanovich 2010)).

The Belarusian authorities use positive evaluations of international agencies to legitimise the country's existing model of socio-economic development, in parallel trying to neutralise the negative political rankings referring to their "biased evaluation" of the situation. The following could be used as an example of the use of international rankings and national statistics by the Belarusian authorities for propaganda purposes: the information aids titled *Belarus': mezhdunarodnye rejtingi i natsionalnaja statistika* (*Belarus: global rankings and national statistics)* issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) for circulation abroad (in particular, on display on the official websites of the embassies of Belarus). These materials include the country's most favourable indices from a variety of areas and sources to demonstrate the Belarusian socio-economic achievements. We could use the news item *Belarus: mezhdunarodnye rejtingi i natsionalnaja statistika (Belarus: global rankings and national statistics)* uploaded to the official website of the embassy of Belarus to Lithuania as an example. It contains disparate excerpts from the documents of various international organisations: UN Report on Human Development (2011), the UNICEF Report *Levels and Trends in Child Mortality* (2011), the report of the International Telecommunication Union, the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation report *Doing Business 2012* along with the report of the foundation *Initiative to Reduce Nuclear Threat* etc.[4]

The socially oriented development of the economy declared by the Belarusian authorities exists as a characteristic feature of the state not only at the level of official rhetoric; it is partly reflected in the evaluations by the international organisations as well. For instance, up to the economic crisis of 2011 Belarus had high regional indices of socio-economic development allowing to speculate about a specific "Belarusian development model" with a low degree of social differentiation and poverty as compared to the neighbouring countries. For example, one of the World Bank reports emphasised that "Belarus is characterised by a relatively low level of consumption inequality ... (which) is achieved by compressing the range of pay levels, administrative regulation of prices, and high social benefits" (World Bank 2004). However, the report noted absence and deficiency of the systemic reforming of the economy as well.

The standings of Belarus and Lithuania in the international rankings in the social, economic, and political areas are compared further. The data of 1995 (if they were measured) and 2011 as well as of a number of years when the events politically and economically important to these countries took place: 2004 (when Lithuania joined the EU), 2009 (manifestation of the consequences of the global financial and economic crisis), 2010 (the presidential election year in Belarus[5]); 2011 is considered as particularly important to Belarus which found itself in the situation of the economic crisis delayed by political efforts; the consequences of the crisis had been experienced by the neighbouring countries two or three years earlier (see Table 1).

Table 1. Belarus and Lithuania in international rankings

Category evaluated. Agency name	Short description	Standing/index Belarus					Standing/index Lithuania				
		1995	**2004**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**1995**	**2004**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**
Human development United Nations Development Program (UNDP)	Human Development Index/ Complex development index in 183 countries	0.774 /**42**	0.794 /67	0.729/ 68	0.732 /61	0.756 /65	0.696 /**71**	0.857 /41	0.782 /46	0.783 /44	0.810 /40
Prosperity British non-partisan analytical centre Legatum	Legatum Global Prosperity. Well-being ranking in 104 countries	-	-	55	54	50	-	-	40	42	44
Economic freedom Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal	Economic freedom ranking. Evaluation of ten components of economic freedom with the scale of 0 (minimum) to 100 (maximum) in 179 countries	40.4	43.1	45.0	48.7	47.9	-	72.4	70.0	70.3	71.3
Doing business World Bank	Ranking of doing business. Evaluation of complexity of doing business. Countries are ranked by standings of 1 (highest) to 185 (lowest).	-	-	85	91	69	-	-	28	25	27

Table 1. Belarus and Lithuania in international rankings (*continued*)

			2003	2008	2010	2011		2003	2008	2010	2011
Development and transformation German Analytical Center Bertelsmann Stiftung	Bertelsmann index of development and changes in the area of democratisation and market relations. Evaluation of 128 developing countries. Status index (SI) ranks countries according to the level of development of democracy and market economy. Management index (MI) is management effectiveness evaluation 1 (lowest), 10 (highest) point.	-	3.99/86 (SI) 2.16/99 (MI)	4.47 /89 (SI) 2.89 /110 (MI)	4.52/ 96 (SI) 3.26/ 110 (MI)	4.36/ 101 (SI) 2.77/ 116 (MI)	-	9.57/2 (SI) 7.70/2 (MI)	9.16/ 6 (SI) 6.70 /15 (MI)	9.04/7 (SI) 6.91/ 10 (MI)	9.03/ 7(SI) 7.15/5 (MI)
Political freedom Freedom House	Political freedom index by Freedom House. Measurement of freedom degree (political and civil freedoms) in 193 countries. 1 (maximum), 10 (minimum).	-	6.0	6.5 (not free)	6.5. (not free)	6.5 (not free)	-	1.5	1 (free)	1 (free)	1 (free)

Table 1. Belarus and Lithuania in international rankings (*ended*)

Freedom of the Press Freedom House	Freedom of the press index. Annual qualitative evaluation of the freedom of mass media in 195 countries. Ranking and classification of countries into "free", "partially free", "not free"	70 not free	86 not free	92 not free	93 not free	93 not free	25 free	18 free	21 free	22 free	23 free
Development of NGOs[6] US Agency for International Development (USAID)	NGO Sustainability Index for 28 Central and Eastern European countries. Evaluation of progress in the development of the third sector. 1 point is the highest, 10 points is the lowest evaluation.	-	5.6	5.9	5.9	5.9	-	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.8

The source: Internet sites of international organisations including *the UNDP http://www.undp.org/; Legatum Institute http://www.prosperity.com/; Bertelsmann Foundation http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/; Heritage Foundation http://www.heritage.org/index/; World Bank http://www.doingbusiness.org/; Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org/; USAID http://www.usaid.gov*

In relation to international rankings we can see special attention paid by the Belarusian authorities to the HDI based on the UNDP methodology which is often referred to by the Belarusian officials as an example of a very positive international evaluation of the country. As seen in Table 1, in 1995-2004 Lithuania has risen in the rankings from the 71st to 41st position while Belarus which used to have a higher starting position (42nd in 1995) dropped to the 67th place in 2004 with insignificant changes in its indices in the following years (68 in 2009, 61 in 2010, and 65 in 2011). In the period of 2000-2011 Lithuania had an annual improvement in the HDI of 0.7 points while the index of Belarus was zero (UNDP 2011).

Despite active use of the HDI both in the political rhetoric of the Belarusian authorities[7] and in the justifications of the state programmes passed and implemented by the government, the peculiar feature of Belarus is that the national human development reports were not issued in 2005-2012.[8] A similar situation can be observed in Lithuania where the last national report is dated by 2003.

According to the classification used in the UNDP human development reports, before 2011 Belarus and Lithuania were in the group of countries with "high human development", in 2012 Lithuania joined the group with "very high human development". Belarus is found in the middle of its group in terms of the three main areas evaluated: gross income (wealth), healthcare, and education. The data provided in Table 2 demonstrates that both Belarus and Lithuania develop in the areas not related to income more successfully. For instance, when adjusting the HDI of 2010 (column 1) by the indices not related to income (column 7), the index increases from 0.732 to 0.763 for Belarus. The situation is similar with regard to Lithuania with the change of the relevant indices from 0.783 to 0.832. Thus, we can speak about relatively high results of Belarus and Lithuania in the area of human potential development not directly related to the economic growth. In economic terms (column 6) Lithuania was ahead of Belarus. However, Belarus has demonstrated a low degree of economic inequality with the Gini index of 28.8 vs. 35.9 for Lithuania (column 8), besides it has got the multidimensional poverty index equal to zero which is second to none in its group. Few of the former Socialist countries referred to the group of countries with "very high human potential development" can boast of the same zero indices (e.g., Slovakia and the Czech Republic). The indices of the number of people living below the poverty line (column 9) are also favourable to Belarus although this index is estimated by the national scale.

It is of interest that evaluations of socio-economic development of Belarus done according to the UNDP methodology drop with switching to the indices related to perception of individual welfare and well-being (e.g., "general life satisfaction", "satisfaction with welfare" (work, personal health, quality of life), and "meaningful life"). At the same time, according to some indices (in particular, "job satisfaction") the citizens of Belarus together with the citizens of two other former Soviet republics (Armenia and Georgia) demonstrate the lowest results in the group of countries with "high human development" (UNDP 2010: 177). Thus, the high HDI of Belarus predominantly refers to the structural level of

satisfaction of the population's basic needs with no evaluation of the qualitative subjective component of the quality of life.

Table 2. Main indices of development of Belarus and Lithuania in 2010

	HDI place (index)	**Life expectancy at birth, yrs**	**Average duration of studies, yrs**	**Expected duration of studies, yrs**	**GNI per capita (2008)**[9]	**HDI not connected to income**	**Gini index (World Bank)**	**Population below poverty line, %**
Belarus	61 (0.732)	69.6	9.3[10]	14.6	12.926	0.763	**28.8**	17.4
Lithuania	44 (0.783)	72.1	10.9	16	14.824	0.832	35.8	31.8[11]

Source: UNDP, 2010. Human development report 2010. The real wealth of nations: pathways to human development [on-line] Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/chapters/ru/ (date of access 29.10.2012).

The standing of Belarus in the global prosperity ranking of the British Legatum Institute modelled on the basis of evaluation of such areas as economy, entrepreneurship and opportunity, governance, education, health, safety and security, personal freedom, and social capital is also lower than that of Lithuania (cf. Table 1). However, Belarus kept improving its positions while Lithuania's indices deteriorated in the years under consideration. Thus, in 2009-2011 Lithuania moved down from the 40th to the 44th position in 2009-2011, being significantly affected by the global financial and economic crisis, while Belarus moved up from standing 55 to 50 following the logic of the internal politico-administrative cycle and demonstrating quantitative economic growth. The latter circumstance enabled the Belarusian authorities to use the ranking to demonstrate the socio-economic achievements of Belarus.[12]

By all the economic indicators in the rankings under consideration, Lithuania was ahead of Belarus. For instance, when evaluating the level of economic freedom (Heritage Foundation) the best index for Belarus was recorded in 2010 (48.7) while Lithuania's ranking in the same year was 70.3 (out of 100-point scale) (cf. Table 1). At the same time, the Belarusian government (as well as the governments of the other post-Soviet countries) strives specifically to improve the position of the country in economic evaluations while they affect the ability to attract investment and foreign loans. As the BISS research *Getting Belarus to the top 30 Countries with the best business climate* (2010) notes, "Economic liberalisation and the quality of market regulation improve not so much due to the pressure and demands of organisational growth of the national market actors but because of the tactics of the government to attract investment" (BISS 2010, 1). In particular, changes in the ranking of the business environment (doing business) of Belarus have been associated with the order of President A. Lukashenka to the government (2008) to "bring the country to the

group of the thirty world leaders in business" (BISS 2010, 3). According to Belarusian experts, the "ambiguity" of some aspects of the doing business ranking methodology allowed the Belarusian government "to successfully exploit loopholes in the methodology of the report and make a façade adjustment of economic institutions to meet the expectations of external actors" (BISS 2010, 2). As a result, in 2009-2011 Belarus managed to improve its standing in the ranking from the 85th to the 69th position.[13] Lithuania was, respectively, at the 28th (2009), 25th (2010), and 27th (2011) positions although the Lithuanian government tried to improve their country's standing in the ranking as well.

The evaluations in the political area are the most unfavourable ones to Belarus in the reports of international agencies. While analysing the situation with political freedoms, Freedom House places Belarus in the group of countries classified as "not free" (6 points in 2004 and 6.5 during all the other years under consideration). In turn, upon 2004 Lithuania (with its 1.5 points) has been classified as a "free" country with the highest index possible (1 point). In the Freedom House evaluation of the freedom of the press Belarus's standing slides down further year after year (No. 70 in 1995 and 93 in 2011) while Lithuania joins the thirty countries with the highest rankings (25th position in 1995 and 23rd in 2011). Significant differences between the countries can be also observed in the evaluation carried out by the US organisation *USAID* of the NGO Sustainability Index. The index of Belarus was 5.9 in 2011, and 2.8 of Lithuania (with the scale of 10 points). Belarus keeps its lower score against the background of high political indices of Lithuania if one looks at the Bertelsmann transformation index (BTI) which consists of two indices: the status index (SI) and management index (MI). The former ranks the countries according to the degree of democratisation and market economy while the latter does it based on the results of the governance of the country.[14] Since 2004 Belarus's position according to the index fell from the 86th to 101st while the management index from the 99th (2004) to 116th (2011). Among transitional and developing countries Lithuania was among the top ten countries with the highest results.

In the period of 2004-2011 Lithuania demonstrated higher results in all the international rankings under consideration. In the case of the HDI in 1995, Lithuania started from the position lower than that of Belarus (Lithuania was 71, Belarus 42). The evaluations of the social sphere of Belarus by international organisations are favourable to Lukashenka's regime; as a result the Belarusian authorities often publicly appeal to them. In the case of the Legatum Prosperity Index (even with a lower position than those of the country's neighbours) the authorities can still refer to it because of some progress in their performance. When it comes to the economic ranking both Belarus and Lithuania make attempts to technically improve their performance (e.g., in Doing Business). Negative evaluations of the political area in international rankings are at the centre of the Belarusian authorities' ideologised criticism pointing at the bias and prejudice of international institutions towards Belarus. All the political indices of Lithuania under consideration are higher. However, Belarus has not taken any steps to improve the country's external evaluation. The most likely explanation for this is lack of interest in a real political change and tendency of Lukashenka's regime to maintain the existing political status quo.

Painting the bus of Belarus's national statistics

Another important aspect in the evaluation of socio-economic and political development of the state is the situation with the national statistics. If Lithuania (although confronting some difficulties) uses the standardised European indices, in the case of Belarus the national statistics has a number of issues shaped by a closed non-democratic political system. The most essential problems include:

- an outdated methodology of measuring socio-economic indices (e.g., while evaluating employment and unemployment, the share of private and public enterprises);
- significant differences in international and national parameters and scales used to evaluate socio-economic development leading to differences in national and international indices (in particular, poverty studies);
- dependence of national socio-economic indices on the political cycle (e.g., the statistical "adaptation" of the salary amount to the level of 500 US dollars declared in Lukashenka's pre-election promises);
- simulation of changes in the national statistical system under the pressure of external actors (in particular, the World Bank15).

The modern statistics of Belarus retains a number of typical Soviet-era shortcomings. The principal ones are related to lack of reforms in the public administration system within which statistical agencies are a de facto part of the administrative system as well as to the Belarusian economy which still remains a state-planned one to a significant degree (Skuratovich 2012). The main objective of statistics in such circumstances is to provide information to the central government bodies which is its main customer. A minor innovation of the post-Soviet period in relation to the actors receiving statistical information is the obligation of Belstat to exchange information with the statistical authorities of the neighbouring countries and provision of information pursuant to the international treaties (cl. 9.3 of the National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus Regulations).

Besides, the statistical bodies preserve control functions in addition to the main task of information accumulation. For instance, paragraph 1.3., article 3 of the Governmental Statistics Law (No. 345-Z dd. 28 November 2004) provides them with the right "to check accuracy of the primary statistical data by comparing them with the data of the primary accounting documents, visit the territory and premises of the public bodies (except residential) to that end, other organisations and self-employed persons." The latter circumstance is regarded by the World Bank as contradicting the principle of confidentiality of receiving information leading to its possible inaccuracy or respondents' avoiding answers (Olenski, Tomashevich 2007: 40-41).

In Belarus as well as in other post-Soviet countries, international institutions (the IMF, World Bank, OECD, etc.) act as promoters of innovations and transformations of the national statistics system. Among other changes lobbied in the Belarusian system in the 1990s-2000s were the improvement of the legislative framework, of the institutional system of national statistics, of the procedure to calculate the macroeconomic data (in

particular, the GDP) as well as of the practices of delivery and dissemination of statistical information (UNCE 2007). However, international experts noted the areas requiring major changes in their evaluations, including the demography statistics (in particular, employment issues), tourism, and agriculture. Also, the need to improve the methodology and sample surveys was identified (some of the steps have been taken in this direction in the recent years in Belarus).

At the legislative level a number of regulatory acts were passed in the area of national statistics after 1991. The normative documents include, in particular, the National Programme for Transition of the Republic to the Internationally Accepted Accounting and Statistics System (approved by resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus No. 523 dd. 27 August 1992) to adapt the system of accounting and statistics to the international standards along with the transition to the formation of national accounts and the definition of the GDP as the main index of the state's economic activity. With the assistance of the World Bank a project to carry out a selective national household survey covering about 6,000 families was developed.[16] In 1997, taking into account some international recommendations and standards, including the Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics of the UN (1993), the Governmental Statistics Law was adopted. In 2004, a new Governmental Statistics Law came into force (No. 345-Z dd. 28 November 2004). The law included the principle of confidentiality and "depersonalisation of the primary statistical data and terminology definitions in statistics; it also determined the principles of formation of the statistical register (Olenski, Tomasevich 2007: 42). With the participation of the World Bank a governmental program creating a unified information system of the statistics of the Republic of Belarus for 2007-2012 was developed and adopted (approved by Decree No. 665 of the President of the Republic of Belarus dd. 13 November 2006).

In terms of institutionalisation of the statistical accounting system in 2008, the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis was converted into the National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus (Belstat) (Decree No. 445 of the President of the Republic of Belarus dd. 26 August 2008). At the official level, this change was due to the requirements of the "principle of independence of statistical activities," although in reality it brought Belstat out of control of the government subordinating it to the president (for instance, in accordance with clause 10 of the National Statistical Committee Regulations the head of Belstat is appointed directly by the President and is a member of the government after the changes introduced). This formal change made in accordance with the recommendations of international institutions (UNECE 2007) did not affect the actual situation: functionally Belstat remained in the system of public administration. Moreover, according to the World Bank, in the current model of national statistics the chances of duplication of information collected by different authorities are very high along with a limited ability to control the methodological unity and quality of data (Olenski, Tomasevich 2007: 20-21).

Methodological weaknesses of the national statistics can be considered on the example of unemployment evaluation. For instance, according to the National Statistical Committee, the unemployment rate in Belarus after 2003 (with the highest of the recorded

figures of 3.1%) declined steadily, and during the period 2009-2011 was, respectively, 0.9%, 0.7%, and 0.6%.[17] At the same time, the basic measurement unit used was the number of the officially registered unemployed who are registered in the labour, employment and social protection department. Under the current law, the officially registered unemployed person is entitled to a benefit the amount of which is about 15 euros per month; the person is also subject to mandatory participation in paid public work up to 3 days a month as well as subject to compliance with other procedural aspects. The result of this registration procedure is a limited number of the registered unemployed. However, indirect evidence of their higher amount is provided even by the official statistics which supplies some information about the number of the employable population employed and dismissed obtained during the survey of households in 2012. For example, according to the National Statistical Committee, in January and February 2012 the number of employees hired by enterprises of different forms of ownership was 238,367 persons while the number of the dismissed reached 266,641 people. The tendency of excess of the amount of the dismissed persons over the number of the employed ones was seen in all the spheres of employment after the economic crisis of 2011, with the exception of trade and agriculture.[18] However, the data on the number of the registered unemployed has actually remained the same at the level of the statistical error. An additional factor impacting the real unemployment rate in Belarus is the lack of controlled borders with the Russian Federation, one of the main migration directions of Belarusian citizens. However, the official information disclosed regarding the number of Belarusian citizens employed in Russia is currently non-existent partly because of the lack of measurement tools in the existing conditions.

The problem with identification of the real number of the unemployed in Belarus is partly recognised at the governmental level. Thus, in 2010, with the support provided by the World Bank, a sample survey of households was carried out in order to study the unemployment problems (resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus No. 1605 dd. 1 November 2010 on carrying out a household sample survey in order to study population employment problems in Belarus). As part of this measure, quarterly surveys of employment in accordance with the methodology of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) were planned after the pilot studies conducted in 2011. However, at present the indices of the unemployment level according to the number of the officially registered unemployed are used in the national statistics and while compiling the rankings of international organisations.

The poverty and need indices can serve as an example of divergence of the evaluation criteria of socio-economic indices in the international organisations' reports and national statistics (Chubrik 2008; Chubrik, Shimanovich 2010). In Belarus, the index of the minimum subsistence budget (MSB) defined as the "monetary value of the subsistence minimum" (the minimum set of goods and services necessary for preservation of human life and health) as well as obligatory payments and fees is used (art. 1 of the Subsistence Minimum Law of the Republic of Belarus).[19] On an average, the monetary value of the MSB per capita of the main socio-demographic groups in the period of May-July 2012

amounted to 743,020 Belarusian rubles a month (about 70 euros) which is higher than the indices used by some international institutions (e.g., the World Bank) of 1 US dollar and 2.15 US dollars per day in purchasing power parity (PPP). According to the national index, in Belarus there was a steady decline in the number of people living below the poverty line from 41.9% in 2000 to 5.2% of the population in 2010 in 2000-2010 (cf. Table 3).

Table 3. Distribution of population by the ratio of the per capita resources available with the minimum subsistence budget (in % of the total)

Criterion/year	**1995**	**2000**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**
Below the minimum subsistence budget	38.4	**41.9**	12.7	11.1	7.7	6.1	5.4	5.2	**7.3**

Source: Belstat, sample household living standards survey. Available at: http//|belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/indicators/house/php (date of access 14/09/2012).

At the same time, according to the expert assessment of poverty done by the IPM, in 2008 the amount of the resources corresponding to the poverty threshold (or "low income") in Belarus ranged from 870 euros per year (absolute poverty, the poverty threshold is the minimum subsistence) to nearly 1,800 per year (relative poverty calculated by the methodology used by the Eurostat) (Chubrik, Shimanovich 2010: 6). The result is that the experts claimed the need for the recalculation of poverty in Belarus using the modified OECD equivalence scale. When Laaken indicators introduced in 2007 by the Council of Europe were used in calculations, the level of relative poverty in Belarus increased (cf. Table 4).

Table 4. Certain Laaken indicators for Belarus, 2008

	Relative poverty		**Absolute poverty**
	National equivalence scale	Modified equivalence scale OECD	
Poverty, euros p.a.	1,466.6	1,778.4	866.7
Poverty rate, % of population	12.0	12.5	6.1
Poverty death, % of poverty threshold	16.6	16.9	13.8

Source: research by Chubrik, A., Shimanovich, G., *2010. Sotsialnye posledstvija ekonomicheskogo krizisa v Belarusi i napravlnenija izmenenij sotsialnoj politiki (Social consequences of the economic crisis in Belarus and direction of changes of social policy). Minsk: Issledovatelskij tsentr IPM, rabochij material WP/10/01. s. 20. Available at: http://www.research.by/publications/wp/1001/ (date of access 15.09.2012).*

However, in technical terms the techniques and standards used by Belstat for compilation and calculation of statistical indicators are updated regularly. For instance, most of them were introduced in 2010 at the latest.[20] We can mention Belarus's joining the Special Data Dissemination Standards (SDDS) of the IMF in 2004 as a particular step in bringing the national statistics in line with international standards which presupposes a unified provision of economic and financial data.[21]

It is peculiar that in this case the succession to the Soviet statistics is proclaimed even at the level of the description of the National Statistical Committee's activities. For example, as a justification of the tools used it is noted that "since 1932, in all the union republics of the former Soviet Union a sample survey of the budgets of families (households) was completed. At present, such a survey is the only information base to study the living standards of the population."[22] The main drawback of the previous household surveys may be the use in the data analysis of the predominantly regional (by provinces) classification of the results, with the exception of selection of the families having minors as a type, so that there was no information concerning the level of well-being depending on the type of settlement, gender and age composition. This fact limited the opportunities to use the data received for planning and developing public programmes.

Attempts to correct these defects were made in 2011 when, in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding (dd. 25 July 2011) between the National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus and the UNICEF in Belarus, a multiple index cluster survey to evaluate the position of children and women was initiated (resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus No. 1504 dd. 9 November 2011). In 2011 a sample survey of private plots of the citizens permanently residing in rural areas was launched (resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus No. 88 dd. 26 January 2011). However, evaluation of the performance of the measures is currently not possible due to lack of information.

The political and business governance cycle shaped around the electoral cycle influences some of the socio-economic indices in Belarus. This trend is most obvious in the analysis of labour remuneration costs and payment of social benefits. Thus, according to Belstat's data the average labour remuneration was approximately 530 US dollars in December 2010 corresponding to the pre-election promises of President A. Lukashenka. However, a year later, in December 2011 the average salary was 339.7 US dollars.[23]

Conclusion

The national statistics in Belarus is important for research because its flaws affect the quality of information used to describe the socio-economic situation in the country. The methodological solution of the current situation could be the use of indices of international reports for analysis, but they are often based on the national calculation system in numerous cases, which could result in inaccuracy of any further evaluations. Thus, the possibility to use the national statistical data is limited by the inability to control the quality of the information contained therein.

Dependence of the national statistics system on the political regime is an important issue. In the case of Lithuania existing within the logic of transparent democratic governance the standardised European indices are applied. In the conditions of Belarus's non-democratic regime (as well as in the case of Lithuania, following the pressure of international actors) changes are of imitative, formal nature while the statistical data produced are an "internal consumption product" of governmental agencies and are de facto controlled by the head of state at the institutional level, on the one hand; statistical data are instrumentally used for propaganda purposes in Belarus, on the other hand. This trend manifests itself both at the level of the political discourse and the indices themselves modelled on the basis of political requirements and dependent on the politico-business cycle in the country.

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Notes

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2 For instance, the HDI demonstrating positive evaluations of Belarus' socio-economic development is widely used in the rhetoric of the Belarusian authorities while political indices with negative evaluations (for example, those of Freedom House) are criticised as "biased and politicised".

3 Belstat's official Internet site. [Electronic resource]. Access mode: http://belstat.gov.by/.

4 [Electronic resource]. Access mode: http://lithuania.mfa.gov.by/rus/rb/facts/ (date of access 27/09/2012).

5 If the indices of the identified years were not available the indices of the closest years were used (with a proper reference).

6 We used the data of 2009 in the evaluation of the NGO development in the second column for each country.

7 For example, the speech of President A. Lukashenka at the 4th All-Belarusian Assembly (2010). [Electronic resource]. Date of access 18/09/2012: http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2010/12/06ic_news_116_356604/ as well as the section Glavnye printsypy gosudarstvennoj politiki Belarusi (Main Principles of Public Policy in Belarus) at the official website of the President of the Republic of Belarus [Electronic resource]. Date of access 18/09/2012: http://www.president.gov.by/press10663.html

8 The author's correspondence with the officials of the national UNDP office in Belarus shows that the reports were not drawn up after that year while the next national report is scheduled following the results of 2012.

9 It is provided pursuant to the data obtained by the means of the UNDP calculation methodology used in the Human Development Report of 2010 (UNDP 2010).

10 According to the information of the UNDP report; the data of the earlier period were used.

[11] More detailed information about this can be found in the press release Income and level of life of the population, poverty risk of poverty (English) (11/09/2012) on the site of the Lithuanian Department of Statistics. Available at: http://www.stat.gov.lt/en/news/view/?id=10952 (date of access 19/09/2012).

[12] For example, the news item by the first channel of the Belarusian Television and Radio Company (2/11/2011) "The British Institute Legatum conducted the independent annual study of the level of well-being in different countries". It is available at: http://www.tvr.by/rus/society.asp?id=57140 (date of access 19/09/2012).

[13] Belarus had even higher standing but upon the changes that were introduced in the methodology of calculating the given ranking in 2010 the results turned out to be less impressive.

[14] For more details see the corresponding section at the official site of the BTI. [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-7416E337-45920379/bst_engl/hs.xsl/307.htm (date of access 5/09/2012).

[15] The analysis of the system of Belarusian statistics regarding its correspondence to the international standards was carried out by the representatives of international organisations interested in obtaining standardised information about the socio-economic situation in Belarus. The most interesting applied research includes the project Global Evaluation of the Statistical System of the Republic of Belarus realised with the financial support of the TACIS in 2007, the goal of which was to assess the system of statistics and its correspondence to the European standards as well as to define the main directions of improvement. The analytical report of the World Bank consultants Olenski and Tomashevich (2007) contains a detailed analysis and assessment of the system of statistics of Belarus along with recommendations for the development of the national statistics system (NSS).

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[17] The National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus. Number of the unemployed registered in the labour, employment and social protection agencies". [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/indicators/labor.php. (Date of access 12/09/2012).

[18] The National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus: data about population employment in January-April 2012. [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/indicators/pressrel/employment1.php (date of access 12/10/1212).

[19] The cost of the set of goods and services that includes food (based on 2,700 calories per adult per day making up 54.0% of the set), non-food products (clothes 17.4%, household goods 3.3%, drugs, hygiene goods 2.2%), services and obligatory payments (utilities 16.0%, household and transportation services 6.6%, fees and payments 0.3%). According to the data of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection for September 2010. [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://mintrud.gov.by/ru/socnorm/norm1 (date of access 14/09/2012).

[20] The section "Methodology" of the Belstat Internet site. [Electronic resource]. Mode of access: http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/statinstrum/methodiki/main.php (date of access 28/09/2012).

[21] Information in accordance with the "Special Standard of Data Dissemination" of the IMF is provided in a separate section on the Belstat site. [Electronic resource]. Mode of access http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/specst/np.htm (date of access 15/09/2012).

[22] The subsection "About organizing the carrying out of a sample survey of households in the Republic of Belarus" on the site of the National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus.

[Electronic Resource]. Mode of access: http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/households/1.php (date of access 15.09.2012).

23 The information provided is given with the account of the conversion from Belarusian rubles to US dollars: http://mojazarplata.by/main/srednjaja-zarplata/dinamika-izmenenija-srednej-zarplaty-v-Belarusi-za-2004-2010-tablicy#-3

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RESEARCH PROFILE OF COUNTRYSIDE LIFE-SUCCESS STRATEGIES IN THE CONDITIONS OF A BORDER REGION

Abstract

The article analyses research profile of countryside life-success strategies in Kharkiv Region in the conditions of a border region. The author arrives at the conclusion that the "life-success strategy" category makes it possible to study the countryside at the microlevel. In its turn, implementation of such research is possible with application of qualitative sociological research methods such as biographical interview.

Keywords: countryman, success, life success, strategy of life success, everyday life, biographical interview.

In sociology, the issue of the border region as well as the issue of the countryside has been ignored by researchers for a long time. Nevertheless, the processes of globalization draw attention to borders and border regions in the modern world as the modern border represents not only the limits of state sovereignty but also the area of everyday practices and development strategies of life success. In addition, the feature of the border (its protection, contacts, rigidness/softness) is an indicative factor of everyday practice changes and development strategies construction in the countryside.

As for Ukraine, according to Bobkov and Tereshkovich, the state is at a stage of regional formation or acquiring regional names the objective of which is to realize "cultural self-sufficiency and self-sufficiency of its "border-region existence". The border-region existence can be considered either in the sense of moving away from communism but still being dependent on its past or in the sense of striving for the Western values, promising some kind of invariant of the future to be assigned [1, p. 6]. Under these conditions there evolve new forms of everyday practices, life strategies to be found in the border

region intercultural dialogue in the countryside, democracy and authoritarianism, globalism and regionalism, urbanization and ruralization.

In the modern society characterized by the tendency of individualization, the concept of life strategy is used more often in correlation with success category forming a set of collocations in the scientific area. Due to this fact, before going over to the profile of empirical research of development strategies in the border-region countryside it is necessary to consider such concepts as "strategy", "life strategy", "life success", "success" as well as to analyze the main trends in the research of these concepts in a direct or indirect way.

One of the features of modern society is a change in the attitude to the issue of success as a life value. The issues of success and success in personal strategies have been more and more frequently found in the works by sociologists supporting the public need of a constructive, positive direction of social-reality analysis. The features of the social situation of personal development (including economic, social, political, and cultural processes) form the model of a successful person (in the personal, professional and social sense) as an ideal in the public mind. That is why success and life achievements gradually find their place among the most important values of the modern person.

According to general opinion, society is described by the process of "social success ideology" [2] formation, which is a characteristic of the European model of society but was rejected by communism. It is interesting to trace this process in the border-region countryside as the region of this type remains a carrier of unique, original, and authentic features as well as one of European and post-Soviet influences. Therefore, the public mind of the countryside is oriented at social success. The vectorization process to achieve success in different spheres of life, desire to meet social standards of progress, demonstration of progress signs become the factors which determine the behaviour of social agents and affect countryside social-space formation.

The modern society is characterized by the changes of value space and the public idea of social success and legitimate methods and strategies to achieve it. The idea of success is complex and involves different disciplines. It was studied in a set of works in psychology, philosophy, sociology, pedagogy, political science, and management. The sociological aspect of success research is presented in the works by M. Weber, W. Sombart, J. Schumpeter; A. Zdravomyslov; A. Sogomonov, V. Yadov who describe the substance and structure of success. A large number of works research life-success factors (U. Beck, P. Berger, T. Veblen, A. Giddens, T. Luckmann, G. Mead, A. Schuts). Nevertheless, the issue of social success has not been studied sufficiently in sociological literature as the majority of researchers aim to study discreet aspects and elements of this phenomenon. The idea of "success" is usually considered in a more narrow sense as the success of a certain action or activity in the professional, educational or production spheres.

The category of success in sociology characterizes social being of a social subject, describes and structures the living space and serves as an indicator of efficiency of the social system as a whole. The peculiarity of the sociology subject field in the study of success is to focus on the analysis of current views on success and successful people, value orientation,

symbols and ideas associated with success, criteria and factors of achieving success which affect the progress of the person, strategies and practices of social agents in a successful activity.

The formation of the view on success also depends on the social and historical context. Therefore, before studying it in an empirical way, e.g. by making a biographical interview, it is appropriate to analyze the modern consideration of its idea and nature.

The idea of success has grown so popular both in the public and scientific spheres and is used so often in different contexts that it is more and more difficult to understand its meaning. Success can be defined as the accomplishment of an individual but socially recognized achievements giving a person the possibility to stabilize and (or) to increase resources. In this sense, success is a key category, a link connecting personal and social things with the "social gene" in which the complete hierarchy of public norms and values is encoded [3].

However, in the modern transformational society which is a feature of the border-region countryside, the two components of success mentioned above find themselves in conformity with each other rarely. Access to the resources in the crisis society is of a different nature.

Thus, the success strategy is realized in a modified way. The German sociologist S. Neckel called this tendency a transition from the achievement society to the success society where success does not depend on publicly meaningful results of activities. It is worth pointing out that T. Veblen observed a certain contradiction between success and real merits and achievements in American society where normal success was considered the one that required hard work, education, etc., which is not a norm in the lower class [4]. The Russian researcher Golbert described this situation as the transition "from the deserved success to the success without merits" [5]. In his opinion, by the mid-20th century the principle of merit in success played the dominant role representing the only principle which serves as the basis for the fair social-structure concept. The determination of success by means of merits and achievements was an ideal and can be supported by classic sociological literature.

According to the Polish researcher Mizinska, success without considering real merits and socially recognized achievements is interpreted as talented luck that does not depend on efforts made by the person [6]. "The man of call" was replaced by "the man of success" who completely believes in chance anticipating a lucky combination of circumstances or trying to influence these circumstances. Therefore, striving for success is similar to a lottery the result of which does not depend on individual efforts and decisions to reach life goals.

The above-mentioned "demonstration" of success does not correspond to the accepted success ideal considered to be the standard. On this account, it is appropriate to use the terms "successful failure" and "unsuccessful success" [7]. In this case, modern science cannot answer what real success is. Whether it is a theoretical set which, in spite of its own correspondence to the ideals, is not often practiced by society in everyday life or it is a phenomenon characteristic of public consciousness.

The idea of life success is found in much empirical research and sometimes it does not have the proper theoretical support as the terms "success" and "life success" are not clearly defined and developed in social sciences. This situation is partly explained by the fact that the "whole categorial set of notions which define the phenomenon of success, especially life success, is described as contradictory. The meaning and criteria of their usage are always open for discussion and reviewing, their content is not determined and, probably, cannot be in principle" [8, p.45]. However, this statement does not decrease topicality and necessity of academic enquiry aimed at the operationalised definition and differentiation of the notions.

The term "success" which is broadly interpreted as "life success" but not just as a result achieved of a certain social activity or project occupies one of the main places in the cultural value system determining the limits of life motivation and personal perspectives. In the sociological context the term "success" defines the transition from an individual action to social recognition of certain social practices ingrained as simulated structural elements of society. Thus, in this context, it is appropriate to define "life success" as subjective evaluation of social-practice results which can also be manifested as a publicly meaningful and recognized result of a social activity performed by an individual at the objective level.

However, some sociologists think that it is important to differentiate life success as one of the individual's subjective assessment of his/her activity and as social one which is recognized by society. The point of this differentiation is that the term "success" has social and personalized content reflecting a contradiction between social, cultural and collective understanding of success which is measured by an array of definite demonstrative criteria and personal understanding of life success expressed through objective criteria which could not always be measured. For example, the Ukrainian sociologist I. Yarema points at "life" and "social" successes claiming that the peculiarity of life success is that it is based on personal subjective evaluation of social practices and this evaluation may not meet the socially accepted standards of success. The internal satisfaction with the results of an activity is not always accompanied by the recognition of these achievements by society. Besides, social success represents a socially meaningful and recognized result of an individual's social actions [9] which is absurd within sociology as sociology studies phenomena in sociological terms. In this case, equaling life success to the individual, leaving out the social one, it would be necessary for the author to consider the psychological and sociological aspects of success.

In any case, social success cannot be assigned to a separate category as an achievement recognized by society in accordance with collective standards of success and current perception principles, does not add to but determines (the individual) life success of the agent and cannot exist separately. On the contrary, (the individual) life success will be defined with social norms and rules set in society. In other words, social success and life success are equal terms in sociology, and there is no use differentiating them in terms of their meaning.

It is more rational to consider the levels of life-success strategy construction which takes place both at the social and individual levels. A clearer answer to this question is given by the phenomenological paradigm which studies and brings "a priori…essential necessities" [10, p. 88]. "In comprehension of the whole system of consciousness formation" constructing the objective world (immanently) [10, p.128] and orienting at the "other", the individual's life success is formed.

Thus, life success is the positive result of the agent's practice performance in a certain field of activity achieving goals, which is evaluated by both the agent himself/herself and society in a way of rewarding and recognizing. Therefore, life-success strategy can be described as one aimed at achieving a desired goal and as a complex of the agent's practices (consistent practical actions) consciously directed by him and determined by social standards.

The phenomenological approach suggests that every individual develops his/her own life strategy in his/her social reality where the perception of some parts of this strategy is shared among other society members while the perception of the others can be different. These strategies can largely change when exposed to the influence of external factors, e.g. such transformational alterations or inner processes taking place within the individual. However, there is a possibility of the reverse process. For example, describing the nature of changes during the post-Soviet transformations T. Zaslavskaya points out: "The changes of typical behavioral patterns lead to the transformation of the practices concerned, and accumulating shifts in the practices, realizing that or another institution, results in the changes of this institution's role" [11, p.15]. Thus, life strategies chosen by different groups of population have a crucial impact on the development of transformational processes.

The term "life strategy" in the sociological aspect is rooted in the phenomenological tradition of sociology. One the first studies of this issue is considered to be "The Polish Peasant in Europe and America" by Thomas and Znaniecki. This work is the basis for analyzing the idea of "the life journey of a person". Further development of the personal life journey issue is associated with such scientists as Berger, Luckmann, Schuts, Goffman, Garfinkel whose studies describe the life strategy in connection with subjectivity and intersubjectivity of a person's "life world", "action strategy" and interaction as well as through the empirical study of human behaviour addressing everyday life.

In life strategy the central point of transformation logics is the idea of the life world. The life world is referred to as the environment of human activity which is realized by the person and explicated in the existential perspective. This idea is very close to one of everyday life which is defined as a natural pace of actions developing beyond the rational way of thinking, i.e. reproduction of the same attitudes, lack of intention to transform the surrounding reality, a non-problematic worldview.

The life world outlines dependence on the traditions of social surrounding and the interests of the referent group. However, this term provides the characteristic of the object only while it is important for the strategy to have not only the object but the method to interpret it as well. For the purpose of determining the background of a situation reflected

in the person's consciousness, it is appropriate to practice the biographical method of research which deals with analyzing oral and recorded life stories from the perspective of the present serving self-identification of the individual on the basis of the previous generations' experience. Just as it is impossible to understand country life without historical records, so it is impossible to develop a life strategy from the scratch without the knowledge of the previous experience. The support of stories, besides life principles, is necessary because, on the everyday life basis, the person's thinking is based on life examples, the so-called narratives rather than conceptual systems. Life stories make it possible to build cause-and-effect connections between the past, the present, and the future on which the success of personal self-realization depends.

It is important to point out that the article focuses on personal life strategies but not on one of politics which develops the strategy for people by means of making reforms. Political reforms obviously lead to social changes, but they are not always reflected in personal life strategies. It is important for us to understand how life strategies are developed at the microlevel under the current conditions of transformations providing a set of scenarios. This is what is important to study in the conditions of a border region, as the individual in his/her personal biography adapts to the changes in institutional formations. In the border region, these changes can evolve in the crossing point of two so-called fields of attraction such as the European influence and post-Soviet past experience.

Given insufficient research methodological basis and adequate approaches to the study of the countryside in sociological terms, social countryside study applying the new approach involving the border-region methodology provides ambitious opportunities. The true picture of the countryside social space in sociology, in spite of numerous theoretical attempts, does not show the problem of the country dwellers completely. It remains both problematic in society and complex in research.

The interest in the research of the countryside as a regional and local range of issues, including the issues of the border region, is not accidental. Under the conditions of globalization which, according to M. McLuhan, turns the humankind into the "global village", the region remains the carrier of distinctive, unique, single and authentic features. In this sense it resists universalization as its natural counterbalance and balance. In addition, sociocultural transformations determining the humankind development dynamics at the beginning of the 21st century rendered importance to the social development of the countryside as a border-region territory. It is explained by the fact that the borders in the modern world are no longer considered to be barriers and this turned border regions into contact zones in which cultures interaction and sociocultural innovations take place. Nowadays bordering, remoteness from the centre are no longer regarded as features of cultural delay but as opportunities for self-development. This development is demonstrated in the agent's everyday life and everyday practices which in their turn construct life-success strategies.

Taking into consideration countryside transformations, the countryside development programme has remained one of the priorities of the national projects for 20 years and unfortunately this programme has not been successfully developed so far. The Ukrainian

countryside reform, as a certain success strategy at the institutional level (microlevel), does not lead to a transformation to improve the life of the rural population. The typical village is undergoing the process of destruction both in Ukraine and all over the world under the impact of such modernization processes as the industrial-society development and urbanization rise. This results in elimination of such characteristics as self-sufficiency and isolation. However, it is impossible to be certain that the village disappears as an autonomous social community with its own system of values and behavioural patterns involved in farming and the rural lifestyle. It is appropriate to study the countryside at the microlevel analyzing "life-success strategy" categories, as the period of adaptation to the new conditions encourages changes of the typical everyday-life strategies leading to the transformation of certain practices, and accumulating shifts in the practices result in the change of the social system.

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Adi Schnytzer, Alina Zubkovych

COMPARATIVE SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE: THE CHISINAU AND TIRASPOL NATIONAL HISTORICAL MUSEUMS

Abstract

In this paper we compare the representations of the exhibitions dedicated to World War II (WW2), located at the National Historical Museums of Chisinau in Moldova and Tiraspol in Transnistria respectively. We provide general descriptions of the museums' contents in order to understand the more subtle policies of the museums, as well as to highlight the meaning-forming points of the countries' histories, as they are presented today. We will show that in Moldova, the national museum engages in rampant symbolic violence, while in Tiraspol symbolic violence, accompanied by classic displays of Sovietism such as, industrialization, militarism and sports prowess, is used as an element in the legitimization of Transnistrian independence.

Keywords: museums, Moldova, Tiraspol, Chisinau, Second World War, representations, symbolic violence.

Introduction

In this paper we compare the representations of the exhibitions dedicated to World War II (WW2), located at the National Historical Museums of Chisinau[1] in Moldova and Tiraspol in Transnistria respectively. We provide general descriptions of the museums' contents in order to understand the more subtle policies of the museums as well as to highlight the meaning-forming points of the countries' histories, as they are presented today. We will show that in Moldova, the national museum engages in rampant symbolic violence, while in Tiraspol symbolic violence, accompanied by classic displays of Sovietism such as industrialization, militarism and sports prowess is used as an element in the legitimization of Transnistrian independence.

Both countries were parts of various state associations to the middle or end of WW2; both countries were subsequently transformed into republics of the Soviet Union. Thus, Bessarabia was part of Greater Romania and began WW2 as an ally of Nazi Germany. The area, which is called today "Pridnesrovie" (or Transnistria[2]) had been part of the Russian Empire, then part of it was annexed to Greater Romania and the other part to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Both cities had periods of German occupation (German- Romanian in Moldova).

The chosen countries had a significant Jewish population which was decimated by genocide during World War II (Gregorovich,; Burakovskiy, Dumitru). The problematic and incomplete reflection of the Jewish question is typical of both museums. It is interesting that with respect to the Holocaust both museums agree. There is no denial but, equally pernicious, no blame is apportioned to anyone; it was simply something that happened during World War II. As we shall see, aside from this issue, the museums under consideration differ markedly with respect to the history of the two sides of the Dniester River.

Our basic research method is discourse analysis in the interpretation of researchers Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Jørgensen M., Phillips L. J). The essence of their method is closely related to the logic of the selected methodology: to understand the context, and not to take fragmentary objects for analysis. For a detailed analysis they developed the necessary elements, such as: articulation, nodal point, and locus. These elements help to analyze, explain and interpret data. We then show how this view of the exhibits helps bring out the various layers of symbolic violence.

We pay particular attention to plaques located near the stands, because we see them as providing essential information about the route of the exhibition. Being communicative acts, they construct imaginable myths of history, which play a role in the projection of identities. We proceed with a separate presentation of the two museums and interweave the analysis with a descriptive presentation.

National Museum of Archaeology and History of Moldova

At the entrance of the museum stands the monument of the Capitoline Wolf, which, of course, symbolizes the founding of Rome (fig. 1). A similar monument stands near the central entrance of the National Museum of Romanian History in Bucharest. This is a clear indication that Chisinau is a Latin and, by implication, not a Slav city.

The Chisinau museum has two floors and one basement floor, where the newest exhibition is presented (fig. 1). Its title is «Soviet Moldova between Myths and the Gulag». The right part of the first floor is occupied by a furniture store. For the period of observation, which took place in November 2012, there were four temporary and two permanent exhibitions. The temporary ones were: an exhibition dedicated to the "Russian-Turkish" war of 1812 and to the "Gulag". The permanent exhibition presents the history of Moldova from 500,000 BC until the day of independence. Each exhibition hall employs a different mix of languages. Some use three languages (Romanian, English and Russian), while others pro-

vide only Romanian and English. The second option is more typical of newer expositions, such as the presentation of the Gulag, although whether this is related to the topic or not is unclear.

The exposition begins from the second floor. The first hall is »500,000 – to the middle of the 14th century«, after which follows a narration of the Medieval Moldavian state period, the chronological frame being the 13th through the 18th centuries. The central figure located here is Stephen the Great. He is one of the key heroes for the post-Soviet Moldova, a product of re-actualization of the national emancipation discourse of "moldovisation" (Portnov). A monument of the emperor also decorates the main square of the central park and Chisinau's main street is named in his honor. Historically, Stephen the Great has several characteristics which add to his status: as Prince of Moldavia between the middle of the 15th and the beginning of 16th centuries, as a holy person in Christianity and as an opponent of the Ottoman Empire. The other important figure but less powerful in terms of visibility in the process of constructing the modern Moldavian identity is Dimitrie Cantemir (Gusterin P.). He symbolizes the "cultural icon" of the country.

The exhibits in the next hall "present history of Bessarabia" during the tsarist occupation (1812-1918). It should be noted that this is the first time that the term »occupation« appears. It seems to be a modern approach to automatically mark everything connected with Russian power as an occupation. On the other hand, the term »occupation« is never used when the territories of the modern country were part of other political associations. Why not say "Nazi Occupation" or "Romanian Occupation" or "occupation by medieval kings"? Further, the implication that only one foreign country has been an aggressor follows from the observation that other terms such as "annexation" and "foreign domination", are all related exclusively to either the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union. This failure to distinguish between these two "occupiers" does mean, however, that the official aversion is ethnically rather than politico-ideologically based[3].

The 19th century is presented via every-day life perspectives. We find clothes and other items belonging to the country's peasantry, the magazine »Bessarabia life«, and a photo of mill factory workers.

Finally we stand near the last chronological temporary exhibition hall covering the years 1900-1940. It claims to present the social-cultural development of Moldova from the beginning of the 20th century, World War I, and the national movement of 1917. 1917 has a special connotation in the grand historical narrative of the museum and is highlighted by the creation of the first Bessarabian parliament (Sfatul Tarii). Sfatul Tarii would appear to be the other nodal point of the Moldavian history together with Stephen the Great presented from a modern perspective.

Another event closely connected with the parliament's appearance is the protectorate of Romania (27 March 1918). This event is represented first as a "consolidation" and secondly as a "high development of culture and education" period. As the relevant plaque states: "the integration process of Bessarabia into political, economic and cultural life of greater Romania leads to important socio-economical changes, especially to high de-

velopment of culture and education. Documentary evidence displayed at the exhibition testifies to this fact". This short piece of information presents the opposite strategy concerning relations with Russia. Here there is a construction of positive relations regarding Romania. The construction of the dichotomy of Great Romania-Russian/Soviet Empire appears as the main conflict in the museum's temporal exhibitions. It is a seeming paradox, but the relation to "Other"[4] allows to present the Moldavian history from the current viewpoint. This position divides the space into black and white, where black is the Russian Empire (tsarist occupation) and white is Great Romania (consolidation, development). This period is shown through World War I and through significant figures from politics (political activists and writers like Constantin Stere, Liviu Deleanu) and cultural life (opera singers like Anastasia Dicescu, Maria Cebotari; conductor, composer Alexandru Cristea; painters Nicolae Coleadici, Rostislav Ocusco and Claudio Cobizev). Economic success is shown with the help of "Production of the industrial enterprises in Bessarabia". The requirements of Symbolic Violence demand that the Latin-Slav dichotomy be unstated; the point comes across clearly as it is. To invoke ethnicity would be politically incorrect!

The exhibition is situated at a room with a corridor which is used as a continuation of stands about famous opera singers of the "union period" with a smooth transition into the presentation of another topic: World War II. This war is presented by a small number of ambiguous stands. A stand with a Romanian soldier is located near that of a Soviet soldier. Chronologically this is correct because before the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, Moldova (the Bessarabian part) was under the Romanian protectorate and began the war under the control of the Nazi Wehrmacht. However, chronology aside, the other part of the then Moldova never fought under the Romanian army and was part of the Soviet Red Army. In other words, what is today Moldova was part of the Axis while a large part of what is today Transnistria was then part of the territory under the control of the Red Army. So, here too, Symbolic Violence dictates that some (trivial?) facts be glossed over.

A stand with personal items of WW2 participants in the ranks of the Romanian Army proceeds with the same stand with Soviet soldiers' personal items (fig. 2). After this, we see two stands about collectivization and then a stand about the deportation of the Bessarabians to Siberia. The important construct – "Bessarabia" was created during the Russian Empire's "occupation" (Clark Charles Upson). Even though the national museum has to present some kind of "national history" it is difficult to apply it to the exhibition. We also notice one stand and several photos on the wall presenting the Holocaust: children (in one photo) and adults (in another) behind barbed wire and people prepared for collective shooting. When the guide was asked if she thinks that the question receives sufficient coverage she suggested a visit to the Museum of the Jews in Chisinau[5]. The exhibition concludes with a stand on the "armed conflict on the Dniester" with the Pridnestrovian Republic. As is noted below, the same event is marked as "war" at the Pridnestrovian museum. Another interesting aspect of the naming for the conflict is the name of the enemy, or rather, its anonymity. The Pridnestrovian Republic (Transnistria) is not recognized by Moldova, so

the name doesn't appear in the display. The apotheosis of symbolic violence: there was an armed conflict sufficiently important to warrant coverage at least equal to that accorded the Holocaust and yet the enemy is not named.

The last stand presents the events of gaining independence. At the centre we can see the declaration of independence. On both sides of the declaration are photos with president and people who are hoisting the national flag.

The next hall "reflects[s] spiritual culture and religious identity of the inhabitants of the republic". Here we see different artifacts, showing the Orthodox, Catholic and Jewish religions. The exposition is of a generalized nature with no exact data on the presented religions regarding the specifically Moldavian case. It tells us of religions and what kind of art they contain: icons, Bible, Torah, holy clothes, etc.

Other temporary exhibitions are presented on the first floor and one of them is the latest: «Soviet Moldova: Between Myths and the Gulag» (fig. 3). It consists of two rooms, presenting the issue of deportations, the chronological frame being 1920-1951. The plaques are made in Romanian; there is only one English plaque which is located near the entrance. Also near the entrance we see Stalin's study. Then come some Soviet attributes like a little monument of Lenin, Soviet posters and newspapers. There is also a stand representing the victims (fig.). On the wall there is a new map with the title "Gulag Archipelago", showing the territory of Russia, part of Ukraine, Kuban area, Caucasus and the Baltics.

The last temporary exhibition located on the first floor in English is presented as "The diorama «Operation Iasi-Chisinau« (20-29 August 1944)". While it is possible to translate this as the Jassy–Kishinev Operation, this has not been done. The diorama was created by two painters and opened in August 1990. This operation may be viewed either as an end to the Nazi occupation of Chisinau or as the beginning of the Soviet occupation. While the exhibition is vague on this point, Moldova is evidently divided on the issue. Moldova's President celebrated the 61st anniversary of the battle as the end of Nazi occupation, while the Chairman of the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Anti-Pact" organization Jacob Golovca explained, "With this action, the true patriots of Moldova want to make the authorities and population understand that August 24, 1944 is not the date of our liberation from the Nazi but the date of our occupation by Stalin's regime".[6]

In summary, it is clear that the authorities determining the nature of the presentations at the Chisinau National Historical Museum have demonstrated proficiency in the use of Symbolic Violence in order to convey the following messages:

1. The Russians, be they Tsarist or Communist, have been evil occupiers of Moldova and contributed nothing positive to its economic or cultural development.

2. Moldova is a Latin country whose language is essentially Romanian and Romania has assisted in all aspects of Moldovan development.

3. The Nazis were an ambiguous force in modern Moldovan history.

4. Jews suffered during World War II, but at whose hands and for what reason remains unclear.

Tiraspol Museum

If the Capitoline Wolf provides a Latin welcome to the Chisinau museum, the Tiraspol museum is in an evidently Soviet-style town both in terms of architecture and such symbols as Lenin's statue. The Museum itself is a one-storey building located on the central square of the capital (fig. 4). Currently, there are two exhibitions: »In memory of the fallen defenders of Transnistria« and »Tiraspol is 220 year old«. For research purposes we not only observed the museum, but also ordered an excursion. This was conducted by a young woman, perhaps of student age, who was very surprised to make an excursion for only one person, especially for another young student. It was officially forbidden to take any photos, but we were allowed to take a few, once the main controller had left the room.

The excursion was short, about twenty minutes, and it contained observation of three rooms. The first room presented "Tiraspol today": a stand with the Sheriff Football team, Sheriff Stadium, one stand with the produce of winery "Kvant", best-known for its cognac production (fig. 5). Nearby was located a stand with the output of another factory, specializing in the production of sockets and pans. Other stands presented "cultural life" (posters from a cultural evening, a newspaper with a photo of the Orthodox Church with the title "Orthodox Pridnestrovie") and presents and medals given to Pridnestrovie. Strangely, there appeared an award-winning shipbuilder on the stand about cultural life. It would seem that Transnistria, unlike Moldova, is unable to boast of internationally known opera stars but, like the old Soviet Union, is proud of its industrial capacity.

The second room presents the events of the years 1990-1992, when the region was in an armed conflict with the Moldavian army. The main accent of the exhibition is on the mood of opposition of that period among citizens and workers. We are shown the "durability, courage and determination of Pridnestrovian people". Alongside such photos one can see "factory workers". The core element uniting all workers is the figure of the ex-president of the republic Igor Smirnov. The hall is full of photos which purpose is to show his leadership qualities and the high ideals for which he was fighting. Typical titles of the photos: "Smirnov with women", "Smirnov in prison". This is a classical personality cult.

The last room is the most modern exhibition in terms of equipment. It presents the soldiers who died during the battles for independence of 1990-1992 (fig. 6). The walls are decorated with the photo prints of the soldiers and military life in general. The issue of 1990-1992 is the central nodal point for the construction of a (relatively unrecognized[7]) national identity. It is the kind of construction where national identity is based on the existence of the Other. Another important aspect of being recognized as a country is its level of national self-conscience. A common strategy of such presentations is adopted by presenting the number of battles and victims. The more battles, the more tragic the results, the greater the probability that the majority group will find sufficient sympathizers for gaining independence. Such a construction is usually based on ideological or ethical opposition and our case seems to be of the latter kind. The ideologies are not different: both the official Moldova and Pridnestrovie wanted to receive independence and to build the

country under a purportedly democratic ideology. The question of the language (together with emphasis on ethnicity) was an important reason for the beginning of the conflict (Rupesinghe, Kumar; Tishkov Valery A). The Moldavian constitution proclaims that the official language of Moldova is Moldavian with addition in parentheses: »identical to Romanian«. History as taught in Prindestrovian schools and also as presented at the museum shows that the territory "beyond the River Dniester" is essentially a Russian-speaking area and has been an area of interest for Russia for years: the emergence of a new living area for Slavs was made possible by Catherine II's decree and Count Suvorov's implementation (Cojocaru Natalia, Suhan Stela). After the establishment of the Soviet Union it was taken under the Soviet control. Tiraspol was the capital of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic until 1940. Then, after 1944 when Bessarabia became part of the Soviet Union, both sides of the Dniester were proclaimed as the Moldavian Socialist Republic (Waters, T.R). The myth[8] that no Transnistrian territory has ever been part of Greater Romania is still the main form of argumentation for legitimizing its independence (Cojocaru Natalia, Suhan Stela) and symbolic violence is evident here for the first time in one of the museum exhibitions.

"The Soviet Society in Miniature" seems to be an adequate term to describe the projected identity of Transnistria. It is so not only owing to the evident pride in industry displayed in the museum and the sports prowess implied by the Sherriff display, but also in the official public sphere (the central avenue of the city has the eternal flame, plaques with the lists of dead heroes and a statue of Lenin). Symbolic violence in the museum is necessary to cut the last tie with the Moldovans and that is, of course, the removal of Greater Romania from any place in the Pridnesrovian history. Whether or not symbolic violence is implied by the absence of any reference to the Holocaust in the museum's exhibitions is unclear. For visitors acquainted with the history of the region it is certainly notable. On the other hand, the museum's organizers might feel that, given the relatively small size of the museum and the lack of recognition of Transnistria as an independent nation state, there are more important issues at hand.

Additional material



Fig. 1. National Museum of Archaeology and History of Moldova, external view



Fig. 2. Romanian and Soviet uniform, WW2 period



Fig. 3. Exhibition «Soviet Moldova: Between Myths and the Gulag»



Fig. 4. Tiraspol museum, external view



Fig. 5. Exhibition «Tiraspol is 220 years old»



Fig. 6. War of 1990–1992

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Notes

1 "Chisinau" is the Romanian equivalent of "Kishinev", from the Russian "Кишинёв". The terms are used interchangeably in the paper.

2 "Transnistria" is the Romanian word for "beyond the Dniester River" whereas "Pridnesrovie" is a transliteration of the Russian "Приднестровье", meaning [a land] by the Dniester [River]. We use the two words interchangeably.

3 It is as well to be reminded at this point that Transnistria, situated just across the river, is inhabited largely by Slavs.

4 "Other" in terms of Schütz and Luckmann.

5 An analysis of this museum is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to note that in this museum, the Holocaust is presented in such a way that the reader might consider the Kishinev Pogrom, with its fewer than 50 murders, as a more important manifestation of anti-Semitism in Moldova.

6 http://www.mdn.md/en/index.php?view=viewarticle&articleid=1582.

7 Transnistria is currently recognized only by Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia. Transnistria is also one of the few countries which recognizes these three countries.

8 Those parts of Transnistria belonging to Bessarabia were part of Greater Romania from 1919 to 1940. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Romania.

Gun-Britt Kohler

SELF, OTHER SELF AND INTIMATE OTHER IN THE CONDITIONS OF AN OÙ-TOPOS: ADAM MICKIEWICZ AND JAN ČAČOT

1. Prologue: Fragment of a failed utopia

Adam Mickiewicz learns about the death of his once close friend from 'Lithuanian days' Jan Čačot in 1847 not until several years later, in 1853. Communicating the news about Čačot's passing away in letters to two of his Philomath friends of the times at Vilna University[1] Mickiewicz describes a recurring dream. He writes:

> About at the same time when he died I was dreaming about him time and again and time and again the same: that he had come to Paris, that for whatever obstacles I was not able to meet him. This tortured me in my dream, and I awoke distressed.[2]

At the time when he died, I was often dreaming about him and always the same dream; it always seemed to me as if he had come to the place where I had settled, and that he was searching for me: I myself, so it seemed to me, had forgotten how to find out about his whereabouts, and I was angry with myself for this negligence. The same dream recurred several times until I received the news about his death. And the last time he seemed to invite me to join him.[3]

Mickiewicz's meeting with the erstwhile friend Čačot is conceptualized as the trauma of a re-iterated *non-rencontre*, as a 'failed search' suspended in the mode of a dream. This failure's place of action – Paris – is most likely of essential significance: after all, Mickiewicz's literary oeuvre consistently projected his native space 'Lithuania' as an (increasingly utopian) vanishing point of reminiscent (re-) appropriation of a lost 'Self'; precondition to this aesthetic 'presentification' of the lost through the literary voice had been biographical extraterritoriality (cf. Uffelmann 2007). The dream described by Mickiewicz, however, takes the opposite way: the possibility of a 'real'

cure of biographical fractions is located in the extraterritorial space. In other words: the dream reveals precisely what had not been possible to capture by Mickiewicz's literary imagination, namely the lost 'Self's' presence in the biographical here and now, in Parisian emigration. This 'lost Self' is, as it seems, metonymically represented by Mickiewicz's Intimate Other of the Lithuanian past, Jan Čačot.

In this way Mickiewicz's dream might be considered as a quasi-biographical counterpart to aesthetic utopia. It drafts a fragment of an alternative biography of Čačot, who in reality was denied the road to emigration. This alternative biography – possible only within a dream – opposes the erstwhile friend's real path of life in the sense of a contrafactual alternative to the path of life of Mickiewicz. Čačot's path is the path of Mickiewicz's 'Other Self'.

De facto, Čačot's and Mickiewicz's encounter in or around Paris evoked in Mickiewicz's dream seems to make it possible to reconcile the two friends' trajectories – as well as their opposed poetics – similarly affected by discontinuity, loss and extraterritoriality and yet entirely contrary to each other, and seems to be able to neutralize them, so to say, in joining the Self with the Other Self. Even in the virtuality of the dream, however, Mickiewicz is denied this synthesis; the tension between Self and Other Self materialized in the opposite trajectories cannot be dissolved. Paris will only re-iterate the trauma of spatial discontinuity; it is not apt to serve as a utopian place.

The closing picture in the second quote – Čačot inviting Mickiewicz to join him ("zapraszając mię do siebie" – interpreted by Kastus' Cvirka (1996:377) as Mickiewicz's premonition of death – may thus be interpreted in a different way: The merging of Self and Other Self cannot succeed by transforming the 'Other' into the 'Self' (Čačot coming to Paris). Rather, it is the 'Self' that has to set out on the path in search of 'becoming Other'. Čačot's invitation thus might be read as an invitation to Mickiewicz to revise his own path – to the re-enactment of Čačot's trajectory via the return to the lost space of the region of Lithuania.

2. Trajectories and discontinuity of space

Recently postcolonial approaches have been prolifically applied in order to reconceptualize Polish literature, especially the literature of the 19th century – and above all Mickiewicz's oeuvre. These approaches proved productive, for example, in relation to the performative creation of identity that, as has been shown, in Mickiewicz's poetry is based on different strategies of anti-colonial ambiguity (mimicry, signifyin(g); cf. Uffelmann 2007; 2012). These strategies "retrospectively have proved as highly productive political and cultural long-term strategies in east-central European cultures" (Uffelmann 2012:296).

Regardless of the efficiency of postcolonial approaches its limitations have to be seen as well.[4] Uffelmann convincingly argues that Mickiewicz designs Lithuania (what is it, anyhow?) as Poland's 'Other Self' (das Eigene Fremde), and that in applying this strategy of "subversive occupancy of the Other's voice that is perceived as colonial" (Uffelmann

2012:297) he lays the foundation for the creation "of a cultural nation across classes that had never existed before" (ibid.:296). Strictly following this line of reasoning, Lithuania would be a twofold, Belarus even a threefold colonized area whose multiple 'subversive voices' would inevitably annul each other.

With respect to the area in question (historical Lithuania) the approach's potential lies probably in the idea that the mere (literary) conceptualization of a 'primarily colonized' space's (i.e. Poland's) 'Orient' (i.e. an 'Other Self') constitutes this internal colonized space, admits its existence that potentially will be capable of freeing itself from the subaltern position ascribed to it. Historical Lithuania's aporetic hybridity as a Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian (and partly Ukrainian) cultural space still syncretic at the beginning of the 19th century, however, remains elusive in this approach.

In the monograph *The world republic of letters* (2004) French literary critic Pascale Casanova uses the example of two authors that were born in the same year (1878) in different regions of Switzerland (Charles-Ferdinand Ramuz and Robert Walser) to ponder over the impact of an author's regional provenience (i.e. the literary resources imparted by it) versus a 'corresponding' structural relation to a superordinate literary center. Casanova writes regarding regional provenience and structural relation respectively relevant for the specific trajectory of an author:

> The sense of revelation is never greater than when one [...] compares writers who though they are separated by linguistic and cultural traditions and appear to be opposed to one another in every respect nevertheless have in common everything that a shared structural relationship to a central literary power implies. […] The imbalance in the literary resources of the regions from which they came explains the differences in the formal choices made by the two writers, who stood in the same relationship of fascination and rupture with their respective traditions. (Casanova 2004:177f.)

Casanova's considerations aim at strategies of assimilation and differentiation by means of which authors try to escape literary invisibility that they are affected by because of their origin (Casanova 2004:179); of special interest, however, is the interrelation between literary-biographical provenience, literary-structural reference system and literary-poetological orientation or corresponding aesthetic techniques provided by Casanova's model.

These theses can be linked with Pierre Bourdieu's concept of 'space of possibles' that allows to relate the individual author's successive actions in a field that will eventually form his 'trajectory' to the field, to the positions that are available either in reality or in virtuality.

> The relationship among positions and position-takings is by no means a relationship of mechanical determination. Between one and the other, in some fashion, the space of possibles interposes itself, that is to say, the space of position-takings actually realized, as it appears when it is perceived through the category of perception constitu-

> tive of a certain habitus, that is, as an oriented space, pregnant with position-takings identifiable as objective potentialities, things 'to be done', 'movements' to launch, reviews to create, adversaries to combat, established position-takings to be 'overtaken' and so forth. (Bourdieu 2011:234f)

Bourdieu conceptualizes the 'space of possibles' on two levels: first, on the general level of objectively existing possibilities: the "heritage accumulated by collective work" that every acting individual disposes of as "an ensemble of probable constraints which are the condition and the counterpart of a set of possible uses" (Bourdieu 2011:235); second, on the level of individually realizable options that result from "the categories of perception constitutive of a certain habitus" (ibid.). Thus, the 'space of possibles' results from the interaction of objective structure and individual disposition and history. It, therefore, is sum and intersection at the same time: not everything 'possible' in a given context is 'feasible' on the individual level.

An author's 'trajectory' can be understood as a series of successively occupied positions, chosen positions and changed positions in literary space. It describes the author's singular way of moving within the (or rather: within his own) 'space of possibles' (Bourdieu 2011:259) and is to a considerable degree governed by his dispositions (different sorts of capital, features such as readiness to take risks, etc.). Bourdieu distinguishes different 'classes' of intergenerational trajectories that may be ascending (direct or fractured), transversal (in a sense declining) or 'static' (nil displacement (ibid.:260)), and he firstly has in mind the path to the field of cultural production in relation to the social starting point.[5]

From the perspective of the theoretical outlines provided by Bourdieu and Casanova the problem of interdependency of space and literary trajectory seems to be crucial precisely in the case of Mickiewicz and Čačot: As a matter of fact, the biographical as well as literary trajectories of both authors have almost identical starting points (local and social background, age, education). Nevertheless, they tread on paths that could not be more different! Considering the authors starting points, the contrariness of the two canonized literary historical fates (Mickiewicz as Poland's national poet, as "a Polish National Icon" (Koropeckyj 2010), Čačot as lately acknowledged predecessor of Belarusian national awakening and literature (Świrko 1989)) seems to be almost incredible. As modes to overcome the discontinuity of the 'pre-national' space 'Lithuania' affected by colonization, internal colonization and self-colonization these trajectories are paradigmatic – not only regarding biography and poetics, but also regarding the – as postulated by Bourdieu – repercussive effect of authorial action on the cultural and literary space itself, on the 'possibles' of literary action that evolve from it.

3. Initial positions of two trajectories: Navahrudak and Vilna

The two authors' discrepant trajectories that originated from almost identical starting points and many common interests are already brought up by their common friend Ignacy Domejko:

> Both our pupils at the school of Navahrudak had known our Lithuanian people since youth, they loved its songs, were soaked with its soul and poetry, which obviously was supported by the fact that our little town Navahrudak did not much differ from the surrounding villages and suburbs. School life was rather rural. The friends went to the markets, to religious festivities; they were at farmer's weddings, thanksgiving celebrations and funerals. In those years, the modest cottages and folk songs ignited the first poetic fire in both of them. Adam soon rose up to the high sphere of his wonderful works. Jan, however, remained true to native poetry until death… (as cited in Čačot 1996:9)

Domejko's account is symptomatic with respect to the axiomatic connection of space, identity and poetological trajectory: on the one hand, the relation between town and village (thereby Mickiewicz's and Čačot's relation to the "Lithuanian people")[6] is reflected as one of intimacy (not identity, however); within a context of lack of an "integral conception of an intrinsic ethnos" (Zeraschkowitsch 2001:363) it reflects the relation between the Šljachta (as intellectual carrier of Polish culture; cf. Snyder 2003:3-4) and the people (as carrier of a "developed system of social-ethnical conceptions"; Zeraschkowitsch 2001:363) as a relation that stipulates the social and cultural difference through the mode of partaking intimacy – closeness through participation. On the other hand, Domejko conceptualizes the different trajectories that do not accidentally start from fascinated participation in the people's poetry and establishes initial identity between Mickiewicz and Čačot as two different movements in space: for Mickiewicz an ascending line, for Čačot a linear one: upturn versus fidelity, dynamics versus stability. This opposition in poetics and biography is perceivable when looking from the endpoint of the development Mickiewicz and Čačot went through; within the coordinate system that Domejko inscribes the two authors' trajectory into the lines assigned to them correspond to assessments in literary history established later on.

From a field-theoretical perspective, however, both trajectories start with an ascending line: both authors find their way from little provincial town Navahrudak to Vilna University, the "hub of intellectual life in the greater region of Lithuania-Belarus" (Zeraschkowitsch 2001:360) where in the first third of the 19th century 'revolutionary youth' forms up – mainly, but not exclusively under a 'Polish' *signum* (Schybeka 2001:121; cf. Zeraschkowitsch 2001:366).

The early works of both authors are written in the context of the Philomath association (Čačot 1998:328) and thus influenced (and maybe inspired) by the polemics between

classicism and romanticism. They reveal an eminent discrepancy in poetics that have to do with a different conceptualization of the relation between 'reason and feeling': In contrast to Mickiewicz whose "Have a heart and look into the heart" sends a clearly romantic message,[7] Čačot pleads for a reconciliation of both principles.[8] The reference to the 'people' ("lud") expressed in both competing positions is of high importance: Mickiewicz understands the ordinary folk as the carrier of a truth solely available to the 'heart', while Čačot sees the scholar's *ratio* founded precisely in the folk's wisdom.[9]

Moreover, a prominent difference appears on a functional level: besides a shared early-romantic system of genre (especially ballads) Čačot develops in his poetry a literary voice that mainly aims to create identity within the circle of young intellectuals. This communicative voice is complementary to the romantic subject developed and articulating itself in Mickiewicz's poetry.

The sporadic usage of the 'Belarusian dialect' (instead of the Polish language) in Čačot's poetry might be interpreted as an attempt to enhance the 'space of possibles' by a new crucial option of distinction (i.e. the choice of language – Polish or Belarusian – as a potential strategy in position-taking). Seen in the context of a poetry that is mainly designed to establish performative identity within the intellectual elite this conjunction of aesthetic poetry and (at that time and further) literary non-compliant Belarusian might be read as an "avant-garde strategy" (*sensu* Bourdieu) that does not simply serve the public but rather (at least to some extent) produces it – even produces it in a performative way, since performative genres (songs, small scenes) are concerned. Čačot in a way accomplishes a playful-subversive interspersion of the (subordinated) 'Intimate Other" (the rural-local) in the 'Self', namely in the Polish elitist discourse.

First biographical fractions – Mickiewicz is employed as teacher in Kowno, Čačot due to material constraints abandons his studies – steer the till then similar trajectories from 1819 onwards in different directions: Mickiewicz will compensate the dissatisfaction in Kowno by increased literary work; Čačot, forced to ensure the material situation will "ban poetry out of my study"[10]. While Mickiewicz accumulates literary capital Čačot's literary career 'stagnates'. He thus shifts his function: as an actor in the field he substitutes his function as a poet by that of an agent. As an agent he will support Mickiewicz's position by preparing his first two volumes of poetry. Mickiewicz's career as a poet has its starting point in the publishing of the first anthology of poetry 1822 in Vilna; Čačot's literary path, however, seems over before it even started.

4. Trajectories of exterritoriality

The discontinuity of Mickiewicz's and Čačot's native space receives a palpable existential dimension by the experience of imprisonment and banishment. From a field-theoretical perspective Mickiewicz's spatial trajectory is that of an 'ascent': His living in exile (Saint Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa) and the stations of his émigré life (especially Dresden, Lausanne and Paris) can be seen as stages of a breathtaking internationalization, as a con-

quest of an enormous literary space (cf. Snyder 2003:27,47).[11] The immense scope of his oeuvre immediately strikes with regard to the places of publication: Vilna (1822, 1823), Moscow (1826), Lwów (1827), Petersburg (1828, 1829), Poznań (1828), Warsaw (1831), Paris (1834, 1838 etc.).[12] Čačot's road, however, leads to Russian exile past the Urals where he firstly lives imprisoned, afterwards in Ufa until 1830 and then, until 1833, in Tver'. Only then in 1833 Čačot is allowed to resettle in Lepel' and afterwards in 1839 at home in the Navahrudak region. From 1837 until his death he issues four compilations of folk songs from different parts of Belarus; all of them are published in Vilna. In contrast to the case of Mickiewicz, Čačot's exile equals a 'suspension' of his literary trajectory: he can (partly due to the adverse circumstances of living in Siberia) hardly turn the alien space opening up before him into something literarily fruitful.

4.1. Loss of home – loss of enemy – poetic utopia: Mickiewicz

Mickiewicz's poetic trajectory starts with the conceptualization of the loss of home as a loss of poetry. On October 22nd 1824 he writes, "w kilka godzin po odebraniu rozkazu oddalenia się z Litwy" ("within some hours after having received the decree to leave Lithuania"), into Salomea Bécu's album:

Ryknęły burze, ciągłe leją słoty,
Trudno wynaleźć na ojczystej błoni,
Trudno wynaleźć, gdzie kwiat błyskał złoty,
Listka dla przyjaznej dłoni.
Co wynalazłem, niech tobie poświęcę,
Racz wdzięcznie przyjąć, chociażby z tej miary,
Że był ten listek w przyjacielskiej ręce,
Że to ostatnie są dary.[13]

Mickiewicz drafts the native ground as a *tabula rasa* drained because of storms and rain that does not offer any more harvest than a single leaf 'hardly' discovered by the lyrical subject. The metaphoric imagery of the (poem's) delivery from the hand of the lyrical subject to the hand of the adressée that is shown in the consonance of „błoń" (the vast native meadows) and „dłoń" (the friendly palm) stages the loss of poetic imagination accompanying the loss of home also as a loss of communication, exemplifying the rupture of connection between lyrical speaker and female adressée[14] in whose hands the last poem remains.

This 'total loss', nonetheless, discloses a new poetological line that will henceforth conduct Mickiewicz's work and reach completion in *Pan Tadeusz* (1832); the poetic re-acquisition of a 'Lost Self' is from now on carried out in a mode of lack and reminiscence. To Mickiewicz who is banned and exiled the factual absence of the native ground constitutes the *conditio sine qua non* of the presentification of Lithuania through aesthetical imagina-

tion – in the *Sonety Krymskie*, in *Konrad Wallenrod*, up to *Pan Tadeusz*: "Today thy beauty in all its splendor I see and describe, for I yearn for thee" („Dziś piękność twą w całej ozdobie / Widzę i opisuję, bo tęsknię po tobie") (cf. Uffelmann 2007).[15]

Connected to this line of aesthetic re-acquisition of 'Lost Self' is a second poetological line that Uffelmann (2012:297) describes as "subversively inhabiting the Other's voice perceived as colonial": The combination of mimicry and subversion exemplified in *Konrad Wallenrod* illustrates the loss of identity that accompanies subversion – the undermining appropriation of the 'Other'. This loss of identity runs through the greater part of Mickiewicz's work and is connected to motifs such as double identity and treason – in *Konrad Wallenrod*, *Dziady III* as well as *Pan Tadeusz*: the trauma of banishment and exile that leads the poet to the political and literary centers of Imperial Russia can be understood as the colonized subject's subversive appropriation of colonial space. The 'cost' is the loss of identity as a result of (permanent or multiple) mimicry and disguise and that in *Konrad Wallenrod* can be 'cured' only with Konrad's suicide; on the cultural level the loss stipulates Lithuania as Poland's 'Other Self'.

Besides the loss of genuine 'Self' in exile, emigration *de facto* abolishes the 'Enemy' (the Other). The *Dziady III* reflects the fate of erstwhile friends exiled to Siberia (that of Čačot as well) and, doing so, aesthetically focuses on Russia as cruel colonial power – the now 'Lost Enemy'. The identity-shift from Gustav to Konrad can be seen as Mickiewicz's attempt to master this exterritorial 'loss of enemy'. The absence of any real, 'tangible' Enemy equals a now 'absolute' Alienation,[16] because in exterritorial conditions it is impossible to inscribe it further into the space of colonization and colonized state of being.[17]

Both lines – re-acquisition and subversive appropriation – join in *Pan Tadeusz*. The traumata of the past – loss of home, appropriation of the 'Other' through alienation of one's[18] 'Self', loss of the 'Self' (which means his shifting to an 'Other Self') – are cured in a (utopian) past through a discourse of retrospection constituted by the experience of 'lack'. The doubled identity Jacek Soplica-Father Robak re-iterates Konrad Wallenrod's treason (Jacek Soplica), but sacrificially atones for it with a long-term disinterested service to the country (Father Robak).[19] Dying Robak-Soplica learns that his treason has been long since forgiven. His death has to coincide with the news about Lithuania joining war against Russia – Lithuania restituted:

> Wyrzekną uroczyście przyłączenie Litwy. […]
> Właśnie już noc schodziła i przez niebo mleczne,
> Różowe, biegą pierwsze promyki słoneczne.
> Wpadły przez szyby jako strzały brylantowe,
> Odbiły się na łożu o chorego głowę
> I ubrały mu złotem oblicze i skronie,
> Że błyszczał jako święty w ognistej koronie. (Mickiewicz *PT* 8208, 8216ff)[20]

Apotheotically 'canonized' Father Robak thus represents an active, restituted Lithuania cured of treason and fraternal strife; *Pan Tadeusz* leads to a poetic utopia witnessed and established in fictional retrospection by the narrator himself – an utopia of a socially sound, 're-territorialized' Self cured of self-alienation and discontinuity.

4.2. Loss of Home – Suspension – Change of paradigm: Čačot[21]

Čačot conceptualizes the loss of home as the separation from the beloved one, however in a largely de-personalized, downright typified mode whose imagery is borrowed from folklore. Shortly before leaving for Siberia he writes while still in prison a six-stanza dialogue based on a famous song about Kościuszko's departure to exile: two lovers promise each other to surmount their separation through permanent remembrance. The woman's 'unswerving dreaming' opposes the lover's certainty to live on solely "through" [remembering] his far-away lover. The absolute 'Otherness' of the country of forced exile equals here its fortuity:

Ты ў чужых краінах будзеш жыць.
Я цябе няспынна буду сніць. [...]
У якіх краінах мне б ні быць,
Юліяй адзінай буду жыць. (as cited in Čačot 1996:52)[22]

In Čačot's (few)[23] texts produced during his exile in the periphery of Russian Empire this topic of abstract and insurmountable distance remains vivid. To Mickiewicz absence and negativity turn positively into the ultimate ground of poetic voice that enables to retrieve 'lost Self' over and again. In Čačot's texts that are inspired by folklore distance remains insurmountable. Inaccessibly lost in an abstract distance the beloved women/homeland is an eternal 'Absent', from whom the lyrical subject is isolated through space: concrete aesthetic presentification of hers thus is denied.[24] As a symbol for the lyrical attempts to establish a connection with the distant homeland represented in the beloved serves the motif of the bird (birds of passage, dove, nightingale, cuckoo, hawk). The lyrical subject addresses questions to the (assumed) messenger from the beloved women/homeland. However, they remain unanswered:

Ptaszku! ptaszku! skąd przylatasz?
Czy nie z polskich ziem? […]
Ach, ulatasz, ach, nie mówisz
Któż mi wiedzieć da? ...
I ptaszynę odegnała
Dola moja zła![25]

In contrast to the poetry of Mickiewicz, Čačot's poetry of exile does not establish a discourse of retrospection or reminiscence, no sublimation of that lost through its pre-

sentification in the lyrical voice. His texts from exile rather evoke a communication failing over and over again, to some extent a 'phatic' speaking-into-the-void. This locates the lyrical subject torn from the native ground in a (fortuite, as we said) space of 'nothingness'. Other than Mickiewicz who is constantly referring to 'Lithuania' Čačot speaks, at least once, of the 'Polish countries';[26] nevertheless, his poems constantly evoke forms (songs and dialogues with only short and simple stanzas, refrains etc.) and a stock of motifs and images (winding a wreath, braiding the hair, etc.) from Belarusian-Lithuanian folk poetry. This adaptation of native poetry (in a way 'devoid of space') as of the once intimate 'Other Self' enables Čačot to retain the continuity of the 'Self' in a situation of utmost exterritoriality.[27]

After his return to native grounds Čačot begins with the collection and publication of regional folk poetry which is accompanied by a heightened (scientific) interest in the Belarusian language (called the Krivich dialect). Doing so he fulfills an idea uttered already in the early years in Vilna (in a critical statement on Mickiewicz's ballad "Kurhanek Maryli"): the higher classes should acquire and appropriate the "pleasant melodies of folk songs" (as cited in Čačot 1996:206). In the prefaces to his collections of folk songs Čačot bids for a respectful approach towards the peasants by representatives of the social and intellectual elite, for the adoption of their (the peasants') cultural traditions and for the acquisition and maintenance of the peasantry's language and "humiliated" literature:

> That poetry which we today call 'base', simple folk poetry, once all our ancestors had in common: masters, princes, in a word: all the people […]. We are indebted to our peasants because they have preserved the old customs and songs. For that we have to be thankful. In submitting to the influence of neighboring peoples and civilizations we are those who changed rather than they are. (As cited in Čačot 1996:212)

In addition to his scientific occupation with folk poetry as well as to its communication to the educated 'Polish' elite Čačot increasingly turns to the peasant as a potential addressee of lyrical production. Thus, he not only transfers the heritage of folk songs and language of the common people into the sphere of artistic literature but also introduces and explores new themes, forms and motifs and endeavors to create a 'new' public. Doing so, he eminently widens the 'space of possibles'. In the course of these endeavors Čačot's perception of his ‚native grounds' (called Polish lands, Lithuania, etc. before) changes more and more into differentiation, a line between the 'genuine' Self (that is meant across classes) and that which is only 'close' (or intimate) to the 'genuine' own Self, but 'Other' (such as the Polish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and even Russian; cf. Čačot 1996:212) becomes perceptible on a terminological level.[28]

Čačots works thus provide a "voice" to the one culture that, until now, had been subsumed by colonial and inner-colonial habits to Polish or 'Lithuanian' culture as their "Subaltern Other" (Spivak; cf. Uffelmann 2007). His trajectory leads to a change of paradigms in discourse, within which the combination of 'Self' with 'Other Self' and the separation of

'Self' from the 'Intimate Other' in the 'here and now' establish a literary discourse that defies all colonialisms (including the so far 'inner' one).[29]

Thus, Mickiewicz's and Čačot's trajectories – the former in an ascending line and highly dynamic, the latter in contrast transversal and retarding – run through different stages of aesthetically fathoming and construing the 'Self' and its experiences of difference. They both lead to a re-conceptualization of the native space 'Lithuania' as a space of 'Self'. However, they establish a diametrically opposed conception of time: Mickiewicz envisions in 'perennial retrospection' a utopia beyond all time, Čačot drafts a future set in present time. Therefore, Mickiewicz's vision fixes the space as 'Lost (integer, syncretic) Self' that gains a quasi-mythical dimension. Čačot's modeling of space as 'a Self to be gained' by differentiation has a pragmatic dimension.

5. Epilogue: Literary (Non-)Centers

From a field-theoretical point of view, in literature there is no territorial 'beyond' (out of). Despite the suggestive character of the field-metaphor, "literary fields" are not primarily spatially determined; their borderlines are rather due to the interplay of centripetal and centrifugal forces and are located there, where the "effects" that the field exercises on the actors moving within it decrease (Bourdieu/Wacqant 2006:131). Following this assumption, the potential that field theory offers in order to investigate and reassess competing, overlapping or hybrid literary spaces and discourses in literary history has not yet been fully exhausted and maybe is not even sufficiently known.

The interaction between the development of literary centers – as Vilna, Warsaw and Paris –, the trajectories of authors and the establishing of literary historical discourses is of utmost importance with respect to a localization of Mickiewicz and Čačot in (national) literary histories (cf. Chaustovič 2012). A sophisticated examination of the interaction has to follow elsewhere; however, the axiomatic of possible and impossible literary centers falls into line with the cited before dream of Mickiewicz about the non-encounter with Čačot in Paris.

In 1821 the latter had depicted Warsaw – the pretended cultural and literary 'center' – this way:

> Wszystko tu źle, wszystko się nie podoba, kiedy człowiek nie brzuchem, ale rozumem, na to, co się dzieje, patrzy I sądzi. Jeść, pić, stroić się, paradować, swawolić, nie wiem, czy I w Paryżu lepiej można. […] Słowem, wszystko sądzi się tu na to, aby, czy to skarb publiczny, czy to fortuna prywatna pod chciwe się szpony nawinie, szarpało, kręciło, kradło. Dosyć już postąpili Polacy w sztuce Rosyanów, a może się ze swoimi mistrzami zrównali. Wszystku przecież tu zajęte sobą i utopione w zbytkach, nie pamięta, co czyni. Zdaje się, że ci ludzie muszą być w malignie […] Lubią nauki dla ich okrzyczącego blasku I sławy, ale nie dla ich gruntu; nie lubią wcale pracy I dyszą za wygodą życia, zbytkiem, rozpustą, a zatem gnuśnością. Niech Pan Bog broni: był w Polsce

bezrząd, a teraz nierząd. Bodajby licho wzięło ten Paryż, że on całemu światu za model służy, a Warszawa ma zaszczyt być jego bardzo bliską kopią. (Czubek 1913:57; 59)[30]

Čačot who had already described Minsk as the 'provincial Other' of cultural city Vilna (cp. Czubek 1913:71) depicts Warsaw as a place of the decay of civil society that seizes the city not only from the side of colonial power Russia but rather from the 'model town' of bourgeois and aristocratic culture, Paris. Thus, for Čačot the literary or cultural center is by no means Warsaw: the intact 'Self' is Vilna – the town where the value system of the Vilna Philomath Society (enlightenment, scientific ethos, aesthetic quality, individual self-refinement, etc.; cf. Čačot 1996:8ff) and that of traditional rural peasant community (labor, responsibility, solidarity, etc.; cf. Kachanouski 2009:254ff.) come to a synthesis.

From this perspective the encounter with Čačot in Paris that Mickiewicz dreams about almost a quarter of a century later can be read as a paradoxical hope for 'cure' from cultural self-alienation which Čačot as the carrier of a persisting value system from their days in Vilna would be able to bring about. Čačot is no more perceptible as a representative of Mickiewicz's 'Other Self' (of an alternative trajectory, including banishment to Siberia, but excluding final emigration), but as the representative of Mickiewicz's irrecoverably lost original 'Self' from Vilna times,[31] and whose unattainability becomes manifest by the failed encounter in the dream.

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Notes

1 To Ignacy Domejko on July 26th 1853 and to Tomasz Zan on Sept. 2nd 1855.

2 „Około tych czasów jego zgonu ciągle mi śniło się o nim i zawsze toż samo: że przyjechał do Paryża i ja dla jakichsiś zatrudnień nie mogę z nim widzieć się; to mnie we śnie trapiło i budziłem się smutny" (Mickiewicz 1955:472).

3 „Właśnie około tego czasu, kiedy żyć przestał, często bardzo śniło mi się o nim, a zawsze w jeden sposób; zawsze zdawało mi się, że on przybył do miasteczka, gdzie teraz osiadłem, i że mnie szuka; ja znowu, zdawało się, że zapominałem wynaleźć jego mieszkanie i sam siebie obwiniałem o takie niedbalstwo. Sen ten powtórzył się kilkanaście razy, aż doszła wiadomość o jego zgonie i on mi ostatni raz pokauał się jak gdyby zapraszając mię do siebie" (Mickiewicz 1955:543).

4 Note for instance the laconic statement that in Mickiewicz's works Poland is "represented by Lithuania" ("durch Litauen vertreten"; Kirschbaum 2009:9).

5 However, Bourdieu admits that this classification need be completed with a categorization according to the 'point of arrival' in the field (ibid.:260).

6 Cvirka laconically identifies „Lithuanian" as „Belarusian" (cf. Čačot 1996:9).

7 „Martwe znasz prawdy, nieznane dla ludu, / Widzisz świat w proszku, w każdej gwiazd iskierce. / Nie znasz prawd żywych, nie obaczysz cudu! / Miej serce i patrzaj w serce!" (Mickiewicz 1822).

8 „Хай з розумам сэрца сябруе / Вы верце, калі што вам кажа вучоны – / збірае ж ён мудрасць людскую" (as cited in Čačot 1996:85).

9 The word „lud" used by both authors refers to the ordinary people in a social rather than national sense.

10 „Postanowiłem więc się pożegnać moję na ten rok lutnią, nie zatrudniać się pisaniem, czytać nawet mało nie ściągających się do prawa dzieł, samemu tylko poświęcić prawu" (Čačot to Mickiewicz, Sept 30th-Okt 2nd 1819; Czubek 1913:138).

11 That is, the fathoming of a public (so called Polish diaspora) and contacts to eminent authors (Pushkin, Ryleev, Goethe, G. Sand and others).

12 Listed here are only original publications. Translations have not been considered, as well as other transformations for instance into music.

13 "The storm was roaring, continuously pouring rain, / It's difficult to find on the native meadows, / Difficult to find, where the golden flower once glistened, / A small leaf for a friendly palm. // What I found I should bestow on you, / Rather take it gratefully, even if only for that reason / That this small leaf lay in a friendly hand, / That this will be the last gift."

14 The addressée is Słowacki's mother who ran a literary circle in Vilna.

15 Moreover, it joins the assessment and productive acquisition of 'alien' literary traditions such as the petrarcist discourse about love.

16 In this respect one might call it a twofold exterritorialization.

17 Correlate to this absolute 'Alienation' is the pilgrim.

18 Coming from Dziady III the road on the one hand leads towards the concept of Polish messianism that re-territorializes Poland within European culture; on the other hand, it leads back to the active struggle against Russia – i.e. to Istanbul where Mickiewicz dies.

19 „Uciekłem z kraju !… / Gdziem nie był! com nie cierpiał!… / […] Zły przykład dla ojczyzny, zachętę do zdrady / Trzeba było okupić dobrymi przykłady, / Krwią, poświęceniem się…" (Mickiewicz PT 8138ff.).

20 „… would solemnly decree the union of Lithuania. […] Night was just departing, and across the milky sky were streaming the first rosy beams of the sun: they entered through the window panes like diamond arrows, and fell upon the bed; they surrounded the head of the sick man, wreathing with gold his face and his temples, so that he shone like a saint in a fiery crown".

21 Unfortunately, an edition of original texts written by Čačot in the Polish language has not been available yet. Some theses introduced in this paper remain to be checked using the original and not yet published works and thus are to be regarded as preliminary.

22 The original text is in Polish. "You will live in foreign lands, / I will constantly dream about you. // In whatever lands I will have to be, / Through Julia alone I will live." The difference in conceptualizing the subject of action is interesting as well: „You will live…" vs. „it will be imposed to me to live…", which stresses the aspect of ‚forced' depart.

23 Čačot produces only few works in exile, cf. his following letter of the year 1825 where he writes about his difficulties in writing poetry: "I don't know where my furtile vain has vanished. Today I don't know anymore what I was thinking in earlier days, I just know that verses and rhymes were just floating like that. Now it is difficult to grasp a thought, and even more difficult, to transform it into rhymes." („Не ведаю, дзе дзелася мая плодная вена? Як я перад гэтым думаў, дык і сам цяпер не ведаю, толькі ведаю, што проста ліліся вершы і рыфмы. Цяпер цяжка мне ўлавіць якую думку, а яшчэ цяжэй аформіць яе рыфмамі"; as cited in Čačot 1996:307).

24 „Dzielą wielkie nas góry, / Dzielą lasy jak chmury, / Jak lasy, tak góry, grody / I rozliczne narody" („Ona daleko").

25 "Bird! Bird! From where do you come? / Don't you come from the Polish lands? […] / Ah, you fly away, ah, you don't tell me / who will give me news? … / And the bird was scared away / by my bad fate".

26 This does not automatically mean an identification with the Polish ethnos that Čačot distances himself from: "The Orenburg line meanwhile is dammed by the Polish (*this is what we are called and this is what we are considered to be*)"; („Цяпер аранбургская лінія, можна сказаць, запруджана палякамі (*так нас называюць тут і за такіх прымаюць*)"; letter from the year 1825, as cited in Čačot 1996:306, italics GK).

27 In contrast to Mickiewicz who acquires and successfully applies forms and techniques of foreign literary traditions. An exception in Čačot's work is, for example, a sonnet inserted in a letter to Petraškevič.

28 The borderline of 'Self' and 'Other Self' or 'Intimate Other' is also explored in the cycle *Historical songs*.

29 Other than Zeraschkowicz (2003:266-67) states for the times in Vilna, Čačot's activities, patterns of argumentation and intra-literary comments in his last years hint at an increasing identification with the 'Belarusians'; cp. for instance his comments on the slight inflicted to folk poetry, the increasing identification of 'peasant poetry' with 'folk poetry' etc. (as cited in Čačot 1996:228).

30 "Everything in this place is bad, everything is unfit for someone who does not use his stomach but his mind looking at the things that go on. To eat, to drink, to dress, to stroll, to rag, I don't know whether it is easier to do in Paris. […] In a word, everybody here longs for it, be it a social achievement, be it in order to lay their greedy hands on some personal benefit, everybody is grubbing money, wheeling and dealing, stealing. In this discipline the Polish close in on the Russians and are probably even equals to their mentors. They are all only concerned with themselves, everybody floats in exuberance, nobody thinks about his own doings. It seems as if these people were suffering some kind of fever. […] They love the sciences because of their brilliance and glory, not for their own sake. Work they do not love at all, they aspire advantages for life, luxury, luxury and that means idleness. God beware: Poland was in disorder, and now chaos rules. To the devil with Paris that serves the whole world as a model. And Warsaw has the honor to be its true copy." Mickiewicz as well critically comments on the Warsaw literary scene – already when still in Moscow – and rebukes the epigonous backward character of Warsaw literary criticism. But doing so, he takes European (and French) literature as a model.

31 What Mickiewicz could not know is, that he later on served as a vehicle for the 'transfer' of Vilna into the Polish literary discourse as well. From this results, *inter alia*, the Belarusian 'Vilna-nostalgy', perceptible until now.

Alla Stremovskaya

BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: MULTIPLE IDENTITY OF THE LITHUANIAN MINORITY IN KALININGRAD REGION OF RUSSIA

Abstract

This article reviews the history and current status of the Lithuanian minority in Kaliningrad Region of Russia, based on the findings of the survey and biographical interviews conducted by Lomonosov Moscow State University within the framework of ENRI-East Project in the region. It states that Kaliningrad Region is a former territory of Lithuania Minor. However, Lithuanians living in Kaliningrad Region are not the native population of this region but descendants of the Lithuanians who relocated from Lithuania after the Second World War. Primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist theories of ethnicity are also reviewed and the efficiency of a poliparadigmatic approach is stressed. The research findings of this paper are also linked to the theory of S. Huntington who showed that there are different sources of identity. In continuation of G.Soldatova's concept of the composition of identity structure the author shows the existence of cognitive and affective components of the Lithuanians' identity. Secondary analysis of the sociological studies of the general population of Kaliningrad Region showing prevalence of regional identities over national identities and multiplicity of the sources of identity is also provided. The paper argues that few Lithuanians with strong ethnic identity remain in Kaliningrad Region. Instead, most respondents have a multiple identity and feel close to Russia, Kaliningrad Region and Lithuania. They also do not identify themselves with Europe. The study observes a trend towards gradual loss of the Lithuanian language, despite existing learning opportunities, and outlines active processes of assimilation and interpenetration of cultures. It also discusses faith

and religious practice, access to media in Lithuanian and Russian, traditions and holiday celebrations, ethnic and national pride as well as political participation as indicators of identity development. The author concludes that identity formation of Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Region is a circumstantial phenomenon which has its own history and is determined by a number of socio-cultural factors.

Keywords: Lithuanians, Russians, ethnic identity, national identity, regional identity, European identity, Russia, Kaliningrad Region, Lithuania, European Union

Introduction

At the beginning of the XXIst century evidence was found for 'interrelations between two contradictory trends: universalism and particularism, strengthening of cultural unification and enlargement of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity'(Andreychuck, Gavrilina, 2003: 155). These processes have various forms in 'different cultural, social, economic, political and ideological conditions' (Andreychuck, Gavrilina, 2003: 155). In Kaliningrad Region these processes have become significant not only due to the global changes but also as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, communist ideology, 'destruction of the 'iron curtain" and 'liberalization in the spheres of economy and finances' (Andreychuck, Gavrilina, 2003: 156). All these factors resulted in search for cultural, subcultural, social, national, ethnic and other identities (Andreychuck, Gavrilina, 2003: 156). 'Processes of regionalization and identity construction as a form of sovereignty spread throughout the whole territory of the former Soviet Union' (Malakhov, 2001: 95-98; Andreychuck, Gavrilina, 2003: 156). As a result, formation of local, regional, and national identities and their ratio became extremely topical (Andreychuck, Gavrilina, 2003: 156).

One of the ethnic groups inhabiting Kaliningrad Region is a Lithuanian minority. This paper addresses processes of development and formation of ethnic, regional, national and European identities of the Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Region based on the sociological study of this group.

The paper starts with the overview of the historical background, statistics and current status of the Lithuanian community. A theoretical overview of the concepts and views on four types of identity is presented in the next part of the paper. These include multiple identities, their relation with transculturation and review of the studies of the citizens of Kaliningrad Region of Russia is given in the next part of the paper. The third section is a description of the main research issues and methodology. The following section provides detailed analysis of ethnic, national, regional and European identity formation of the Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Region of Russia. It also shows that most respondents have multiple identities which is a clear sign of an active assimilation process. The next section provides an in-depth analysis of assimilation of the Lithuanians and interpenetration of Lithuanian and Russian cultures in Kaliningrad Region. The final part of the paper provides general conclusions.

Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Region of Russia: Historical Overview and Current Status

Kaliningrad Region is the most Western region of the Russian Federation with a territory encompassing 15,100 km2. The region was formed in 1946 on 1/3 part of the territory of former Prussia which became part of the Soviet Union under the decision of the Potsdam conference. In 1871 Prussia formed a German empire. In 1878 it was divided into Eastern and Western regions. Eastern Prussia became an independent province with its capital in Königsberg. In 1945, July 17 - August 2, a conference was held in Potsdam, suburb of Berlin. During this conference a decision was made to sign away part of the territory of Eastern Prussia to Poland and another part (Königsberg and surrounding areas) to the Soviet Union. The German exclave was annexed and in September 1945 to April 1946 the Königsberg military district was located on this territory. In April, Königsberg Region was formed as part of the Russian Federation. On June 4, 1946 Königsberg Region was renamed into Kaliningrad Region (Klemeshev, 2004).

Kaliningrad Region is one of the few regions of Russia which was formed by the migrants from other parts of the USSR, namely from 20 regions and autonomies of RSFSR and Belorussia (Berendeyev, 2007: 127). This migration started in 1945. The German population which constituted 1,17 million people in 1939 either evacuated with the German armies or under the decision of Potsdam conference was made to leave the territory for Germany in 1948-1951(Klemeshev, 2004). The composition of the population significantly changed at the end of 1980s to the beginning of 1990s due to mass migration of the population from the former republics of the USSR (Berendeyev, 2007: 127).

Kaliningrad Region is a former territory of Lithuania Minor. However, Lithuanians living in Kaliningrad Region are not the native population of this region but descendants of the Lithuanians who relocated from Lithuania after Second World War.

Locality of Kaliningrad Region is also unique. For Russia it is an exclave with territory outside the borders of the country, but it is also a Russian enclave which has land borders only with the countries of the European Union (Berendeyev, 2007: 127). Kaliningrad Region borders Poland in the south, Baltic Sea in the west, and Lithuania in the north and east (Klemeshev et al., 2004).

According to the 2010 All-Russian Census, 31,377 Lithuanians lived in Russia in 2010. The preliminary findings of the 2010 All-Russian Census showed that the population of Kaliningrad Region was 941,474 people. The majority of these were Russian people (772,534 (86.4%)), Ukrainians were in the 2nd place (32,771 (3.7%)), Belarusians were in the 3rd place (32,497 (3.6%)) and Lithuanians were in the 4th place (9,769 (1.1%)). Other ethnic groups inhabiting Kaliningrad Region included Armenians (9,226 (1%)), Germans (7,349 (0.8%)), Tatars (4,534 (0.5%)) and other groups (Preliminary Findings of 2010 All-Russian Census). Therefore, almost a third of all the Lithuanians living in Russia reside in Kaliningrad Region.

Nowadays, Kaliningrad Region houses 78 registered national and cultural public autonomies and organizations. In total, there are 99 national and cultural communi-

ties which unite 18 ethnic groups. Federal law on national and cultural autonomies stipulated principles of their activities, including the mechanism of their cooperation with the public authorities (National and Cultural Autonomies of Kaliningrad Region). Alvidas Antano Muliuolis is the head of the Regional National and Cultural Autonomy of the Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Region as well as the Federal National and Cultural Autonomy of the Lithuanians in Russia. In 2002 18 cultural and ethnic communities were united into the Regional National and Cultural Autonomy of the Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Region (National and Cultural Autonomies of Kaliningrad Region). Administration of the Regional National and Cultural Autonomy of the Lithuanians of Kaliningrad Region of Russia cooperates with the Administration and Duma of Kaliningrad Region (Chayauskas). As Alvidas Muliuolis states, 'they don't only arrange holidays of the Lithuanian culture, children's songs, celebrate Catholic Christmas, but also pay much attention to learning mother tongue'. There are not only language courses for adults and Sunday schools at the churches for the children but also schools where some subjects are taught in Lithuanian (National and Cultural Autonomies of Kaliningrad Region). Every year regional festivals of Lithuanian children's songs and poetry are held in the region. In August, 2011, a Russian-Lithuanian Ethno-Cultural Festival was held in the museum of a well-known Lithuanian poet of the 18th century Kristijonas Donelaitis. Participants of the festival were Russian and Lithuanian folklore groups from Kaliningrad and other towns of the region and Lithuania (Official Website of the Government of Kaliningrad Region). A memorial museum of Kristijonas Donelaitis is a cultural centre where people can learn much about the works of this famous Lithuanian poet and learn more about Lithuanian culture. There are more than 10 Lithuanian ensembles in Kaliningrad Region (Chayauskas). From 2001 to 2007 the regional newspaper 'Gintaras' ('Amber') of the Lithuanian autonomy was published in Russian and Lithuanian six months a year. However, in 2007 its publication was ceased. Concomitantly, Lithuanians residing in Kaliningrad Region have an opportunity to receive newspapers from Lithuania.

Theoretical Overview

For analyzing identity formation process of the Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Region of Russia it is necessary to start with the overview of the main concepts of ethnic, national, regional, European and multiple identities.

The literature proposes primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist visions of ethnicity. For example, from the perspective of primordialist theories, 'ethnicity is fixed at birth. Ethnic identification is based on deep, 'primordial' attachments to a group or culture' (Wan and Vanderwerf, 2009) while advocates of instrumental theories claim that 'ethnicity, based on people's 'historical' and 'symbolic' memory, is something created and used and exploited by leaders and others in the pragmatic pursuit of their own interests' (Wan and Vanderwerf, 2009). However, constructivist theorists argue that 'ethnic identity is not

something people 'possess' but something they 'construct' in specific social and historical contexts to further their own interests'(Wan and Vanderwerf, 2009).

Nowadays in Russia all the mentioned above theories are discussed and the efficiency of poliparadigmatic approaches is stressed (Drobizheva, 2003). In the post-Soviet Russia ethnicity is interpreted as a changeable, circumstantial phenomenon which has its own history and is used in different contexts (ethnic identity, ethnocentrism, etc.) (Drobizheva, 2003).

According to Drobizheva, a leading Russian scholar in the field of ethnic sociology, **ethnic identity** can be defined as:

> consciousness of the community of people based on the views on their ethnicity, language, culture, history, territory, interests, emotional attitude towards them and under certain conditions readiness to act for the sake of these views (Drobizheva, 2010: 49).

Wallman argues that

> ethnic identity is not a fixed, inflexible commitment, steadfast, and once-for-all. Neither is it necessarily singular: multiple ethnic identities may coexist. Perhaps, most importantly, ethnic identity is only one of many identity options (Wallman (1983) cited in Hutnik, 1991).

From the perspective of V.Malakhov, the place of ethnic identity in the individual's structure can change. 'In some circumstances it might not be significant and expressed at all whilst in other cases it might be in the forefront or even dominate' (New Philosophical Encyclopedia, 2001: 79). V.Malakhov states that 'processional and situational natures of ethnic identity are evident' (New Philosophical Encyclopedia, 2001: 79). Self-identification of the individuals depends on a number of conditions. According to Malakhov, the activisation of ethnic identity is caused by a certain situation (New Philosophical Encyclopedia, 2001: 79).

The concept of **national identity** has been addressed by a number of scholars (Bruner, 2005; Bond, 2006; Mansbach, Rhodes, 2007; Hardwick, Mansfield, 2009; Hardwick, Marcus, Isaak, 2010, etc.). R. Bond argues that

> the three most prominent markers of national identity are residence, birth and ancestry (Bond, 2006, p.611).

In our case, identification with Russia was explored as a form of national identity.

On the contrary, **regional identity** can be defined as

> individual's self-reference to a specific limited by territory community – region which can be characterized by territorial, historical, cultural, political, legal and linguistic entity (Denisova, Kotel'nikov, 2012).

Three levels of regional identity can be observed in the modern Russia: macro-regional, sub-regional and local (Denisova, Kotel'nikov, 2012).

The issue of regional identity formation becomes topical in relation to new views on the region, regionalization. Presently, the region is perceived as a socio-cultural reality in a global world. This issue has become very significant for the regions which appeared to be in the unique geopolitical conditions after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Berendeyev, 2007: 127). One such region is Kaliningrad Region of Russia which is unique by its origin and location (Berendeyev, 2007: 127).

Recently, there has been much discussion on the concept of the ***European identity*** (See, for example, Jacobs & Maier (1998), Amin (2004), Walters and Haar (2005), Grundy & Jamieson (2007), Magistro (2007), Bee (2008), Sassatelli (2010), and many other scholars). Identity in the European context can be defined as

> a supranational identity, a sense of European togetherness (Magistro, 2007: 53).

According to Shore and Black (1994), the European Union

> has frequently tried to convey images of unity to stimulate the construction of a collective identity among Europeans (Magistro, 2007).

There is also a different opinion of Walters and Haar (2005) who state that:

> the Union primarily calls on concepts and values of public concern (i.e. security, justice, democracy) to foster the construction of a collective identity (Magistro, 2007).

Literature fails to provide findings of the studies of the Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Region of Russia. So, we can assume that such studies have not been conducted before. However, we can find reviews of the sociological studies of the general population of Kaliningrad Region (Berendeyev, 2006; Alimpiyeva, 2003; Andreychuck, Gavrilina, 2003). For example, A.Alimpiyeva states that Russians and Kaliningrad citizens are the main 'we'-groups of the inhabitants of the region. However, newly migrants do not identify themselves so much with the citizens of Kaliningrad Region. Concomitantly, duration of an individual's stay in the region positively influences his/her identification with the regional population (Alimpiyeva, 2003: 176). Identification with Europe is on the lowest places in the hierarchy of other social and territorial identities. One of the possible explanations might be the research findings indicating value differences between Europeans and citi-

zens of Kaliningrad Region and Russia (Alimpiyeva, 2003: 176; Kaliningrad Society in the European Context, 2002). N.Andreychuck and L.Gavrilina state that the general conclusion of all studies they have conducted was a significant prevalence of the regional identity of the citizens of Kaliningrad Region over general Russian identity (Andreychuck, Gavrilina, 2003). M.Berendeyev suggests that the respondent refers himself/herself with quite conventional groups of citizens of Kaliningrad Region, Russians and Europeans as they construct their own social images of these groups and more often has only one ground for referring themselves to some social entity. Thus, the category of Europeans might include geographic Europeans, economic Europeans, national Europeans and political Europeans (Berendeyev, 2006: 78). A similar situation is for other categories. One person might identify themselves with the citizens of Kaliningrad Region based on larger or smaller financial income in comparison with other regions and another one might consider themselves a citizen of Kaliningrad Region based on the territorial affiliation (Berendeyev, 2006: 78). According to Berendeyev, by defining themselves as a citizen of Kaliningrad Region, Russian or European a respondent can't construct their social image by referring themselves to one or several of these groups. Berendeyev suggests that citizens of Kaliningrad Region, Russians or Europeans are not social groups by themselves but categories which generalize a number of people and describe them from the perspective of closeness of behavioral or style attitudes formed on the basis of different sources of identity (social, cultural, political, ascriptive, etc.) (Berendeyev, 2006: 79). Research of the young population of Kaliningrad Region showed that each respondent had his/her own image of a European, Russian and citizen of Kaliningrad Region (Berendeyev, 2007: 132). Each respondent's self-discovery in one of these categories originated from personal social, political, historical and other experience (Berendeyev, 2007: 132). The findings of the above mentioned studies of the population of Kaliningrad Region showed multiple and different sources of identity formation. According to S.Huntington, there are six primary sources of identity: ascriptive, cultural, territorial, political, economic and social (Huntington (2004)). As will be shown in the paper, the study of Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Region also revealed various sources of identities of the respondents.

A number of scholars suggest that most if not all people have ***multiple identities***. For example, N.Hutnik states that

> most people have multiple group affiliations which may be emphasized or minimized according to the situation (Hutnik, 1991: 20).

From the perspective of K. Razlogov, Director of the Russian Institute of Cultural Studies, each person has multiple identities. Some of them are conceived, others are not but all of them are in complicated contradictory relations with each other (Razlogov, 2011: 116). In fact many scholars conclude that identity has two layers: perceived outward and deep non-perceived layers (Andreychuck, Gavrilina, 2003: 161). For example, according to the Russian ethno-psychologist G.Soldatova, two main components are usually identi-

fied in the structure of ethnic identity: cognitive (knowledge, awareness of specifics of the personal group and self-identification as a member of this group based on differentiating ethic indicators) and affective (sense of affiliation to the group, assessment of its qualities, etc.) (Stephanenko, 1999: 48). It seems to me that not only ethnic identity but also other identities contain cognitive and affective components.

K.Razlogov also states that nowadays ratio between the centre of modern cultural development and global mass culture as well as its peripheries, i.e. all types of subcultures, substantially change. From the traditional perspective which is still reflected in the UNESCO documents there is a national culture and minorities, usually ethnic minorities, of a particular state as subcultures. However, according to Razlogov, these borders of the minority or cultural community have been erased as a minority and a majority are actually equal subcultures of a global mass culture (Razlogov, 2011: 119). It suggests to me that maybe it would also be more appropriate to consider Lithuanians of Kaliningrad Region of Russia not simply as an ethnic minority but also a subculture of a global culture.

According to M.Tlostanova, specifics of the multiple, changeable and dynamic identity of a contemporary individual is related to the process of transculturation (Tlostanova, 2010: 152). The majority of scholars define transculturation as a process of change of the material culture, customs and faiths of a socio-cultural group when this group is in long-term close contact with another group which has its own cultural traditions (Tlostanova, 2010: 142). Some elements of transculturation process can also be observed among Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Region of Russia today.

Research Questions and Methodology

The arguments of this paper are based on a survey of the Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Region of Russia conducted by the team of Lomonosov Moscow State University in November – December 2009, as part of the international FP7-SSH ENRI-East collaborative research project *Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities: Nations between States along the New Eastern Borders of the European Union*[*]. The Project Coordinator was Dr. Alexander Chvorostov and the Russian Team Leader was Professor Sergei Tumanov. Four hundred and four people were selected with the use of snowball sampling for the quantitative survey. In addition to the traditional survey biographical interviews were carried out with 12 people in July-August, 2010. The biographical method can be used for greater in-depth understanding of identity formation and change at different life stages and in various socio-cultural conditions (Semenova, 1998; Roberts (2000); Chamberlayne, Bornat, Wengraf (2000)). In the sociological research of developing and changing

[*] ENRI-East is an international research project dedicated to the study of socio-ethnic identities in East European countries. This is a study with equally strong theoretical, methodological and empirical components and deploying methods and approaches of a variety of social sciences. Primary funding for the research project ENRI-East is provided by the European Commission through an FP7-SSH grant #217227.

identities, affected by significant historic and social changes experienced by people in the Eastern European countries in the last two decades, biographical methods can be used to understand individual accounts of life experience within the contemporary cultural and structural settings.

For the participation in the biographical interviews 3 groups of people representing different generations were randomly selected: the younger generation who were born and brought up in the post-communist era (16-22); the middle generation who experienced the transition and are old enough to be the parents of the younger generation (35-50) and the older generation who would have experienced World War II (65+).

Research questions focused on interaction of ethnic, national, regional and European identity for Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Region. Part of research was aimed at identifying the main channels for identity formation and clarifying the role of locality in ethnic/regional/national/European self-identification.

Detailed analysis of the identity formation process requires research on the whole complex of identities. Our study allowed the investigation of four types of identity: ethnic (connection with one's ethnic group), national (connection with Russia), regional (connection with Kaliningrad region) and European (connection with Europe). The findings of the survey and biographical interviews are used in the paper for justification of the existence of multiple identities of the Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Region of Russia.

Mix of Ethnic, National, Regional, and European Identities among Lithuanians in Russia.

During the survey respondents were asked to select the statement that best describes their ethnic status. The findings showed that almost a half of the respondents (48.3%) considered themselves Lithuanians living in Russia. More than third of the respondents (37.7 %) considered themselves Russians of Lithuanian origin. It should be noted that only 7.4 % of the respondents considered themselves simply Lithuanians and 4.2% - Russian people.

Formation of ***ethnic identity*** of the Lithuanians was measured by such indicators as knowledge of Lithuanian, pride of belonging to a Lithuanian group, aspiration to preserve Lithuanian traditions and customs, preference of Lithuanian music and songs, cooking traditional dishes, observing Catholic religion, interest in Lithuania media, feeling close to Lithuania as the centre of Lithuanian traditions and other indicators.

When respondents were suggested to determine the degree of importance of a number of factors for being truly Lithuanian, the ability to speak Lithuanian was considered to be the most important factor. Being born in Lithuania was in the second place and Lithuanian citizenship was in the third place. The least level of importance was having lived in Lithuania for most of one's life.

Pride of belonging to a particular ethnic group is one of the indicators of ethnic identity. The highest percentage of respondents of the quantitative study stated that they were proud of being Lithuanian (very proud – 22.9 % and rather proud – 45.1 %). Concomi-

tantly, almost a fifth of all the respondents were not proud of their ethnicity. More than a tenth of the respondents did not know how to answer this question (11.1 %) indicating indistinct ethnic identity. Roughly the same number of people were proud of being citizens of Russia (very proud – 12.6% and rather proud – 54.9 %), and those who were proud of being citizens of Kaliningrad Region (very proud – 14.5% and rather proud – 52.5 %) (See Fig. 1).




Figure 1. Ethnic, National, Regional and European Pride for Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Region (%%).

It appeared that not all participants of the biographical interviews were proud of being Lithuanian:

> R.: No, I haven't got such pride. Lithuanian and Lithuanian. The only thing is that I know the language …. [Lt (RU)_08].
>
> To be honest, I don't know what to say. To be proud or not to be proud. Maybe, partly I am proud of having this diligence [Lt (RU)_03].

Preference of ethnic music and songs is another indicator of ethnic identity. Some respondents stated that they liked Lithuanian music and songs. There were respondents who could even sing Lithuanian songs themselves. Quantitative study findings showed that almost an equal number of the respondents liked Russian (18.7%) and Lithuanian (16.7%) music. Nearly half of the respondents did not have musical preferences (47.8 %) and 16.5 % prefer music of other countries.

Feeling of closeness to Lithuania, a centre of Lithuanian culture, can also be an indicator of ethnic identity. Only a fifth of the survey respondents felt very close to Lithuania. A little bit more than half of the respondents felt rather close to Lithuania. Concomitantly, almost a quarter of the respondents did not feel any connection to Lithuania at all.

Cooking traditional dishes is another indicator of ethnic identity. Almost all participants of the biographical interviews eat and cook Lithuanian traditional dish – tseppelins (potato-meat dumplings) and Lithuanian cold borsch (beetroot soup) which is a sign of preserving ethnic identity:

> If you are in Lithuania make sure to order tseppelins. They are so yummy that you can't turn yourself away [Lt (RU)_01].

One family cooked herring with vegetables and yeasty balls with poppy seed and poppy seed milk based on the Lithuanian recipes for Christmas celebration.

However, the findings of the qualitative study showed that a minority of the participants of the biographical interviews had strongly expressed ethnic identities. Among them were women representing different age groups. There appeared to be no men with the strongly expressed Lithuanian identity. Among the indicators of that was making children keep Lithuanian traditions and culture, willingness to speak Lithuanian and missing Lithuania:

> If I had had more freedom I would have never left Lithuania [Lt (RU)_02].

The grandchildren are desired to keep Lithuanian traditions and culture. The respondent's soul and heart are in Lithuania:

> I feel that I am here but live there. As we say, head is here but legs are there [Lt (RU)_02]..

The grandfather of another respondent came to Russia being very old after having lived most part of his life in Lithuania and didn't feel settled due to lack of readiness for accepting another culture. Thus, he went back to Lithuania. When their family gathered for celebration of a holiday and the respondent spoke Russian to her Russian-speaking husband, Lithuanian by origin, elderly people got angry:

> Why do we have to speak Russian here just because there is one Russian person among us? [Lt (RU)_02].

It seems to me that such willingness to speak Lithuanian is a clear sign of striving to preserve Lithuanian identity.

On the whole, the majority of the participants of the biographical interviews considering themselves Lithuanian represented middle-age generation (44 and 46 years old):

> I am proud because my father was Lithuanian [Lt (RU)_04].
> I am Lithuanian living in Kaliningrad Region [Lt (RU)_08].

Willingness to marry a person of the same ethnicity and raise children in the same ethnic traditions is also a clear sign of trying to preserve ethnic identity. One participant of the biographical interview expressed a desire to have a Lithuanian wife and see future children remembering their ethnicity. That's why this person has a Lithuanian girlfriend.

There was also a respondent who considered himself Lithuanian who was born in Russia mainly due to a sense of affiliation,

in the soul probably Russian [Lt (RU)_12].

Part of the study was also dedicated to research on ***national identity*** of the Lithuanians living in Kaliningrad Region and their connections with Russia. The majority of the participants of the biographical interviews identifying themselves with Russians were representatives of the younger generation. Among the sources of national identity formation were territorial factors (living in Russia the whole life), having roots in Russia, mixed marriage, participation in Russia's political institution, inability to speak Lithuanian or just a sense of affiliation:

> I was born here and lived all my life... I don't know Lithuanian…. That's why I think that I am Russian" [Lt (RU)_09]...
>
> Probably, Russian of a Lithuanian origin.…. After all, I grew up in Russia [Lt (RU)_11].
>
> I feel myself more Russian … in the soul, I am probably more Russian [Lt (RU)_12].
>
> Most of the respondents have already substantively settled in Russia:
>
> … the roots have already grown in so deeply.…[Lt (RU)_01].
>
> … I was born and have lived here in Russia….[Lt (RU)_09].

One woman said that she felt she had more freedom in Russia and had never left the Russian town where she lives.

Another respondent said that she was more for Russians than Lithuanians and explained that by the influence of living in Russia:

> I am more for Russians. I don't know why. The impact of Russia, all that, of course [Lt (RU)_09].

Some respondents did not want to move to Lithuania. The reasons for that included the age of the respondents, having a Russian spouse, lack of housing in Lithuania, well-established children's lives in Russia and Russian citizenship:

I don't want to go anywhere now. Here are my children, they have all settled here, live their lives, and where will I go, who needs me there alone, who? No one [Lt (RU)_03]..

I.: Maybe, children wanted to move to Lithuania? R.: No. I.: But they are Lithuanian? R.: … they are married to Russians, where will they go?! [Lt (RU)_03]..

…in Lithuania… Who will I go to and what will I have there? Nothing. The house … has been fallen to pieces there. I have sold it ….[Lt (RU)_01].

One respondent thought that they had become completely Russian because

"how can it be different? We live here, … the whole age has been lived here" [Lt (RU)_03].

"…Lithuanian surname but in fact I grew up here. … What kind of Lithuanian can I be?" [Lt(RU)_11].

I don't consider myself Lithuanian, I merely was born and grew up among Russian people. I lived in correspondence with their traditions... [Lt (RU)_11]..

I.: In your family, your father is Lithuanian, have any Lithuanian traditions been observed? R.: Hard to say, probably, not [Lt (RU)_04].

Participation in Russia's political institutions is another indicator of national Russian identity. More than half of the respondents of the quantitative study and almost all participants of the biographical interviews took part in the elections to the State Duma (Parliamentary elections). This illustrates the manifestation of an active civic position.

Regional identity (connection with Kaliningrad Region) was also addressed in our study. The overwhelming majority of the participants of the quantitative survey felt closeness to Kaliningrad Region. Roughly the same number of the respondents referred themselves to Russia and Lithuania and those numbers were relatively high (See Figure 2).

Some participants of the biographical interviews also identified themselves not simply with Russia but with Kaliningrad Region mainly due to the territorial factor (Kaliningrad Region is place of their residence), having been born and feeling settled in this region or feeling more comfortable in this region than in Lithuania:

I.: Are you Lithuanian of Russian origin or Lithuanian of Kaliningrad Region? R.: Probably, Kaliningrad Region because I am more in Russia [Lt (RU)_04].

I am Lithuanian who lives in Kaliningrad Region [Lt (RU)_08].

Identification and closeness to Kaliningrad Region were determined by presence of all the respondent's friends in the region. Feeling of comfort of living in Kaliningrad Region was also related to habit. Another respondent was satisfied when he moved to Kaliningrad Region because he received financial support including an apartment after he ar-

rived. Willingness to stay in Kaliningrad Region was also explained by the potential job prospects.

Nevertheless, there was also a respondent for whom Kaliningrad was still alien as he had lived there for only 4 years.

Of lower significance than closeness to Kaliningrad Region, Russia and Lithuania was the percentage of respondents of the quantitative study connecting themselves with Europe (See Fig.1). Contrary to this the percentage of people who did not feel close to Europe was quite high (See Fig. 2).




Figure 2. Closeness to Russia, Lithuania, Kaliningrad Region and Europe (%%)

Recently, there has been much discussion on the concept of the ***European identity.*** Our survey showed that the number of people who were proud of being European appeared to be significantly lower (very proud – 7.1 % and rather proud – 24.1%) than those one who were proud of being Lithuanian, citizen of Kaliningrad Region and Russia. More people in this group were not proud of being European (not proud at all – 9.6 % and rather not proud – 24.9%). A higher percentage of people in this group did not know how to answer the question on the degree of their pride of being European (31.5 %). A similar picture was obtained whilst analyzing the responses to the question on the degree of the respondents' pride of living in Eastern Europe. The largest number of the respondents were not proud of that (not proud at all – 7.4 % and rather not proud– 27.6 %). Only 4.4 % of people were very proud and 25.6 % were rather proud. Again a very high percentage of the respondents (32 %) were unsure how to answer this question. This shows that European identity is much less important for the majority of respondents than ethnic, regional and national identities.

Similarly, a minority of the Lithuanian respondents, participants of the biographical interviews, considered themselves European and identified themselves with Europe. One of the main explanations was related to the territorial factor, place of their residence:

> I think that everyone who lives in Kaliningrad Region is European [Lt (RU)_07].
>
> European … because I can also say that I was born and have lived in Europe …. At least, near Europe. I think Kaliningrad Region is Europe …..[Lt (RU)_09].
>
> We live in Europe [Lt (RU)_10].

The majority of the respondents did not self-identify themselves with Europe:

> I.: … if we talk about Europe in general do you feel yourself European? R.: No, no, I haven't got such a feeling" [Lt (RU)_08].

It appeared during the quantitative survey that 40 % of the respondents had a neutral image of the European Union, very positive – 6.4 %, fairly positive – 34 %, fairly negative – 3.4% and very negative – 1 %. Quite high percentage of the respondents (14.5 %) didn't know how to answer that question.

Views on *Lithuania's entry into the European Union* are also indirect indicators of the respondents' attitudes towards EU and degree of identification with EU. That's why this issue was also raised during the study. The advocates and opponents of Lithuania becoming a member of EU were revealed. Some respondents observed positive outcomes of Lithuania's joining into the EU and saw it as beneficial to the citizens of Lithuania. Among the positive consequences they named, first of all, the change of the passport-visa regime and introduction of the Shengen Visa. It was also stated that it had become cleaner concomitant with more order in Lithuania. Nevertheless, one of the respondents said that due to the small size of the country Lithuania would always be under certain pressure.

Negative views on Lithuania's entry into the European Union were also expressed. The "minuses" included dependence of Lithuania on the decision of the EU, deterioration of Russian-Lithuanian relations, eagerness of the EU to reach its own aims, poor job prospects and unprofitability of the transition to another currency. On the one hand, many political issues have been solved but, on the other hand, people's lives have become harder.

There was also a concern that due to Lithuania's entry into the European Union Lithuanian identity would gradually be lost and that this process has already started. Such view shows more importance for some respondents of preserving Lithuanian identity than development of a European identity:

> I am afraid, Lithuanians … will dissolve in this European Union. They will become a unified European nation. And it will be very hard to find these roots … I think it has already started in seven-mile steps (quantum steps)… [Lt (RU)_10].
>
> Always when people get united, something unites them, and then they become a unified homogeneous mass. It is the same in the European Union, it has united … 27 states ... and they will all become something uniform and maybe their territory where they are located will remind them that they belong to such group [Lt (RU)_10].

On the whole, the findings of the survey and biographical interviews showed that the majority of the respondents have multiple identities and for some of them it was even hard to identify themselves:

> I.:…Are you Russian of the Lithuanian origin? R.: That is probably most likely …I.: and maybe you are Lithuanian living in Russia? R.: Maybe so. It is hard to say now. … I don't know now who I am and what I am. I am now not this or that [Lt (RU)_03]...

Two participants of the biographical interview couldn't say who they considered themselves to be which probably shows that they don't have strongly expressed identities and is an indicator of having multiple identities. One of them was a respondent with double citizenship who stays in Kaliningrad Region but greatly misses Lithuania. In spite of the fact that his wife and friends are all Russian, he is trying not to forget Lithuanian roots and speaks Lithuanian whenever it is possible. He also sings Lithuanian and Russian songs. Another one was an elderly person who knows Russian and Lithuanian. His wife was Russian. However, this respondent did not want to go to Lithuania, because none of his relatives remained there.

Assimilation and Interpenetration of Cultures

As prevalence of multiple identities is a clear sign of active assimilation processes, it would be reasonable to provide a detailed analysis of the assimilation process of the Lithuanian minority in Kaliningrad Region of Russia.

From the sociological perspective, assimilation is

> the process by which minorities gradually adopt patterns of the dominant culture (Macionis, 2007. P. 373).

The process of assimilation

> can involve changing modes of dress, values, religion, language, and friends (Macionis, 2007. P. 373).

The findings of the biographical interviews demonstrate active assimilation processes and interpenetration of cultures. Among indicators of these processes are gradual loss of Lithuanian language among Lithuanians living in Kaliningrad Region, celebration of Russian holidays, prevalence of Russian friends, no interest in the events taking place in Lithuania, converting to Orthodox religion, Russian cooking traditional Lithuanian dish. Closeness to Russians was also observed during the study which was shown by high degree of ethnic tolerance and trust, even readiness to accept Lithuanians as family members by marriage which is the highest degree of closeness to another group (in our case - Russians) in Bogardus scale (Bogardus, 1925).

So, inability to speak Lithuanian is one of the signs of assimilation. Language is a very important factor in preservation of ethnic identity (Baranova, 2010). Furthermore,

J.Fishman argues that till ethnic groups exist, languages will be a symbol of these groups and also a tool of creation of the images of the group, antagonism and cooperation with other communities (Fishman, 1989, p.48). The findings of the survey and biographical interviews show that many Lithuanians lost this connection with their ethnic identity. According to 2002 All-Russian Census, almost all Lithuanians living in Kaliningrad Region could speak Russian (13,864 out of 13,937 people) (Ethnic Composition and Language Competence, Citizenship, 2004).

It also seems paradoxical that whilst there are opportunities for learning Lithuanian in Kaliningrad Region a gradual loss of Lithuanian language is observed. Presently, there are 23 Lithuanian language centres, including 3 Sunday schools and 16 elective courses in this region. Along with that, "in four … secondary schools one or several subjects are taught in Lithuanian» (Chayauskas). Despite that, many respondents speak badly or don't speak their mother tongue at all:

> I can't understand many words now. … I get lost in the words now, I don't understand them now. …It's easier for me to speak Russian than Lithuanian [Lt (RU)_03].
>
> R.: What language can I speak if the grandchildren speak Russian and daughter-in-laws do …? R.: It's the same with the children [Lt (RU)_03].
>
> R.: … (Russian – author's note) stepfather … was an outrageous opponent of us speaking Lithuanian … as he didn't like the fact that he couldn't understand what we were talking about. That is why we started to speak more and more seldom. So it was gradually forgotten [Lt (RU)_05].
>
> I don't know Lithuanian at all because I was born and have lived all my life in Russia. I have been to Lithuania several times [Lt (RU)_09].

This trend to gradual loss of Lithuanian is quite a negative factor which would not foster ethnic identity formation of Lithuanians living in Kaliningrad Region of Russia.

Some interviews also showed that a gradual loss of Lithuanian is observed among the Lithuanians living in Kaliningrad Region along with the change of generations:

> Nephews don't speak Lithuanian. The daughter doesn't speak Lithuanian at all … . And I am trying none the less somehow not to forget Lithuanian [Lt (RU)_01]..
>
> Mother speaks fluent Lithuanian. … I understand everything what she has said … but I can't say myself…Children don't understand Lithuanian. …Children speak only Russian [Lt (RU)_04].

It should be noted that not all Lithuanians want their children to learn Lithuanian. For example, one young woman said that when she studied in a Russian-language school in the second grade the school wanted to introduce Lithuanian as an elective course for

Lithuanian children. The respondent's mother agreed but the parents of other Lithuanian children were against that idea. As a result, the Lithuanian class was not opened.

However, more than half of the quantitative survey respondents stated that an opportunity for their children to get education in Lithuanian and study Lithuanian history and culture at school was important for them.

Amongst the quantitative study respondents only 3.9 % said that they most often speak Lithuanian at home, more than third of the respondents (36 %) speak Russian and Lithuanian at home and the majority (59.9%) speak Russian. These findings justify active assimilation processes.

Most or all the friends of the majority of respondents are Russian:

> I.:What friends do you have more, Russian? R.: Probably, Russian. Yes, only Russian [Lt (RU)_11]..

However, Russian friends of the latter respondent are also mainly immigrants from other places, e.g., Kazakhstan. They are meant to be Russian "by blood".

Some participants of the study are from the families where Lithuanian and Russian holidays have been celebrated, e.g., both Catholic and Orthodox Christmas which is a typical example of interpenetration of cultures.

Media is another factor for ethnic identity. An opportunity to read newspapers and magazines in Lithuanian as well as speak Lithuanian in everyday life is significant for more than half of the respondents. Interest in media is also an indirect indicator of closeness to a particular group. The quantitative study findings showed that a minority of respondents read Lithuanian newspapers. This number is around 8 times smaller than the number of those who read Russian newspapers regularly or often. More than 2/3 of all respondents watch Russian TV programs regularly or often. However, less than a third of all respondents watch Lithuanian TV programs regularly or often. Forty-three percent of respondents listen to Russian radio programs regularly or often. However, the number of those who listen to Lithuanian radio programs regularly or often is almost 3 times smaller (13.3%). The number of the respondents who view Russian websites regularly/often is almost four times higher than the number of the representatives of the similar category group selecting Lithuanian websites (See Table.1). Moreover, the number of those who never read Russian websites whilst having such an opportunity is significantly lower than the number of the respondents who never read Lithuanian websites though such an opportunity is available. More than half of all the respondents did not have an opportunity to view Russian and Lithuanian websites. One biographical interview respondent found it simpler to use and communicate via Russian-language websites and uses Lithuanian websites only for watching Lithuanian channel programs. It seems to me that more interest in Russian media than Lithuanian one shows closeness to Russians and is an evidence of assimilation process.

Table 1. Usage of Newspapers, Radio, TV and Internet (%%)

	Regularly/ Often	**Rarely**	**Never but I have such an opportunity**	**Never but I do not have such an opportunity**	**Don't know**	**Refusal**
Russian newspapers	42.9	32.3	5.9	16.7	2.0	0.2
Lithuanian newspapers	5.4	25.9	13.1	52.0	3.0	0.7
Russian TV programs	69.2	8.9	4.2	17.7	-	-
Lithuanian TV programs	27.3	25.9	8.9	36.0	1.5	0.5
Russian radio programs	43.3	16.5	8.6	30.5	1.0	-
Lithuanian radio programs	13.3	23.6	12.3	48.0	2.5	0.2
Russian websites	23.9	8.6	10.3	53.2	0.5	3.4
Lithuanian websites	6.2	10.8	20.0	54.9	1.0	7.1

In my opinion, interest in Lithuania, the centre of Lithuanian culture, is also an indicator of strong ethnic identity. However, some participants of the biographical interviews were not interested in the events taking place in Lithuania which might be interpreted as a result of assimilation process:

> R.:They have separated from Russia and let them live. I.: i.e., it has been cut off and that's it, yes? R.: Yes" [Lt (RU)_06].

Many Lithuanians, especially the young people, tended to move abroad. First and foremost it's related to the impossibility to find a job in Lithuania:

> …When I came I was thinking, that, for example, … How many are there ? 3 million in Lithuania. So, you … ask: 'Where is this person, where is that person?'. Everyone is somewhere in England, somewhere in Norway and everyone is moving [Lt (RU)_12].

The process of assimilation and interpenetration of cultures is also reflected in the choice of faith and religion of a person. Almost a fifth (18 %) of all quantitative survey respondents were Orthodox.

Not all participants of the biographical interviews are committed to a Catholic denomination which is a clear indication of assimilation process:

> "Why should I be Catholic if I live in Russia?" [Lt (RU)_09]..

Converting to another religion is also an indicator of interpenetration of cultures. Several respondents were Christened in the Orthodox Church. One respondent had the burial service for her mother in the Orthodox Church. There were respondents who celebrated Orthodox Christmas and colored eggs for Orthodox Easter because there are Russian members in their families.

The Russian wife of one respondent learned to cook traditional Lithuanian dish – cold borsch (beetroot soup). This is another example of mutual enrichment of cultures.

High degree of ethnic tolerance is an indicator of closeness to another culture. The majority of the respondents did not mention any confrontations between Lithuanians and Russians. They get on well and supported each other, even help to look after the children. Many respondents did not see the difference in the way Lithuanians and Russians treated them. They failed to notice any disagreement or harassment from the Russians' side related to their (Lithuanians) ethnicity.

However, several respondents noticed some opposition between Russians and Lithuanians:

> "… I went to my mother to NNN (Lithuania) …"Oh, Russins (scornful word for Russians) have come". What is it? And I … got very irritated by this, … I came … home, … to my Motherland" [Lt (RU)_03].

Existence of the Russians' contempt towards Lithuanians was also discussed. In one case the respondent was discriminated at school because he was called Lithuanian all the time.

Overall, only 3.9 % of the respondents have felt discriminated on the grounds of their ethnic origin in the past 12 months. The overwhelming majority (95.3 %) didn't feel any discrimination.

Respondents have felt discriminated or harassed on the grounds of their ethnicity in the past 12 months: at school/university (37.5% of the respondents who have felt such discrimination), in the street (31.3%), at work (25%), on public transportation (18.8%), by neighbors (12.5%), by the police (6.3%), at church (6.3%), when looking for a job (6.3%) and in restaurants/bars/pubs or discos (6.3%).

It should also be noted that according to the quantitative survey findings, the degree of trust of the Lithuanians to Russian and Lithuanian people living in Russia and Lithuania is roughly the same and does not differ much from the level of trusting people in general. The level of the respondents' trust to Lithuanians living in Russia is a little bit lower than the level of trust to the Lithuanians living in Russia and Russian people but this difference is insignificant. Amongst the respondents who have answered the question on the degree of trust to the Lithuanians living in Lithuania the highest percentage of the respondents did not know how to answer this question (15.5%). On the whole, it can be concluded that ethnic belonging does not influence much the trust level of the respondents (See Figure 3).




Figure 3. Could you tell me how much do you trust …? (%%)

The majority of the questioned Lithuanians were ready to have Russians in any role, even as a member of family. This shows a very high level of Lithuanians' trust to the Russian people and readiness to accept their lifestyle.

Conclusions

This analysis illustrates that few Lithuanians with strongly expressed ethnic identity remained in Kaliningrad Region. Indicators of strong Lithuanian identity included willingness to speak Lithuanian, making children keep Lithuanian traditions and culture, reading Lithuanian newspapers, surfing Lithuanian websites, watching Lithuanian TV and radio programs, missing Lithuania and other indicators.

Many of the respondents felt close to Kaliningrad Region and Russia. Among the reasons for staying in Russia were named the age of the respondents, having a Russian spouse, lack of housing in Lithuania, well-established children's lives in Russia and Russian citizenship. Closeness to Kalininigrad Region was determined by such factors as residence, feeling settled and more comfortable, presence of all friends, financial support and potential job prospects. The majority of the questioned Lithuanians did not identify themselves with Europe. Pride of being European was significantly lower than pride of being Lithuanian, citizen of Kaliningrad Region or Russia. On the contrary, more people were not proud of being European. Generally, attachment to Europe appeared to be much less important for the majority of respondents than ethnic, regional and national identities. Identification with Europe was mainly explained by the territorial factor. There was also expressed a concern that due to Lithuania's entry into the European Union the Lithuanian identity would gradually be lost and this process has already started.

On the whole, respondents with multiple identities prevailed in the study. Such multiple identities have much been formed under certain circumstances, mainly living outside Lithuania – in Kaliningrad Region of Russia and much communication with Russian people. The study also showed that respondents have various sources of identities: ascriptive, social, ancestral, territorial, cultural, economical, political and other sources. We can also conclude that respondents have cognitive and affective components of their identities. In

many cases they are aware of typical characteristics of the groups and also have a sense of affiliation to them. Sometimes they just feel that they are affiliated to some groups but can't clearly explain why they identify themselves with certain groups. The strengths or weaknesses of identities were determined much by the socio-cultural conditions.

Active processes of assimilation, mutual enrichment and interpenetration of cultures were also observed. These processes have been formed under the impact of such socio-cultural factors as a gradual loss of Lithuanian language despite opportunities to learn it, speaking Russian, prevalence of Russian friends, mixed marriages, converting to Orthodox religion, celebration of Russian holidays, reading Russian newspapers and websites, listening to Russian radio programs, watching Russian TV channels, participation in Russian political institutions, losing interest in the events taking place in Lithuania and other factors. Research findings also showed closeness of Lithuanians to a Russian culture. High degree of ethnic tolerance and Lithuanians' trust to Russians were revealed as well. Lithuanians get on very well with Russian people and many of them have Russian spouses. There are not many examples of insignificant confrontations between these two nations.

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The Center for Advanced Studies and Education (CASE) on Social Transformation in the Western Eurasian Border Region was established in 2003 with funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York to American Councils for International Education. CASE is a vital research center which works to strengthen research on social transformation in the region, improve the system of higher education in social science and the humanities, and form effective networks of university academics and scholars. CASE is affiliated with the European Humanities University (EHU), but is open to participation by eligible scholars throughout the three-nation region Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine.

The CASE mission is to promote and foster research on the transformational processes of the western Eurasia border region in the post-Soviet period. The key elements of the CASE project mission are the following:

– Develop professional networks within the western Eurasia border region;
– Raise the level of professionalism in social science scholarship;
– Promote interdisciplinary collaboration;
– Strengthen vital partnerships with affinity organizations;
– Disseminate and popularize the results of the study of social transformation processes in the region.

CASE intends to achieve these objectives through a range of complementary activities:

– Providing collective and individual research grants;
– Organizing international seminars and conferences;
– Publishing the scholarly journal *Perekrestki*;
– Publishing the volume of the English language digest;
– Publishing the scholarly monographs;
– Maintaining the library of resources for scholars
– Introducing intensive short-term seminars on social sciences methods.

The main topics proposed by CASE include, but are not limited to:

– The border region in between the East Partnership and post-imperial Russia;
– Energy issues in international relations in the West Eurasia Region;
– The world economic crisis as a political force on the regional scale;
– Old and new minorities and the practices of official identity; and
– Language, identity, and education in an era of transformation.